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ABSTRACT 
     Although the US government has been using remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), more 
commonly referred to as drones, to conduct military strikes against terrorists and 
insurgents since at least 2001, only around 2011 did media outlets and polling 
organizations began assessing the attitudes of Americans towards the use of drones as a 
weapon of war. Initially, public support for drone strikes was robust with nearly 70 
percent of Americans expressing approval. As the discussion of drone strikes intensified 
however, public support declined over 10 percentage points. 
     Only a handful of studies have examined public opinion and drone strikes, and all 
have focused exclusively on explaining support. This study seeks to fill this gap in the 
literature and explain opposition to drone strikes. The primary argument put forth in this 
dissertation is that people’s beliefs determine their opinions, and their morality 
determines their beliefs. Although independent opinion formation is often considered a 
cognitive process, I argue that, at least in the case of drone strikes, the opinion formation 
process is largely an affective one.  
     By examining media coverage and elite discourse surrounding drone strikes, I isolate 
three narratives which I believe communicate certain messages to the public regarding 
drone strikes. I argue that the messages produced by elite discourse and disseminated by 
the media to the public are only influential on opinion formation once they have been 
converted to beliefs. I further argue that conversion of message to belief is largely 
dependent on individual moral attitudes.  
     To test my arguments, I conduct a survey-experiment using subjects recruited from 
Arizona State University’s School of Politics and Global Studies student subject pool. 
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My research findings lead to two key conclusions. First, opposition to drone strikes is 
largely the product of the belief(s) that drone strikes are not necessary for protecting the 
United States from terrorist attack, and that drone strikes kill more civilians than do 
strikes from conventional aircraft. Second, whether an individual expresses support or 
opposition to drone strikes, moral attitudes are a relatively good predictor of both beliefs 
and disposition.   
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PREFACE 
    The first US “drone strike” occurred on October 7th, 2001. In an attempt to kill the 
Taliban’s top Commander, CIA agents launched a single hellfire missile from an MQ-1 
Predator aircraft. What made this attack unique, is that the pilot pulling the trigger for 
this strike was over 7000 miles away from the intended target. At the time it occurred, 
this strike garnered very little media attention. However, as the US government’s use of 
remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) expanded, people outside the military began to pay 
attention. 
     Although drone strikes steadily increased during the Bush Administration, the use of 
RPA as weapons of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency peaked during the Obama 
administration. Not coincidentally, so did public scrutiny. Beginning around 2009, media 
coverage of drone strikes dramatically increased. Human rights groups “investigated” the 
human costs of drone strikes, anti-war advocates protested outside military bases, and 
legal scholars debated the legality of “targeted assassinations.” Government officials and 
policy-makers pushed back, touting drone strikes as both highly effective and vitally 
necessary in the “War on Terror.” 
     In 2011, newspapers and polling organizations began to query the American public 
regarding its attitudes toward drone strikes, and by 2015 there were dozens of books 
dedicated to the issue of drone strikes. Drone strikes were featured in movies and 
television (often in less than flattering terms), and by 2013 it seemed that most 
Americans were fully aware that the US government was using “pilotless” aircraft to 
target and kill terrorists overseas. Aware, although not necessarily informed.                
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     My interest in drone strikes, stems from my own personal experience. After returning 
from a deployment to Afghanistan in 2009, I was looking to make a change in my 
military career. When the opportunity to become an MQ-1 drone operator presented 
itself, I took it. In 2010 I began training at Randolph, Air Force Base in San Antonio 
Texas. As an enlisted man, I would not be piloting drones. In the Air Force only officers 
are pilots. Instead I would be a Sensor Operator, which meant I would be in control of the 
drone’s cameras and lasers, and when the time came, I would be the one guiding the 
missile onto the target.  
     I completed my training in January of 2011, and 4 weeks later was inserted into my 
unit’s duty rotation. Like most military operations, drone operations are 24/7, 365 days a 
year. There are times, of course, when operations are suspended due to weather or 
maintenance, but operating a military drone is not a Monday through Friday, nine-to-five 
job. You work weekends, you work holidays, and on your days off, you are subject to 
recall. Being a Sensor Operator was not the hardest job I have ever had in the military, 
nor was it the easiest. It was however, the most satisfying.  
     As drone operators we scanned routes for improvised explosive devices (IED), we 
provided security over-watch as troops slept, and we took insurgents and terrorists off the 
battlefield. In short, we made sure that as many US troops as possible would come home 
to their families, alive and in one-piece. We did not, as many have claimed, carelessly 
and callously kill innocent women and children. And for most of my time as a Sensor 
Operator, I believed the American people knew this. 
     In 2013, while sitting in the flight operations center waiting to be relieved off shift, 
one of our newest Sensor Operators entered and asked, “Master Sergeant Davis, why are 
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there people outside the front gate protesting us?” Before I could answer him, one of our 
officers, a former B-2 pilot, chimed in. “Ain’t you heard son? We kill babies.” The pilot 
was obviously being sardonic, but despite the coarseness of his answer, he was, I now 
believe, correct. The reason those protesters were outside our gate that morning and, I 
argue, the main reason that most people who oppose drones do so, is the belief that drone 
strikes cause an inordinate number of civilian casualties.  
     Understanding that the protesters outside our gate were motivated by this belief was 
relatively easy, as several of them were holding signs that read “Drones Kill Children!” 
Realizing that drone strikes were not as popular among the general public as the media 
had led me to believe, took a bit more effort. During my time as a drone operator, I read 
the newspaper, I watched movies and I absorbed a lot of the negative things that were 
being said and written about drones. Mostly I just shook my head and dismissed it as 
typical “anti-war” rhetoric. Again, I believed most Americans knew better. 
     In 2014 I entered the PhD program at Arizona State University. While engaged in my 
studies I continued to work as a Sensor Operator part-time. Two or three times a month, 
usually on weekends, I would drive 110 miles to my duty station and, weather permitting, 
fly four to six combat support sorties. Because of my close involvement with this issue, 
my initial impulse was to steer clear of directing my dissertation efforts towards drone 
strikes. But as I began to read actual research papers dealing with the various arguments 
surrounding drone strikes, I realized that due to my close involvement with the issue, I 
was in a position to contribute certain insights and perspectives that seemed to missing in 
the literature. 
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     Now, this is not to imply that I am an expert on all things related to drones and drone 
warfare. I am not. My knowledge and experience is circumscribed within the boundaries 
of MQ-1and (to a lesser degree) MQ-9 operations within certain recognized zones of 
armed conflict. So while I almost certainly know more about the particulars of drone 
operations than most of the people who have written on the subject, my knowledge and 
ability to definitively answer specific questions about drone strikes has well-defined 
limits. I worked for the United States Air Force, not the CIA. When it comes to 
controversial issues like “double-taps”—the practice of targeting rescuers with a second 
missile strike—I cannot definitively say that this does not happen. I can only say that I 
have never observed it, and the rules of engagement I operated under for over seven years 
would not have allowed it.  
     Of course even if I were an expert on all things drone-related, I wouldn’t be able to 
reveal anything here that isn’t readily accessible on the internet. The usefulness of my 
understanding of how drones operate, of what capabilities they possess and don’t possess, 
extends only as far as GOOGLE. If it can’t be supported with a web-search, it won’t be 
used here. What my experience does allow for however, is the ability to spot 
arguments/perspectives that don’t quite make sense. To me, the idea that public support 
for drone strikes is “high”, doesn’t quite make sense. Neither does the fact those 
interested in explaining public support for drone strikes seem to be totally uninterested in 
explaining opposition.  
     The reason most commonly put forth to explain public support for drone strikes, is 
that they effectively target terrorists while keeping US military personnel out of harm’s 
way. Intuitively, this makes perfect sense. A large majority of Americans support the 
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military, and an even larger majority is concerned about protecting the United States from 
terrorist attack. So if a majority of Americans support drone strikes that makes sense 
right? Apparently for a lot of academics interested in this issue, it doesn’t.    
     Granted, while the body of research examining public opinion and drone strikes is 
relatively small, it oddly focuses almost exclusively on explaining public support for 
drone strikes. Even odder is the general tone of this research, which seems to view 
explaining support for drone strikes as akin to finding a cure for a disease, or at the very 
least discovering the answer to some inscrutable puzzle or riddle. Despite an almost 
obsessive fixation on explaining support for drone strikes, there appears to be a complete 
lack of curiosity about what explains opposition.  
     For me this presented a puzzle. In my experience drones save lives, both military and 
civilian. Beyond just removing the need for a pilot and aircrew, drones permit near-
continuous military over-watch of forces on the ground, and can provide near-immediate 
air support if those troops come in contact with enemy forces. Route surveillance using 
drones allows for the detection of improvised explosive devices. Once spotted the 
location of these devices can be relayed to ground units, who can then safely remove or 
detonate them before anyone, military or civilian, is harmed. The GPS and laser-guided 
munitions drones employ are precise, and they deliver a much smaller payload than the 
weapons used by most other aircraft. This, along with the extended loiter-time drones 
provide, greatly minimizes the risk of injuring or killing innocent civilians. In effect, 
drones protect US military personnel, kill terrorists, and avoid killing civilians. So why 
are so many academics puzzled (and apparently disturbed) by the fact that a majority of 
Americans support their use?  
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     To me, the most obvious answer was that I had underestimated just how many people 
believed that drone strikes “kill babies.” Apparently, the idea that drone strikes kill an 
inordinate number of civilians is a conjecture not limited to just the anti-war crowd. 
Opponents of drone strikes routinely argue that drone strikes are imprecise and have 
caused the death of thousands of innocent civilians. Regardless of its validity, this 
narrative has, I believe, taken root in the consciousness of a large segment of the 
American public. This project represents my attempt to understand how and why this 
narrative came to be so pervasive.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Every opinion is a marriage of information and values—information to generate a mental 
picture of what is at stake, and values to make a judgment about it (Zaller, 1991, 
pg.1215).  
     On October 7th, 2001, a single hellfire missile was launched from an MQ-1 Predator 
aircraft, with the intent of killing the Taliban’s top Commander, Mullah Mohammed 
Omar (Woods, 2015). Although ultimately the strike was unsuccessful, the United States’ 
use of armed, remotely piloted aircraft (RPA)—better known as drones—to attack both 
enemy combatants and terrorist suspects quickly accelerated. Since that first failed 
attempt, the US government has conducted hundreds of drone strikes killing thousands of 
Taliban and al Qaeda fighters (Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2017). These 
successes notwithstanding, the use of drones as a weapon of war has become a highly 
controversial issue.  
     Supporters of drone strikes point to the fact that drones reduce the risk to US service 
members by eliminating the need to send pilots into harm’s way, and that drones are both 
necessary and effective at combatting terrorism. Opponents dispute these claims, arguing 
that drone strikes are imprecise and have caused the death of thousands of innocent 
civilians. They claim that drone strikes have killed only a handful of high-level terrorists, 
but that the ill-will created by drone strikes increases terrorist support and recruitment, 
making the United States more vulnerable to terrorist attack. Opponents further argue that 
despite the benefit of reducing potential US service member casualties, the fact that drone 
operators face no real danger may not only make political leaders too quick to resort to 
force, but drone operators too callous about the act of killing. The debate over the use of 
armed drones has become polarized, publicized, and political, and as a result, news and 
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polling organizations have taken an interest in measuring public opinion towards drone 
strikes.  
     The overarching question this project seeks to answer is, “What shapes American 
public opinion on the issue of drone strikes?” Only a handful of studies have attempted to 
address this issue, and all have been aimed almost exclusively at explaining support. 
Little to no attention has been given to explaining opposition. Opinion formation is a 
process. In order to fully understand what motivates Americans to support or oppose 
drone strikes, an examination of the entire opinion formation process is required.  
Why Study Drones? 
     While ultimately I hope that my ideas regarding the connections between morality, 
beliefs, and public opinion can be extended outside the context of drone strikes, 
proximately this dissertation is about public opinion and drone strikes. For all practical 
purposes, drone strikes are simply another use of military force. A Hellfire missile or 
laser-guided bomb produces the same effect when it impacts its target regardless of 
whether it is launched from a drone or from a more traditional aircraft. There is a large 
body of research dealing with the causes and correlates of support for the use of military 
force, so why single out support for drones as a special concern?  
     According to Heyns,1 drones are “unique.” Because they make the long-range 
employment of lethal force across national borders easier, they afford nations the ability 
to keep their own forces out of harm’s way. As a result, drones make it more likely that 
countries will go to war and stay at war. Therefore, because of the threat to international 
peace and harmony they represent, drones necessitate “special care and regulation in their 
                                                          
1 United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions and professor of 
human rights law at Pretoria University. 
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use.” (Heyns, 2015, pg. vii). Riza argues that drones represent a serious challenge to the 
“warrior ethos.” Unlike pilots who fly conventional combat aircraft, drone operators 
enjoy total “impunity” from the risks associated with war. The immunity from retaliation 
that drone operators enjoy takes the “heart” out of killing and in doing so discounts the 
“awful complexity” of war. This negatively impacts the “…conversation among 
combatants engaged in the game of mortal combat,” and threatens to destroy the moral 
foundations of warfare (Riza, 2013, pg. xiv). Others have referred to drones as, “a lens 
through which US foreign policy is understood” (Bergen and Rothenberg, 2015), a 
“revolution in military affairs” (Franke, 2018), and “the ideal, poll-tested counter-
terrorism policy” (Cronin, 2013). So while missiles and bombs may be indifferent as to 
what aircraft they are launched from, for many people drones represent more than just 
another type of military force. They represent a social and political phenomenon, worthy 
of special inquiry.  
Why Public Opinion on Drone Strikes is “Potentially” Important 
     Attitudes regarding the value of public opinion to inform public policy diverge 
sharply. Idealists regard the public as a pool of wisdom where citizens weigh the 
evidence and make reasoned decisions and believe that public participation is a necessary 
condition for the construction of sound laws. Realists, on the other hand, view the public 
as a source of “emotional and shortsighted thinking”, and argue that there are several 
practical obstacles preventing the public from ever being fully informed. As such, the 
inclusion of public opinion in policy-making can only impede effective governance 
(Holsti, 1996).  
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     From the standpoint of analyzing public policy however, the value of public opinion is 
far less important than its effects. Early research into the effects of public opinion on 
policy-making tended to indicate that public opinion was volatile and incoherent 
(Lippmann and Merz, 1920; Almond, 1950), and that the public was inclined to blindly 
follow elite leadership (Lipset, 1966; Verba, et.al.,1967). This led most to conclude that 
public opinion was not a significant determinant of public policy.   
     Since the 1970’s however, research has emerged indicating that public opinion is 
important for the formation of policies and/or laws dealing with the use of military force. 
Examining data collected during the Vietnam War, Burnstein and Freudenberg found that 
cumulative war costs, public opinion, and anti-war demonstrations all produced 
significant effects on the outcomes of Senate roll call voting (1978). Other researchers 
have found a direct and significant correlation between US public opinion and US 
defense spending (Hartley and Russett, 1992; Wlezien, 1996). Since drone strikes are 
currently an important component of the “War on Terror” this suggests that there is the 
potential for public opinion to impact the US government policies on the use of armed 
drones.  
     However, when it comes to public policy, Americans tend to emphasize domestic 
issues over foreign issues (Markel, et.al. 1949; Holsti, 1996). When asked if they feel 
whether it is more important, at this time, for the President to focus on foreign or 
domestic issues, Americans have consistently, and by a large margin, indicated that 
domestic issues should be given priority (Pew, 2016).  Since the use of armed drones to 
attack terrorists overseas is ultimately a matter of foreign policy, it stands to reason that 
for most Americans the issue of drone strikes will be relatively peripheral, and therefore 
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unlikely to provoke any significant political response. So while Americans may express 
strong opinions about drone strikes, they should not be expected to cast their vote based 
on this issue.  
     A series of questions included in the survey-experiment I conducted for this 
dissertation asked respondents how a political candidate’s support for drone strikes would 
affect their voting preferences. When asked about a person seeking election to Congress, 
30 percent of respondents indicated they would be less inclined to vote for someone who 
expressed support for drone strikes, while 21 percent indicated they would be more 
inclined to vote for this person. When asked about someone running for President who 
expressed support for drone strikes, 29 percent indicated they would be less inclined to 
vote for this person, while 27 percent indicated they would be more inclined to vote for 
this person.2 This suggests that while there is no clearly discernable preference or 
rejection for politicians who support drone strikes, a candidate’s position on the use of 
armed drones appears to be important to more than 50 percent of the American electorate.  
     Of course without any basis for comparison it is difficult to say just how important the 
issue of drone strikes is to this 50 percent. It may well be that for most of these 
individuals the issue of drone strikes sits well below several other important issues on 
their list of political priorities. However, in 2015 two members of the Congressional 
Progressive Caucus (Keith Ellison and Raul Grijalva) sponsored an amendment aimed at 
providing “greater oversight of the U.S. drone program” proving that the potential for 
                                                          
2 Specifically, respondents were asked—If a person seeking your vote for [Congress/President] expressed 
support for the use of armed drones overseas would you be…1) more inclined to vote for this person, 2) 
less inclined to vote for this person, 3) neither more nor less inclined to vote for this person. Because 
experimental subjects were exposed to a treatment condition prior to answering these questions, only 
respondents from the control condition were used in this analysis (N = 98).     
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organized political action in response to drone strikes is a real possibility (Grijalva, 
2014). Returning to Burnstein and Freudenberg’s findings that during the Vietnam war 
Senate voting was significantly affected by concerns over cumulative war costs, public 
opinion, and anti-war demonstrations, we should expect that if the costs of drone 
strikes—human or otherwise—come to be perceived by the public as being too high, 
future drone operations could face significant political backlash and subsequent funding 
issues. If public opinion shifts towards the opposition of using drones to combat 
terrorism, then members of Congress may increasingly find themselves under pressure 
from their constituencies to support measures that curtail, or even eliminate the use of 
armed drones. Whether such measures were the “right” or “wrong” thing to do would be 
irrelevant in the face of political necessity. Public opinion on drone strikes is important 
because it has the potential to radically alter the way the United States currently conducts 
the “War on Terror.”  
Why Focus on Opposition? 
     Public support for drone strikes has been explained as the effect of biased poll 
questions (Kreps, 2014), the result of a lack of effective criticism from international 
organizations and non-governmental organizations (Kreps and Wallace, 2016), a desire to 
keep military pilots and aircrew out of harm’s way (Walsh, 2015; Schneider and 
Macdonald, 2016), and as an anger response to the threat of terrorist attack (Fisk, 
Merolla, and Ramos, 2018). To the best of my knowledge, no attempts have been made at 
explaining opposition.  
     Considering the reasons most often given for supporting drone strikes—that they keep 
the United States safe from terrorist attack and protect the lives of US military pilots and 
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aircrew while doing so—I believe the question researchers should be asking is not why a 
majority of Americans support drone strikes, but rather why such a large minority oppose 
them.  
     Additionally, it is not methodologically sound to assume that what explains opposition 
to drone strikes is simply the opposite of whatever explains support. It might be argued 
that in the context of public opinion, support and opposition are distinct opposites, and 
therefore, when one studies support one is also, at least indirectly, studying opposition. If 
a study finds that “X” correlates with support for drone strikes, it seems natural to assume 
that the absence of “X” correlates with opposition. At the causal level however, such 
assumptions may not hold. If the goal is to understand how Americans form their 
opinions on the issue of US drone strikes, then explaining support is only half of the 
equation.  
Scope Conditions 
     This dissertation deals exclusively with US public opinion regarding US government 
drone strikes overseas. As such, no data or discussion related to foreign public opinion, 
foreign drone strikes, or the use of drones domestically (by the federal government or 
other agencies) is included in this analysis. Additionally, while the both the US 
Department of Defense (DoD) and the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are 
involved in the US government’s use of armed drones in the “War on Terror”, this 
analysis does not distinguish between strikes directed by the DoD and strikes directed by 
the CIA. The reason for this lack of discrimination is twofold. First, although the CIA has 
been involved in the US government’s use of armed drones from the outset (Whittle, 
2014), the organization’s role in US drone operations is technically classified. 
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Furthermore, since most (if not all) drone strikes involving the CIA are combined 
operations with the DoD Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), distinguishing 
between a CIA strike and a military strike, is more complex that might be assumed 
(Chesney, 2016). Therefore, what (if any) role the CIA played in any particular strike, or 
even what percentage of drone strikes involve the CIA, is unknown. Second, the focus of 
this dissertation is US public opinion and drone strikes. While some who engage in the 
discourse surrounding US government drone strikes do emphasize the CIA’s involvement 
in drone operations, many do not. By and large, what reaches the public is a single image, 
with little distinction made between the effects of strikes directed by the CIA and strikes 
directed by the US military.  
Road Map 
     The belief that drone strikes cause large numbers of civilian deaths is conjecture. 
However, for most Americans, the idea that drones are an effective way to combat 
terrorism and protect US military lives while doing so, is also conjecture. As Walter 
Lippmann once wrote… 
Of any public event that has wide effects, we see at best only a phase, and an 
aspect…Inevitably our opinions cover a bigger space, a longer reach of time, a 
greater number of things, than we can directly observe. They have, therefore, to 
be pieced together out of what others have reported and what we can imagine 
(1922, p.53). 
Although the state of mass communication and its relationship with the public has 
undoubtedly changed since Lippmann wrote those words, his observations are still valid 
today. When it comes to complex political issues, direct experience plays only a small 
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role in how people formulate their opinions. This is especially true in the case of the US 
government’s use of armed, remotely piloted aircraft.  
     Since the majority of the debate over drone strikes revolves around US operations in 
Pakistan, reliable information regarding the actual number of deaths, and whether those 
killed are civilians or terrorist fighters, is extremely difficult to come by. With one lone 
exception, each of the 400 plus drone strikes that have taken place in Pakistan has 
occurred in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This area is governed by 
the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), a colonial-era policy that assigns FATA residents 
the status of second-class citizen. Under the FCR an individual can be held responsible 
for the crimes of their relatives, and the federal government can seize personal property 
without warning, explanation, or compensation. The Pakistani military tightly controls 
access to FATA, keeping independent observers out. Additionally, all US drone strikes 
occurring in Pakistan are technically covert, and therefore remain unacknowledged by the 
US government. Even when drone strikes are conducted in places other than Pakistan, 
such as Afghanistan, Yemen or Syria (which have access issues of their own), the US 
military is still not completely forthcoming with details of specific strikes, due to a need 
to safeguard capabilities and tactics. This lack of access to the areas where drone strikes 
take place, coupled with a need for military secrecy, essentially ensures that your average 
American will know very little about drone capabilities and operations. As such they will 
have very little factual basis for deciding what to believe when confronted with 
conflicting information.                 
     Public opinion is the aggregated result of independent opinion formation. It is the 
product of a collective discourse, revolving around a variety of competing and 
10 
 
complementing viewpoints. These viewpoints, along with individual attributes such as 
ideology, gender, experience, occupation, ethnicity, religious beliefs, and political 
partisanship, are what govern the process of independent opinion formation. When a 
person endorses a particular viewpoint, they tend to embrace the opinion that is generally 
associated with that viewpoint. Additionally, when someone endorses a viewpoint, they 
are expressing a belief. In this dissertation, I present a very simple argument. I argue that 
beliefs are the main predictors of public opinion on drone strikes. Specifically, I argue 
that opinions are the result of beliefs, and beliefs are the result of moral attitudes.  
     Beliefs are not the same as truth. Truth accords with reality, beliefs may or may not. 
However, while objectively truth and belief are not the same, subjectively they are. 
Everyone has had the experience of believing something that turned out not to be true. 
Most (narcissists and know-it-alls excepted) would admit that at least some of the beliefs 
they currently hold are likely wrong. Few however would be able to give you an 
example. People tend to think what they believe is true. Once a person learns (and 
accepts) that a belief they hold isn’t true, they tend to stop believing it.  
     John Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model is designed to help examine the 
process of political opinion formation. According to Zaller individuals receive messages 
about a political issue, accept those messages based on how well they conform with prior 
beliefs, and then sample from the messages they have accepted based on which of those 
messages are currently salient (1992). The RAS model stipulates that once a message is 
received, it is either accepted or resisted. Only messages that are accepted are later 
available to be sampled from and incorporated into the opinion formation process. I argue 
that only messages that are believed will be accepted. 
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     When a person is tasked to form an opinion on an issue, what they are sampling from, 
is their beliefs. Therefore, to understand how a person formed their opinion on an issue, 
you first need understand what they believe regarding that issue, and more importantly 
why they believe it. Zaller’s RAS model is designed to explain the formation of political 
opinion, and describes the opinion making process as a process of cognitive engagement. 
According to Zaller, affective engagement is likely to affect opinion formation only when 
it leads to intellectual engagement. In this dissertation, I apply the RAS model of public 
opinion formation to public opinion on US drone strikes, but with a distinct focus on 
affective engagement. 
     In explaining where the messages that influence public opinion come from, Zaller 
writes, “To an extent that few like but none can avoid, citizens in large societies are 
dependent on unseen and usually unknown others for most of their information about the 
larger world in which they live” (Zaller, 1992, pg.6). These “others”, according to Zaller, 
are political elites, and they include politicians, high-level government officials, various 
experts and policy specialists. Zaller contends that the public largely receives elite 
messaging through the popular media, and that even when an individual learns about an 
issue from a friend or family member, he or she is most likely receiving second-hand 
information that originated with an elite. He goes on to conclude the information which 
eventually reaches the public on an issue, is never a full accounting, but rather a 
“stereotyped” version of the facts. 
     The RAS model is predicated on intellectual engagement. This implies that the 
opinion formation process is a fact gathering process, in which people gather information 
and refine their assessments. Drone operations are classified, and only a small number of 
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military and military-related personnel have any direct experience or informational access 
to drone operations. This raises the serious question of where the political elites debating 
the merits of drone strikes are getting their “facts”?  
    Elite discourse on drone strikes is divided, with those supporting strikes arguing that 
drone strikes are effective and necessary, and those opposed directly refuting those 
claims. So how does the public decide who to believe? Previous research has indicated 
that the American public is poorly educated on the most basic facts of drone strikes and 
drone operations (Schneider and Macdonald, 2016). Therefore, the ability of the average 
American to assess any argument about drone strikes on its empirical merits is almost 
certainly limited. Because of this, I believe that the process by which most Americans 
decide what to believe about drone strikes, is largely an affective one.  
     In making my argument I adhere closely to Zaller’s RAS model. Like Zaller, I 
contend that the messages that have the greatest impact on public opinion formation 
originate in the discourse of elites, and are transmitted to the public by the popular media. 
Also like Zaller, I contend that the first step of opinion formation is the reception of these 
messages. Where I depart from Zaller is in my conceptualization of the opinion process 
as a mostly affective one. I argue that the most important step in the RAS process, is the 
acceptance of messages. I argue that at this stage, messages cease to be just messages and 
become beliefs. Messages that are received, but not thought to be true, will be rejected. 
Only received messages that are thought to be true (i.e. believed) will be accepted, 
Therefore, only beliefs can shape opinion. This makes understanding personal belief the 
most important part of understanding opinion formation.        
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     Jonathan Haidt argues that when it comes to opinion formation, “intuitions come first, 
strategic reasoning second” (2012, pg.1). In Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Mode, intuition 
precedes judgment and, unlike in the RAS model, there is no clear distinction made 
between emotion and cognition. According to Haidt, cognition comes in two forms, 
intuition and reasoning, with intuition frequently taking the form of moral judgments. I 
argue that moral judgment is the primary means by which people decide what to believe 
about drone strikes. When people are faced with conflicting messages, the one they will 
accept will largely accord with their moral predispositions. Cognition will play a part, 
only insofar as the message being communicated holds little or no moral salience to the 
individual receiving it.       
     This dissertation seeks to accomplish two things. First, I attempt to fill a gap in the 
literature by examining public opposition to drone strikes. I argue that given the reason 
most often presented to explain support for drone strikes—that they allow for the 
effective targeting of terrorists while protecting pilots and aircrew—opposition to drone 
strikes is much higher than should be expected. I believe this higher than expected level 
of opposition is the result of the belief that drone strikes kill large numbers of civilians 
being accepted by a significant number of Americans. Second, I attempt to ascertain how, 
in an environment of competing narratives about drone strikes, individuals decide what to 
believe. I argue that belief is the ultimate determinant of opinion, and that, at least in 
cases where there is very little public knowledge regarding an issue, moral attitudes are 
the primary determinant of belief. In effect, I believe that the debate over drone strikes 
has become, for many, a moral issue.       
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     Since the opinion formation process begins with the popular media, in Chapter 1, I 
examine the media’s framing of polls measuring public opinion on drone strikes and 
conclude that this characterization is based more off normative expectations, than 
empirical reasoning. I argue that the media’s characterization of support for drone strikes 
as high at least partially explains why the handful of empirical studies which have been 
done on public opinion and drone strikes have focused almost exclusively on explaining 
support. After examining this research, I further conclude although the two reasons 
typically given by the US news media to explain public support for drone strikes—
concerns for protecting the United States from terrorist attack and concerns for the safety 
of aircrew and pilots—are likely accurate, these motivators of support are being 
effectively offset by a concern for foreign civilian casualties.  
     In Chapter 2, I expand my study of how the US news media frames drone strikes by 
examining 1286 articles published by the New York Times and Wall Street Journal. Using 
a “word-count” methodology and focusing on how those killed in drone strikes are 
described, I find that those killed in drone strikes are much more likely to be framed as 
legitimate targets than as innocent victims. This accords with previous research on 
media-framing and drone strikes and raises the question as to why support for drone 
strikes appears to be declining. 
     In Chapter 3, I argue that the messages which most affect public opinion on drone 
strikes reach the public through narrative communication, and that these narratives have 
had differing levels of success in communicating their primary message to the public. 
Specifically, I argue that one of the narratives, a narrative I call the “Drones Kill 
Civilians” narrative, has been exceptionally effective at penetrating the public 
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consciousness, and creating an implicit connection between civilian casualties produced 
by military conflict, and drone strikes. 
     In Chapters 4 and 5, I develop a theory that explains public opposition to drone strikes 
as primarily the result of individual moral attitudes. I argue that an individual’s decision 
to support or oppose drone strikes is based off of his or her acceptance of the messages 
contained within the narratives of elite discourse, and that the acceptance of messages is 
largely the product of individual morality. In effect, morality determines belief, and belief 
determines opinion. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 EXAMINING PUBLIC OPINION: IS SUPPORT FOR US DRONE STRIKES 
“HIGH”?  
     On September 14th, 2001 the US Congress passed legislation (S.J. Res. 23) authorizing 
President Bush to use…  
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against 
the United States by such nations, organizations or persons (US Congress, 
2014). 
This legislation, or Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), represents the 
justification for the use of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), better known as drones, to 
conduct strikes against terrorists and insurgents overseas. Since the beginning of the 
“War on Terror”, hundreds, if not thousands, of drone strikes have been conducted in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, Syria. While the actual number of 
strikes is impossible to ascertain, strikes in Pakistan alone are estimated to number more 
than 400 since 2004. In Somalia the estimated number is 42 since 2003 and in Yemen 
there have been an estimated 218 drone strikes since 2002 (New America Foundation, 
2019).  New America does not track drone strikes in any other country.3 The reasons for 
this are unclear, but The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) also tracks US drone 
                                                          
3 The New America website does have a section on airstrikes and civilian casualties in Libya, but this 
section does not deal specifically with drone strikes nor even exclusively with US airstrikes.  
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strikes in these three countries and their estimates are similar.4 However, TBIJ also tracks 
drone strikes in Afghanistan. Since 2015 there have been an estimated 5,888 US 
airstrikes in Afghanistan, only 308 of which were drone strikes (2019). This means that 
for the last three years, drone strikes have made up only about 5 percent of all US 
airstrikes in Afghanistan. It also means that the number of US airstrikes occurring in 
Afghanistan just since 2015, dwarfs the entire number of drone strikes ever taken in 
Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia combined, by a factor of eight. As Vogel points out, 
conducted in the proper context and in compliance with the principles of the international 
humanitarian law (IHL), a lethal strike from a drone is no different than a lethal strike 
delivered by any other weapons platform. The rules that apply to drones are the same 
rules that apply to other military aircraft, and the missiles and bombs carried by drones 
detonate with the same force as similar ordnance released by any other aircraft (Vogel, 
2013). So what makes drone strikes such a controversial issue?  
     Beginning in 2009 US media coverage of drone strikes dramatically increased. This 
coverage peaked in 2013 and has been, for the most part, steadily declining since. As part 
of this coverage, major media outlets and polling organizations sought to measure 
American attitudes on this new and, by many accounts, revolutionary method of 
combatting terrorism. Initially, public approval for drone strikes was quite high, with 
polls recording approximately 70 percent support. More recently however, polls have 
shown support dropping to below 60 percent. In the next section of this chapter I examine 
this polling, and the media coverage that accompanied it. Specifically, I look at how 
                                                          
4 The TBIJ website does not differentiate between drone strikes and other types of US airstrikes. To 
determine how many of the US airstrikes displayed on the webpage graphics are drone strikes, you must 
look at the Excel datasheets accessible via links from the main page.     
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public support for drone strikes was consistently framed by the media as being “high” 
despite the fact that the reasons being given to explain public support suggested that 
support for drone strikes was actually lower than should be expected. 
     In the third section of this chapter I look at the empirical evidence for the two most 
commonly cited reasons given to explain public support for drone strikes—concerns over 
terrorism and concern for protecting the lives of pilots and aircrew—and conclude that 
both these reasons can be overridden by concern for the lives of foreign civilians. This 
chapter establishes the rationale for breaking from the norm and attempting to explain 
opposition to drone strikes.   
Public Opinion and Polling: How the Media Frames Support for Drone Strikes 
     Public opinion is the aggregated result of independent opinion formation While 
individuals may form their opinions privately, without necessarily being aware of other 
peoples’ preferences and choices, individual opinions are inevitably the result of a 
societal-level discussion. Collective discourse, facilitated by the mass media, creates a 
variety of competing and complementing viewpoints which individuals choose from 
when forming an opinion. This is not to suggest that individuals do not make up their 
own minds regarding what they believe about specific issues. Personal attributes such as 
ideology, gender, experience, occupation, ethnicity, religious beliefs, and political 
partisanship also play a critical role in opinion formation. Still, the various viewpoints 
that people are exposed to, along with the information presented to support those 
viewpoints, serve as the primary framework for the process of independent opinion 
formation (McCombs, et.al. 2011).  
19 
 
     Frames are cognitive structures that help people organize meanings and interpret 
events. When the news media uses frames it selects certain aspects of an issue or 
perceived reality and makes those aspects more salient as a way of promoting a particular 
“problem, definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation” (Entman, 1993, pg.52). By framing public support for drone strikes as 
high, the news media promotes the idea that majority support for drone strikes is a 
problem that must be explained. I argue that the news media’s characterization of support 
for drone strikes as high, is based not off the majority standard as it appears, but rather 
off the normative expectations of those reporting on the polls. If one compares public 
support for drone strikes against support for other uses of military force, or assesses 
support based on the reasons most commonly given to explain public support for drone 
strikes, public support for drone strikes appears to about what one should expect, if not a 
bit lower.  
     I believe that this mischaracterization of support has impacted the examination of 
public opinion on this issue.  Although there is only a small body of academic research 
examining public opinion on drone strikes, the focus of this research has been on 
explaining support. No attempts have been made at explaining opposition. I believe this 
unity of focus is largely due to the media’s characterization of public support for drone 
strikes as high. If support is “high”, then the question to be answered is, ‘why do people 
support drone strikes?’ If support were characterized as “low”, the question to be 
answered would be, ‘why do people oppose drone strikes?’ How support is perceived 
affects the questions people ask, and how the opinion formation process on this issue is 
studied. Additionally, since opinion formation is a communicative process, in which 
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individuals are guided by the viewpoints they are exposed to, the media’s 
characterization of public support for drone strikes as “high” represents a viewpoint, and 
as such becomes part of the opinion formation process. Therefore, how support for drone 
strikes is characterized in terms of “high” and “low” matters not just for how opinion 
formation on this issue is studied, but also for how it is formed.   
     Opinion polls represent the outcome of independent opinion formation. Although 
expressed as general measures, what these outcomes represent are collections of 
individual beliefs. As such, opinion polls provide direct insight into how individuals think 
and feel. However, that insight is limited. Opinion polls are designed to inform us of what 
people believe, not why they believe it. In order to understand why individuals hold the 
opinions they do, and subsequently why public opinion is what it is, we must go beyond 
analyzing outcomes and begin examining process. To do this we need to know what 
viewpoints individuals have likely been exposed to, and what personal attributes likely 
factored into their opinion.  
     Additionally, opinion polls cannot by themselves tell us whether a measure of public 
opinion is “high” or “low.” High and low are relative measures, and as such they must 
have a standard of comparison to be relevant. Ideally, this standard of comparison will be 
determined based off the reasons we provide for the outcomes we observe. Without an 
examination of the opinion formation process, it is unlikely that our assessments of 
“high” and “low” will meet this ideal standard. Without an understanding of why people 
hold the opinions they do, assessments of “high” and “low” cannot be empirical in nature. 
Instead they will be based off the personal assumptions and expectations of those making 
the assessments. 
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     Although the US government has been using remotely piloted aircraft (RPA)—more 
commonly referred to as drones—to target and eliminate terrorists and enemy combatants 
since 2001 (Woods, 2015), polls seeking to measure the American public’s support for 
drone strikes only began appearing around 2011. Conventional wisdom, at least among 
those reporting on this polling, is that public support for drone strikes is high. In this 
chapter, I challenge that conventional wisdom.  
    After a review the US news media’s coverage of polls measuring public opinion on 
drone strikes, I apply a series of empirical standards of comparison, and conclude that 
these standards suggest that support for drone strikes is not high and, based on the 
reason(s) most often given by the media to explain public support for drone strikes—that 
they effectively target terrorists while keeping US military personnel out of harm’s 
way—is likely lower than should be expected. I then examine the empirical support for 
these explanations and conclude that a desire to keep US military personnel out of harm’s 
way and concerns about terrorism are very likely key factors motivating public support 
for drone strikes, but that support for drone strikes can be overridden by concerns for 
foreign civilians.  
A Short History of Polling and Media Coverage 
     In October 2011 the Pew Research Center posed the following question to 712 post 
9/11 veterans and 2,003 members of the general public… 
As you may know, the United States military has made increasing use of 
unmanned aircraft called “drones” to launch aerial attacks in Afghanistan, Iraq 
and elsewhere. Do you think the increased use of drones by the military is a 
good thing, or a bad thing?  
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Eighty-six percent of military veterans and 68 percent of the general public responded 
that drone attacks were a “good thing” (Pew Research Center, 2011). In February 2012, a 
Washington Post/ABC News poll asked respondents to indicate if they, “…strongly 
approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove, or strongly disapprove of the use of 
unmanned ‘drone’ aircraft against terrorist suspects overseas.” When the categories were 
collapsed, 83 percent of those surveyed approved of drone strikes, while only 11 percent 
disapproved (6 percent indicated they had no opinion on the matter). Approximately a 
year later, a Farleigh-Dickinson poll asked, “In general, do you approve or disapprove of 
the U.S. military using drones to carry out attacks abroad on people and other targets 
deemed a threat to the United States?” Seventy-five percent of Americans approved of 
such attacks, while only 13 percent of respondents disapproved (Woolley and Jenkins, 
2013). The large majorities returned by these early polls prompted news media outlets to 
report public support for drone strikes as unequivocally “high.” For example, in a column 
for the Washington Post, titled, “The American Public Loves Drones,” Chris Cillizza 
argued that because drone strikes are perceived to be effective at targeting terrorists 
without placing US military lives at danger, American minds are “made up on this 
matter”, and that if left to the public, “drones are here to stay” (2013). Few in the media 
were inclined to question Cillizza’s assessment.  
     Referencing a poll taken by the Christian Science Monitor, LaFranchi (2013) argues 
that the “firm majority” of Americans (57%) supporting drone strikes is evidence of 
“continued enthusiasm” for President Obama’s counter-terrorism policies. In another 
Washington Post column titled “Americans are fine with drone strikes. Everyone else in 
the world? Not so much.” Fuller (2014) concludes that the 52 percent of Americans 
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supporting drone strikes in the poll she cites, “really, really don’t care about foreign 
policy right now—especially when they don’t have to worry about losing American lives 
abroad”. Writing for POLITICO and citing a Pew Research Center poll which found 58 
percent of Americans approved of drone strikes against “extremists”, Lerner (2015) 
characterized support as “overwhelming.” 
     Polling on public support for drone strikes essentially stops in 2015, but during the 
short time this issue was in the media spotlight two very important messages were 
conveyed to the public. The first was that public support for drone strikes is not only 
high, it’s unwaveringly high. The second was that the reason Americans are so supportive 
of drone strikes is that drone strikes allow for the effective targeting of terrorists (which 
keeps the United States safe from terrorist attack) while keeping US military personnel 
out of harm’s way. While there is some empirical evidence for this latter claim (Kreps, 
2014: Walsh, 2015, Schneider and MacDonald, 2016; Fisk, Merolla and Ramos, 2018), 
an examination of polling trends shows the former to be false. 
The Downward Trend in Support for Drone Strikes and the Majority Standard  
     While polls taken in 2011 and 2012 do show a rather large majority of Americans 
supporting drone strikes—67.8 percent on average—polls taken after 2013 indicate a 
decrease in average support of more ten than percent, and an increase in average 
opposition of more than ten percent (from 21 to 31.8 percent ).5 With seven polls taken 
between September 2011 and May 2015, the Pew Research Center has the most 
                                                          
5 18 polls taken between 2011 and 2015 asking similar questions about support for the use of armed 
drones indicate that prior to 2013 support for combat RPA averaged 67.8% and opposition averaged 21%, 
after 2013 support averaged 57.3% and opposition averaged 31.8%. For polls taken in 2013 (the largest 
segment of the sample) support averaged 65.6% and opposition averaged 21.3%. See Appendix A for a list 
of polls included. 
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consistent and comprehensive series of polls on this issue, and within this set of polls 
there is consistent and noticeable fluctuation in support for drones strikes, ranging from a 
high of 68 percent in 2011, to a low of 52 percent in 2014 (see figure 1.1). This suggests 
that, at least as of 2013, many Americans had not made up their minds on drone strikes, 
and also casts doubt on the belief that drones are here to stay. Despite fluctuations and a 
steady decline however, as long as the number of Americans supporting drone strikes 
stayed above 50 percent, those reporting on the polls appeared to be comfortable 
characterizing public support for drone strikes as high. 
     
 
Figure 1.1. Support for US Drone Strikes  
    
     Since public opinion is a consensus, the majority standard often feels intuitively 
correct. The majority standard is not, however, the standard public opinion on social 
issues is normally held to. For example, In February 2017 The Washington Post ran a 
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story with the headline, “You have to be a Christian to truly be American? Many people 
in the U.S. say so.” The story details findings from a Pew survey that found 32 percent of 
Americans believe that being a Christian is an integral part of being an American. Both 
the headline and the tone of the article make it clear that, despite being far less than 50 
percent, this number should be considered high. In addition to contrasting US results with 
Australia, Canada, and select European countries (all of which placed much less 
emphasis on Christianity as a component of national identity), the article emphasized the 
significance of the results by pointing out that the nearly “one-third” of Americans who 
feel this way, do so “despite the history of religious liberty that dates back to the nation’s 
earliest days” (Zauzmer, 2017).  
     Here the standard of comparison isn’t majority vs. minority, it’s outcome vs. 
expectations. The belief that citizens are free to worship whatever god they choose, or to 
worship no god at all, is woven into our national identity. So when 32 percent of poll 
respondents indicate that they believe there should be a religious test for citizenship, that 
number challenges expectations by being higher than what most feel it should be in a 
country founded on religious freedom.  
     If the majority standard were the basis being used here, then we should expect these 
poll results to be greeted with enthusiasm, and headlines of this article to read, 
“American’s Love Religious Tolerance”, or “Poll Finds Overwhelming Support for 
Religious Diversity.” In this case however, the 68 percent of Americans who do not 
believe that a person has to be a Christian to be an American are not the focus. Instead it 
is the minority opinion that warrants interest and attention, and the message being 
communicated to the public is that 32 percent is too high. This illustrates that when it 
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comes to matters of public opinion, judgments of high and low are largely independent of 
the raw numbers. People’s normative expectations play a crucial role in what, if any, 
significance they assign to polling results. I believe that the reason the media has so 
consistently characterized support for drone strikes as high is that those reporting on polls 
measuring public opinion on drone strikes have been applying a normative standard.  
    When Cillizza, writes “To be sure the average American isn’t paying close attention to 
the issue of drones and how they are being used”, that the debate over what the 
government can and cannot do using drones, as well as what it should be required to tell 
the public, is a “worthy” one, and that, “making policy decisions based on what the 
public wants (or thinks it wants) is a dangerous game” (2013), he is injecting a set of 
assumptions into his discourse, based on his normative preferences. The claims that 
average Americans are not paying attention to an issue that is worthy of their attention, 
and that policies based on what Americans think they want are dangerous, strongly 
suggests that in Cillizza’s opinion, Americans should not be as supportive of drone 
strikes as they are and that if they were just better informed, they wouldn’t be.    
     Similarly, in explaining why Americans support drone strikes much more than do 
people in other countries Fuller writes, “Drone airstrikes look a lot different when you are 
exporting the strikes instead of expecting them” (2014). LaFranchi refers to President 
Obama’s use of drones to target terrorist leaders as an “aggressive campaign” that has 
“generated controversy overseas and among counterterrorism experts” (2013). And, after 
describing US public support for drone strikes as “strong” in its headline, Al Jazeera 
informs its readers that a majority of Americans “still” support drone strikes, “despite 
criticism that the attacks have taken the lives of innocent people” (Dizard, 2015). 
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Messages such as these communicate both causal interpretations and moral evaluations 
which suggest support for drone strikes is inappropriate, and that those who support 
drone strikes are either uninformed or morally obtuse.   
     Because these journalists have been exposed to viewpoints which criticize drone 
strikes, they believe that support for drone strikes should be lower than it is. They expect 
that concerns over government transparency, the opinions of other nations, controversy 
among counter-terrorism experts, and criticisms related to civilian casualties will resonate 
as strongly with the public as they have with them, and lead to a majority of Americans 
opposing drone strikes. When this does not happen, the normative expectations of these 
journalists are not met, and the outcome of public opinion polls on drone strikes are 
interpreted and reported as high. When journalists characterize support for drone strikes 
as high, it is not because a majority of Americans support drone strikes, but rather 
because more Americans support drone strikes than these journalists feel should be the 
case. 
 Applying an Empirical Standard of Measure       
     One general expectation in the study of opinion formation is that related issues should 
yield similar levels of consensus (McCombs, et.al., 2011). Therefore, the most straight-
forward empirical standard for assessing whether or not support for drone strikes is 
“high” or “low” would be a comparison of public support for drone strikes to public 
support for other uses of military force. Unfortunately, in the context of the United States 
recent and ongoing military operations against terrorism, I know of no polling that has 
addressed public opinion regarding any specific application of military force other than 
drone strikes. This makes a direct assessment of the difference between public support for 
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drone strikes and public support for the use of other applications of military force 
extremely difficult.  
        As part of this project, I conducted a survey-experiment using subjects recruited 
from Arizona State University’s School of Politics and Global Studies student subject 
pool. Like an experiment, survey experiments compare a “treatment” condition with a 
“control” condition. Subjects in the treatment condition receive a specific stimulus that 
those in the control condition do not. The outcomes are measured and differences 
between the two groups are noted. Because of random assignment, any differences in 
outcomes can be attributed to the application of the treatment. In most cases, survey 
experiments provide “the best of both worlds” in that they combine the generalizability 
and external validity of a survey with the valid causal inference and internal validity of an 
experiment (Nock and Guterbock, 2010). 
     The experiment was conducted online using Qualtrics survey software. Subjects were 
first asked to complete a short demographics questionnaire, followed by a 30 question 
moral attitudes inventory (the reason for this inventory will be discussed in the next 
chapter). Next, subjects were randomly sorted into either one of four treatment conditions 
or the control condition. In each condition subjects read a short news report 
(approximately 500 words) that served as the treatment stimulus.6 Finally, subjects were 
asked to answer a series of questions designed to measure their opposition to various uses 
of military force (including drone strikes), and beliefs about the use of armed drones. All 
news reports were stripped of any source identification and edited for length. Each 
subject group consisted of approximately 100 subjects. 
                                                          
6 The CONTROL group read a news report of approximately equal length describing the awarding of the 
2028 Summer Olympics. This news report also did not contain the word “drone.” 
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      While the purpose of the experiment was to test hypotheses put forth in Chapters 4 
and 5, an examination of data from the control group of the experiment indicates there is 
no significant differences in opposition to the use of drones and opposition of other 
common applications of military force, including the deployment of large numbers of US 
ground troops. While in terms of causal inference, opposition cannot be considered the 
reciprocal of support, in terms of measurement, it sometimes can. In this case I asked 
subjects, “Do you support or oppose the United States using [type of military force] to 
target terrorists in other countries?” Opposition was indicated using a six-point response 
scale ranging from “strongly support” to “strongly oppose.” Responses were coded 1-6, 
with higher numbers representing higher levels of opposition.  
     The military force options presented to respondents included, the deployment of large 
numbers of conventional ground forces, the deployment of Special Operations Forces 
such as Navy Seals and Army Rangers, the use of manned aircraft, strikes by long-range 
weapons such as guided missiles, and drone strikes.7  When the mean levels of opposition 
for each of these applications of military force were compared, drone strikes are opposed 
less than all other uses of force, with the exception of Special Operations Forces. 
However, none of these differences are statistically significant. This suggests that if 
public support for other applications of military force were assessed in the same manner 
as support for drone strikes, support for these applications of force against terrorists 
overseas would be essentially the same as support for drone strikes. This argues against 
                                                          
7 The question regarding opposition to drone strikes was copied verbatim from the Pew Research Center, 
therefore in this question the wording differed somewhat from the question regarding other uses of 
military force. In the case of support for drone strikes, the question read, “Do you approve or disapprove 
of the United States conducting missile strikes from pilotless aircraft called drones to target extremists 
in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia?”  
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the media’s characterization of support for drone strikes as “high.” Table 1.1 displays the 
results of the means comparison. While the mean opposition to drone strikes was less 
than opposition to other uses of military force (with the use of special operations forces 
being the lone exception) the differences were not significant.     
 
Table 1.1. Opposition to the Use of Military Force 
 
Type of Force 
                
N 
                 
Mean     Std. Dev. 
 p-
value 
Drone Strikes   98 3.00 1.143  
Ground Forces  98 3.33 1.441 0.110 
Special Operations Forces   98 2.76 1.415 0.241 
Manned Aircraft Strikes  97 3.12 1.467 0.565 
Guided Missile Strikes  98 3.26 1.501 0.217 
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01       
 
 
     Yet another way we can attempt to assess the empirical validity of characterizing 
public support for drone strikes as high is by evaluating support based off the factors used 
to explain it. As discussed above, the media has tended to explain the majority levels of 
support observed in polling as the result of a desire to keep US military personnel out of 
harm’s way, and/or concerns over terrorism. How those in the media came to this 
conclusion is unclear, as research supporting such assertions was not published until well 
after this narrative became a media staple. However, considering the average American’s 
support for the military and fixation on the threat of terrorism, this explanation is 
intuitively appealing. 
     In the next section I will review the research on drone strikes and public opinion that 
suggests the desire to keep US military personnel and concerns over terrorism are indeed 
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factors that motivate support for drone strikes. First however, I examine how well public 
support for drone strikes accords with public support for the reasons given by the media 
to explain it. 
Applying Comparative Standards of Measure 
     If, as the media suggests, public support for drone strikes is driven by the desire to 
keep military personnel safe while conducting strikes on terrorists, then public support 
for the military and concern for protecting the United States from terrorist attack should 
be good indicators of support for drone strikes. When asked who contributes the most to 
society, Americans rate members of the military above teachers, doctors, scientists, 
engineers, and the clergy (Pew Research Center, 2013a). When asked whom they trust 
most to act in the best interest of the public, Americans again give the military top 
ranking (Kennedy, 2016). In terms of raw percentages, approximately 3 out of 4 
Americans can be consistently counted on to express respect, support, and confidence in 
the nation’s men and women in uniform (Newport, 2017). This represents 13-15 percent 
gap in support for the military and support for drone strikes.8 
     Even more pronounced is the gap between public concern over terrorism and support 
for drone strikes. Between 2002 and 2018, Americans were asked how important it was 
for the President and the Congress to focus on “defending the country from terrorist 
attacks.”9 In every year more than 90 percent of those polled responded that such action 
was either a “top priority”, or “very important” (Pew, 2018a). This makes the gap in 
                                                          
8 This number is derived by comparing the drone support averages discussed in the first section, with the 
polls referenced by Pew, 2013; Kennedy, 2016; Newport, 2017.  
9 The full question read, “I’d like to ask you about priorities for President [current president] and Congress 
this year. As I read from a list, tell me if you think each one should be a top priority, important but lower 
priority, not too important or should not be done.” 
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concern over terrorism and support for drone strikes more than 30 percent. Figure 1.2 
displays the results of this polling. 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Defending the Country from Terrorist Attacks 
      
     Even at the lowest point in 2012, fully 69 percent of respondents indicated that they 
believed combatting terrorism should be a top priority for the President and Congress. 
This is seven points higher than the 62 percent who expressed support for drone strikes in 
April of 2012, and fourteen points higher than the 55 percent who expressed support 
three months later. In 2013 there was an average gap of 12.5 percent between the number 
of Americans who believed fighting terrorism should be a top priority and the number of 
Americans who supported drone strikes, and by 2014 the gap had grown to 21 percent. 
Overall, the average gap between those expressing the highest concern for defeating 
terrorism and those willing to use drone strikes to do it is 13.4 percent. When those who 
felt that defeating terrorism is “very important” are added to the equation, the gap rises to 
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35.6 percent. Overall, when the categories of “top priority” and “important’ are 
combined, at no time between 2002 and 2018 do fewer than 93 percent of respondents 
express a significant concern over terrorist threat. In effect, while 9 out of 10 Americans 
are concerned about terrorism, only 6 out of 10 are willing to use a drone to do something 
about it. If concerns over the threat of terrorism are driving support for drone strikes, this 
gap suggests something is working against support for drone strikes. 
     These measures are of course, not perfect proxies. Drone strikes represent a lethal 
solution to the problem of terrorism. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a 
significant number of Americans are concerned about terrorism but would prefer that 
methods such as diplomacy and/or apprehension and trial be used to deal with the threat. 
In the case of support for the military, it may be that these measures are not simply 
imperfect, but are uniquely bad for assessing the relative level of support for drone 
strikes. Much of the reason Americans admire and respect the military is that, when 
necessary, military members are required to sacrifice their lives to protect the United 
States and its citizens. In an all-volunteer military, every man and woman who has 
accepted this responsibility, has done so willingly. Drone operators sit hundreds, if not 
thousands, of miles away from the battlefield. So while the use of an unmanned aircraft 
inarguably removes the physical risk to military personnel, it also removes the potential 
for sacrifice. As Stern notes, “There is something that feels not quite right about a 
weapon whose use entails no direct physical risk to the user” (2015, pg.65). Therefore, 
because they face no risks, the public may not view drone operators as true members of 
the military. As such the respect and admiration the public generally holds for the 
military, may not equate to support for drones.  
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     Additionally, as discussed earlier, distinguishing between drone strikes conducted by 
the US military and the CIA is a difficult proposition. Therefore, since drone strikes are 
routinely attributed to both organizations, it may be that the gap between support for the 
US military and support for drone strikes is the result of CIA involvement in drone 
operations. Polling data collected by NBC and the Wall Street Journal indicates that 
public support of the CIA has consistently lagged well behind public support for drone 
strikes (Dann, 2017). If a large segment of the public believe that drone strikes are 
predominantly the domain of the CIA, then the gap in public support between drone 
strikes and the US military is easily explained. That support for drone strikes falls 
somewhere in-between support for the military and support for the CIA suggests that 
most Americans understand that drone strikes (in general) should not be attributed 
exclusively to either organization. To what degree the attribution of responsibility for 
drone strikes to either the CIA or the US military affects public opinion on drone strikes 
is an interesting question. Unfortunately, I do not, at this time, have the data to assess the 
effects of such attributions.               
     However, even if we explain the gap between public concern over the threat of 
terrorism and public support for drone strikes as the result of a significant number of 
Americans wanting to address the problem through other, non-lethal means, we still have 
to ask by what measure can support for drone strikes be considered high? If, as the data I 
presented earlier suggests, there is no significant preference for drone strikes over other 
applications of military force, then the gap in concerns over terrorism and support for all 
uses of military force should be approximately the same. In effect, support for using 
drone strikes to target terrorists isn’t high, its normal.  
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     Similarly, this raises the question of why the preference for drone strikes is not 
significantly greater than the preference for other applications of military force, 
especially the deployment of ground troops or special operations forces, both of which 
place military personnel directly at risk. If the primary factor motivating public support 
for drones is the desire to avoid military casualties, then something must be mediating 
this effect. Possibly it is the lack of recognition of drone operators as true members of the 
military, worthy of admiration and respect. However, it is not the drone operators who 
are being kept out of harm’s way; it is the pilots and aircrew that would have to conduct 
the missions if drones were not available to do so. Therefore, I suspect that the reason 
drone strikes are not significantly preferred over other applications of military force is 
something else. In the next section, I present evidence that indicates public support for 
drone strikes is indeed motivated by desires to protect US military personnel and 
concerns over terrorism, but these motivations can be overridden by concern for the lives 
of foreign civilians. 
The Foundations of Public Support for Drone Strikes  
     While the conclusions of journalists may be largely intuitive, there is empirical 
evidence that suggests public support for drone strikes can be attributed to American 
concerns over terrorism, and a desire to keep military personnel safe from harm. Again, 
only a handful of studies have examined public opinion on drone strikes, and virtually all 
of these studies have focused exclusively on explaining support. Despite this unitary 
focus on support, these studies do however provide significant insight into what drives 
opposition to drone strikes. Below I examine four studies on public opinion and drone 
strikes, two of which provide evidence that concern for avoiding military casualties 
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contributes to support for drone strikes, and two that suggest concerns over terrorism 
contribute to support. Importantly, these studies also suggest that both these foundations 
of support can be undermined by concerns for foreign civilian casualties. This indicates 
that opposition to drone strikes is quite likely driven by the belief that drone strikes cause 
an inordinate number of civilian casualties.    
Concern for US Military Casualties  
      Since the end of the Vietnam War it has been widely accepted that Americans will 
not tolerate large numbers of US military casualties. As the number of body bags 
returning from the warzone increases, support for continued military action diminishes 
(Mueller, 1973; Gartner, 2008). Public response to incidents such as the 1983 Marine 
barracks bombing in Beirut and the 1993 ‘Battle of Mogadishu’ stand as direct evidence 
of Americans aversion to seeing US military service members killed in action. As retired 
US Army Major General Robert Scales famously noted, America’s number one center of 
gravity is dead soldiers (2016).  
     Considering the esteem most American’s have for those serving in the armed forces, 
anything that allows the US military to accomplish its mission and reduce the risks to its 
members should garner a high level of public support. The belief that public support for 
drone strikes is the direct result of concern over military casualties is so intuitive and 
widespread, it serves the basis for an entire line of argument against using drones for 
combat. Several scholars have argued that by reducing the human costs of war, drones 
allow governments to bypass the primary objection citizens have to going to war. By 
undermining the Kantian notion of the democratic peace, drones increase the chance 
nation’s will not only go to war, but stay at war (Saur and Schornig, 2012; Kaag and 
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Kreps, 2013; Heyns, 2015). For many, the ability of drones to remove the risk to pilots 
and aircrew serves as a self-evident explanation to the American public’s support for 
drone strikes. The American public’s concern for military casualties however, is not 
absolute. 
     A case study of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, found that while Americans are not 
indifferent to US military casualties, they are willing to accept them, and accept them in 
significant numbers, if they believe the cause of the war is just, and the chance of success 
is high (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, 2006). Similarly, a RAND report on this subject 
found that Americans are willing to tolerate military casualties if they feel the benefits of 
a successful operation warrant it (Larson, 1996). The American public will not limitlessly 
sacrifice foreign civilians to protect US military service members, and when expected 
military casualties are low (5-10) there is essentially no preference for the life of a US 
service member over that of a foreign civilian (Johns and Davies, 2019). Although 
Americans hold US military members in high esteem and will accordingly place a high 
value on their lives, this value is not absolute. When deciding whether or not to accept 
military casualties, the American public performs what is essentially a cost-benefit 
analysis that includes consideration for the lives of civilians. There is no reason to 
suspect that drone strikes constitute an exception to this rule.  
     Additional evidence that concern for civilian casualties tempers support for US drone 
strikes comes from research designed to discover the circumstances under which 
Americans favor the use of drones over the use of manned aircraft (Schneider and 
Macdonald, 2016) In this study, subjects were presented with a series of scenarios for 
conducting military airstrikes where both “manned” and “unmanned” aircraft were 
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available for use. Varying the risk in their scenarios between “low” to “high”, and giving 
subjects four strike options (manned, unmanned, both, neither). Researchers found that 
while Americans generally prefer the use of drones, this preference does not hold in 
situations where foreign civilians are placed at risk. When given a scenario where there 
was a high risk of civilian casualties, subjects reversed their preference for drones, and 
chose to use manned aircraft to carry out strikes. This indicates that Americans are 
willing to risk the lives of military service members to prevent foreign civilian casualties. 
Importantly, it also suggests that many Americans believe that the best way to avoid 
killing civilians is to not use a drone.  
     In an experiment similar to the one described above, Walsh (2015) found that the 
prospect of foreign civilian casualties creates a larger negative influence on support for 
the use of military force than does the prospect of US military casualties. And while this 
effect held true for all uses of military force, Walsh found that among those who 
continued to support a use of military force and accept the risk of potential civilian 
casualties, deaths caused by drones led to more regret and dissatisfaction with strike 
outcomes than did casualties caused by manned aircraft. In effect, respondents were more 
upset about killing civilians when those civilians were killed by drone strikes. This 
suggests that when it comes to the relationship between concern for civilians and the 
willingness to use military force, there is something unique about the use of drones.  
     Taken together, this research suggests that when civilian casualties are not a factor, 
and a perceivable threat to pilots and aircrew exists, those who support the use of military 
force will favor the use of armed drones over manned aircraft. However, when the 
possibility of killing foreign civilians is perceived as high, the American public will be 
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willing to risk the lives of its military service members to mitigate this possibility. 
Concern for military casualties is not absolute, and support for drones can be tempered by 
the specter of civilian death. 
Concern Over Terrorist Attack  
      A second, closely related, explanation often given by the media to explain why a 
majority of Americans support drone strikes is a desire to combat terrorism and/or protect 
the United States from terrorist attack. A recent study provides some empirical evidence 
for this assertion. Seeking to understand how threat perception and emotions work 
together to impact support for drone strikes, Fisk, Merolla, and Ramos (2018) conducted 
an experiment where subjects were exposed to a stimulus making the threat of terrorism 
immediately salient, and then asked to report their current emotional state and their level 
of support for drone strikes.  Reasoning that terrorist threat could evoke feelings of either 
fear or anger and citing literature that suggests angry people are more likely to support 
punitive military actions (Lerner and Tiedens, 2006), the authors hypothesized that 
individuals who respond to the threat of terrorism with anger will be more likely to 
support drone strikes. What they found was that when Americans were primed with the 
threat of a terrorist attack, they responded with anger and increased support for drone 
strikes.10      
     In an attempt to explain why, despite criticisms regarding the ethics and legality of 
drone strikes, public support for drone strikes has remained high, Kreps (2014) 
investigated how the wording of poll questions might affect public opinion. In a sampling 
of 21 polls conducted between September 2011 and December 2013, Kreps noticed that 
                                                          
10 This effect also held for French and Turkish subjects.   
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embedded within the poll questions was the message that the targets of drone strikes are 
terrorists. The typical poll question formulation presented the two main claims of the US 
government—that the strikes do not violate international humanitarian law (IHL) and 
have legal authorization—as uncontroversial. This led Kreps to suspect that the reason 
criticisms of drone strikes had not translated into lower levels of public support lay in 
how drone strikes are framed in most poll questions.11 According to Kreps, this repeating 
of the “government narrative” amounts to “sidestepping the questions about whether 
intended targets are actually terrorists (distinction) and about the amount of collateral 
civilian damage drones cause (proportionality),” and gives Americans an incomplete 
picture of the controversial nature of drone strikes (2014, pg.3).  
     To test her arguments, Kreps conducted an experiment designed to remove the 
assumption that the targets of U.S. military drone strikes were exclusively terrorists, by 
introducing concerns over violations of IHL and legal authorization. Kreps found that 
when concerns regarding the deaths of civilians (distinction and proportionality) were 
made salient, support for drone strikes was significantly reduced, dropping from 52 to 27 
percent. When concerns regarding the domestic and international legality of drone strikes 
were made salient support also dropped (52 to 36 percent), but not by a statistically 
significant margin. These results provide strong support for Kreps’ argument that the 
assumption embedded within poll questions that those targeted by drone strikes are 
terrorists explains the majority levels of support for drone strikes observed in most 
polling. Taken in conjunction with the findings of Fisk, Merolla, and Ramos, this 
                                                          
11 Typical question formulations include, “Do you favor or oppose the use of unmanned aircraft, also 
known as drones, to kill suspected members of Al Qaeda and other terrorists?” [NBC/WSJ, 2013], and “Do 
you favor or oppose the United States using unmanned aircraft or drones to carry out bombing attacks 
against suspected terrorists in foreign countries?” [CBS News, 2013]. 
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suggests that a concern over terrorism is a key factor in explaining support for drone 
strikes. However, Kreps’ findings also suggest that concerns over terrorism can be 
overridden by concerns for the lives of foreign civilians. Much like in the experiment 
conducted by Schneider and MacDonald, the introduction of the potential for civilian 
casualties significantly reduced support for drone strikes. Importantly, Kreps did not 
completely remove the suggestion that the targets of drone strikes are terrorists from her 
experimental condition, rather she added the suggestion that those targeted might be 
innocent civilians who have been mistaken for terrorists.12 Therefore, Kreps’ 
experimental treatment essentially gave respondents a clear choice, support drone strikes 
against terrorists and take the risk of accidentally killing an unknown number of innocent 
civilians, or forgo targeting terrorists and insure no civilians are killed. In Kreps study, 73 
percent of respondents opted for the latter.     
Conclusion 
     While the desire to protect US military personnel and concerns over terrorism appear 
to be determinants of public support for drone strikes, there appears to be little to suggest 
that drone strikes are definitively preferred over other applications of military force. 
Considering the inescapable fact that drones remove direct physical risk to pilots and 
aircrew, and the popular perception that drones are an effective means of targeting 
terrorists, this lack of a clear preference for drones appears to be odds with the perception 
of public support for drone strikes as “high.” If support for drone strikes is not 
                                                          
12 The full question read, “As you may know, the United States has been using unmanned aerial vehicles, 
also known as drones, to target and kill suspected terrorists in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen, and 
Somalia.  The government’s definition of “terrorist” includes individuals who appear to behave in similar 
ways as terrorists—for example, going to a meeting with community elders—but who may not be 
confirmed terrorists.  Such a broad definition likely means there are more civilian deaths than are actually 
reported.” 
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significantly higher than support for other applications of military force, especially those 
which place US military forces at high risk, then either the desire to keep US military 
personnel safe is not relevant to explaining support for drone strikes, or there is 
something actively working to counter this concern. Similarly, if concern over terrorism 
is a significant determinant of support for drone strikes, then we should expect that 
support for drones strikes to be relatively the same as concern for protecting the United 
States from terrorist attack, yet we see a large gap between these two measures. 
       It also does not appear that either concerns over military casualties or the desire to 
attack terrorists, negates concerns over killing foreign civilians. As discussed above, 
when presented with a scenario where civilian lives were at risk, test subjects reversed 
their standard preference for drones, and chose to use manned aircraft to carry out strikes. 
Similarly, when the possibility of civilian casualties is included in poll questions 
querying respondents on their support for using drones to strike terrorist targets, support 
is reduced by almost half. Additionally, a Pew poll taken in 2014 which found that 58 
percent of Americans supported drone strikes, also found that 48 percent of Americans 
were “very” concerned that drone strikes “endanger the lives of innocent civilians” and 
another 32 percent were “somewhat” concerned (Pew, 2015). In effect, no less than 80 
percent of poll respondents expressed concern that drone strikes have the potential to kill 
innocent civilians. Even if one assumes minimal overlap, that still leaves 38 percent of 
drone supporters concerned about the effect of drone strikes on civilian populations. This 
all suggests that if the dominant narrative regarding drone strikes were to become that 
drone strikes kill large numbers of innocent civilians and are not an effective way of 
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combatting terrorist threats, a significant number of Americans who currently support 
drone strikes (potentially two-thirds) would change their opinion.  
     This narrative exists, and that despite Kreps’ misgivings, I believe it has been effective 
at lowering public support for drone strikes. Opponents of drone strikes routinely cite 
claims of large numbers of civilian casualties in their arguments against drone strikes, 
even when their arguments against drones are not specifically about the number of 
civilians killed. Additionally, they reject the effectiveness of drone strikes in combatting 
terrorism, claiming that because of the number of innocent civilians killed, drone strikes 
enhance terrorist recruitment, effectively making the United States less safe. It is the 
messages communicated in this narrative, I argue, that explains opposition to drone 
strikes. In Chapter 3 I examine this opposition narrative, as well as two other narratives I 
believe influence public opinion on drone strikes and test the effectiveness of each of 
these narratives at communicating its central message. First however, there is one final 
foundation of support that needs to be examined.  
     Content analysis has shown that US new media are more likely to frame armed drones 
as effective tools of counterterrorism, than as weapons that violate international law and 
human rights (Cohen, 2014; Jones, Sheets, and Rowlings, 2011; Sheets, Rowlings, and 
Jones, 2015). If this is the case, then it only deepens the question as to why public support 
for drone strikes isn’t higher. In the next chapter, I review previous content-analysis of 
US news media coverage of drone strikes, and then perform a content-analysis of my 
own. After examining twelve years of coverage by the New York Times and the Wall 
Street Journal, I conclude that drone strikes have in fact been significantly more often 
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portrayed by the US news media as an effective instrument against terrorism, than as an 
application of military force that kills large numbers of innocent civilians.                   
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CHAPTER 2 
 THE FRAMING OF AN AIRFRAME: HOW THE US NEWS MEDIA REPORTS ON 
DRONE STRIKES 
All I know is what I read in the papers, and that’s an alibi for my ignorance—Will 
Rogers 
     In the last chapter I argued that the news media’s characterization of public support as 
“high” represents a form of “framing” that has impacted how the study of public opinion 
on the issue of drone strikes has been conducted. Frames are cognitive structures that 
help people organize meanings and interpret events. When the news media uses frames it 
selects certain aspects of an issue or perceived reality and makes those aspects more 
salient as a way of promoting a particular “problem, definition, causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993, pg.52). The news 
media’s characterization of public support for drone strikes as “high” is a cognitive 
structure that promotes the idea that majority support for drone strikes is a problem that 
must be explained.  
     Public opinion polling is not the only aspect of this issue to which the news media 
applies frames. It also frames the effects of drone strikes. In the last chapter I also 
examined the empirical support for the two reasons the news media has traditionally 
given to explain public support for drone strikes. I concluded that while concern for 
protecting the United States from terrorist attack and a desire to avoid US military 
casualties are good predictors of support for drone strikes, I also concluded that both 
these motivating factors can be overridden by the concern for foreign civilians. Previous 
research into the framing of the US government’s use of armed drones has indicated that 
drone strikes are predominantly portrayed by the US media in a manner that reinforces 
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the idea that those killed by drone strikes are terrorists, and that references to civilians 
being killed by drone strikes are relatively few (Jones, Sheets, and Rowling, 2011; 
Cohen, 2014; Sheets, Rowling, and Jones, 2015).  
     John Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model is a way of examining the process 
of political opinion formation. According to Zaller individuals receive messages about a 
political issue, accept those messages based on how well they conform with prior beliefs, 
and then sample from the messages they have accepted based on which of those messages 
are currently salient (1992). Importantly, Zaller argues that messages that have the most 
powerful effects on the formation of public opinion are those transmitted to the public by 
the mass media. “To an extent that few like but none can avoid, citizens in large societies 
are dependent on unseen and usually unknown others for most of their information about 
the larger world in which they live” (Zaller, 1992, pg.6). 
     Although ultimately Zaller argues that these “unknown others”, are political elites13, 
among these elites he includes journalists. So not only is the media the medium by which 
messages influencing public opinion are transmitted, it is also, at least occasionally, the 
crucible in which these messages are formed. Therefore, it is quite reasonable to assume 
that how the US news media frames the effects of drone strikes in its coverage, strongly 
affects American public opinion on this issue.  
     In this chapter I attempt to determine how the US news media reports on the effects of 
drone strikes. Using RapidMiner text-analysis software, I conducted a word-count 
analysis of 1286 articles dealing with the lethal effects of drone strikes. My sample 
consisted of articles published by the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal 
                                                          
13 politicians, high-level government officials, journalists, activists, various experts and policy specialists 
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between 2006 and 2017. By contrasting the number of times words such as “terrorist”, 
“militant”, “insurgent”, etc., appear in the text and headlines of these articles, with the 
number of times words such as “civilian”, “women” and “children” appear in the text and 
headlines of these articles, I attempt to ascertain if the US news media is more often 
framing those killed by drone strikes as legitimate targets, or as innocent victims.    
     How those killed in drone strikes are most often portrayed in the media is important in 
the context of my overall argument in that it assists in determining how messages are 
accepted by the public. If repetition is a key factor in the acceptance of messages, then if 
those killed in drone strikes are mostly portrayed by the media as terrorists, then this 
should be the message accepted by most Americans. If those killed in drone strikes are 
mostly portrayed as civilians, then that should be the message commonly accepted among 
the public. As public opinion appears to break approximately 60/40 in support of drone 
strikes, it stands to reason that this ratio should be the approximated in media coverage, 
with those killed in drone strikes being portrayed as terrorists approximately 60 percent 
of the time, and innocent civilians approximately 40 percent of the time. To be clear, I do 
not expect media coverage to be such a perfect predictor of support and/or opposition to 
drone strikes. Rather, what I hope to accomplish with the analysis in this chapter is to 
gain a sense of just how important, or unimportant, repetition is to the public acceptance 
of messages delivered by the US media on drone strikes.       
The Media’s Influence on Public Opinion  
     According to Walter Lippmann, where personal experience is limited, opinion must be 
“pieced together out of what others have reported and what we can imagine” (Lippmann, 
1922 pg.59). Generally, when people form opinions on complex political issues, personal 
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experience plays a minor role. This is especially true in the case of the US government’s 
use of armed drones. Since only a small number of military and military-related 
personnel have any direct experience or informational access to drone operations, when 
forming an opinion on drone strikes, most Americans must rely on what they hear and 
read in the media.  
     While there is debate over the extent of the media’s influence on public opinion, few 
argue that the media has no effect at all. Public opinion formation is a communicative 
process, and the purpose of the news media is to communicate information dealing with 
the important issues of the day. One of the ways the news media communicates this 
information is through agenda-setting. 
Emphasis and Repetition: Is the Agenda Being Set on the Issue of Drone Strikes?  
     A 1968 survey of undecided voters in Chapel Hill, North Carolina asked participants 
to list what they considered to be the key issues of the day. These issues were then rank-
ordered according to the percentage of respondents who considered each issue to be a key 
issue. Next, researchers collected the nine major news sources used by these undecided 
voters and analyzed the content, rank-ordering issues by the number of stories devoted to 
each issue. What they found was a nearly perfect correspondence between the 
perceptions of voters and the amount of news coverage. The more media coverage 
devoted to an issue, the more important the issue was perceived to be (McCombs and 
Shaw, 1972). Since the 1968 Chapel Hill investigation, there have been more than 400 
empirical studies confirming this agenda-setting effect of the media. The effect is both 
robust and widespread, and it has been observed in cities as diverse as Tokyo, Japan and 
Pamplona, Spain (McCombs, 2004).   
49 
 
     There are several ways in which the news media performs its agenda setting function. 
While the placement of the story and the size of the headline both signal importance, the 
most powerful means by which the news media signals to the public that an issue is 
important is through sheer repetition. Over time, issues emphasized in the news tend to 
take on personal salience and come to be regarded by members of the public as issues 
they should be concerned about (McCombs, 2004). By placing the issues it deems most 
important on the front pages and in the headlines, and by increasing the number of stories 
devoted to these issues, the news media strongly influences the degree to which the 
public deems these issues important. 
     Since placement, headlines, and repetition all represent important ways in which the 
news media signal the importance of an issue to the public, an examination of these 
elements in news coverage dealing with US drone strikes should indicate the degree and 
manner in which the US news media has set the agenda on drone strikes. Because the 
articles I selected for analysis were collected from online databases, an assessment of 
where each story was placed in the newspapers printed edition was not possible. 
Although information on what page and section of the paper the article appeared in was 
available, this information would not help determine where on the printed page an article 
appeared in relation to other stories. In short, the visual and spatial elements that are 
critical to the concept of placement in agenda-setting cannot be conveyed by stories 
downloaded from digital databases, therefore no attempt was made to evaluate this aspect 
of agenda-setting.  
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     To assess repetition and headlines, 1284 articles were selected14 from the New York 
Times and the Wall Street Journal for the period covering January 1, 2006 through 
December 31, 2017.  Beginning with just a handful of stories between 2006 and 2008, 
both outlets show a steep and relatively steady climb in the number of articles discussing 
the effects of US government drone strikes, which peaks in 2013 with each news outlet 
publishing over 100 articles on this issue. After 2013 both outlets show a rather steep and 
relatively steady decline until 2014 after which, the close similarity in publication of 
articles dealing with the effects of drone strikes ends. Figure 2.1 illustrates this pattern. 
      
  
Figure 2.1. Drone Strike Articles Over Time 
   
                                                          
14 A full discussion of the sampling technique used to collect these articles appears in the next section. 
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     In regards to headlines, a comparison of the two news outlets usage of the word 
“drone” in the headline of the articles in this sample produces a pattern very similar to the 
pattern for articles published, but without the divergence observed in 2014. While this is 
somewhat expected, this result is not purely a function of more articles being published. 
If one looks at the number of times the word “drone” appears in the headline as a 
percentage of all articles published that year, there is also a steady increase followed by a 
rather rapid decline. The primary difference being that the peak in the percentage of 
articles with “drone” in the headline occurs in 2012 for the Wall Street Journal, whereas 
for the New York Times the peak occurs in 2014. Figure 2.2 illustrates this pattern.       
 
Figure 2.2. Percentage of Articles with “Drone” in the Headline Over Time  
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“drone” in the headline, represents an increase in both repetition and emphasis of this 
issue. What it does not indicate, is whether or not the American public was actually 
paying attention to this increase. Google Trends tracks the number of Google searches a 
term or topic receives over time and compares these searches as a relative percentage to 
one another. 15 A Google Trend analysis of web searches for the term “drone strike” 
shows searches peaking in 2013. Perhaps more interestingly, when yearly article totals 
are expressed as a percentage of all articles published, and graphed against the Google 
Trend data, the trend lines are remarkably similar. Figure 2.3 illustrates this comparison. 
     While a yearly aggregation of web searches vs. articles published is arguably too 
coarse a measure to definitively state that public interest is following media focus and not 
leading it (i.e. the media is indeed setting the agenda and not just publishing what the 
public is interested in), as news media coverage of drone strikes increased, public interest 
in drone strikes also increased. As discussed earlier such a ‘public-following’ relationship 
has been repeatedly demonstrated (Weaver, et.al., 1981; Winter and Eyal, 1981; Smith, 
1987; Eaton Jr., 1989; Takeshita, 1993; Weaver, 1996; Soroka, 2003). This suggests that 
the pattern observed in Figure 2.4, represents the media setting the agenda on the issue of 
drone strikes. That public interest was at its highest in 2013, the same year that 
publication of articles dealing with drone strikes was at its highest, is unlikely to be a 
coincidence. Regardless of who was ultimately setting the agenda, when public interest in 
drone strikes was at its peak, so was news media coverage. Therefore, how the media 
                                                          
15 Search results are proportionate to the time and location of a query by the following process: Each data 
point is divided by the total searches of the geography and time range it represents to compare relative 
popularity. Otherwise, places with the most search volume would always be ranked highest. The resulting 
numbers are then scaled on a range of 0 to 100 based on a topic’s proportion to all searches on all topics. 
Different regions that show the same search interest for a term don't always have the same total search 
volumes. https://support.google.com/trends/answer/4365533?hl=en&ref_topic=6248052 
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framed drone strikes in its coverage likely influenced public opinion. So what aspects of 
this issue did the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal choose to make salient in 
their coverage?   
 
   
Figure 2.3. Newspaper Coverage vs. Google Trends 
      
Framing: How the Media Presents Drone Strikes  
     Frames are cognitive structures that help people organize meanings and interpret 
events. They provide rules for communication and cognition, and how an event or issue is 
framed directs how people relate to it (Lipisto-Johansson, 2012). Frames provide issue 
context and meaning through the use of “selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration” 
(McCombs, 2004, pg.87).  When the media uses frames it selects certain aspects of an 
issue or perceived reality and makes those aspects more salient as a way of promoting a 
particular “problem, definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Newspaper Coverage vs. Google Trends
NYT Articles WSJ Articles Google Trends
54 
 
recommendation” (Entman, 1993, pg.52). Through framing, the media also has the power 
to significantly influence interpretation. Aspects of an issue that are emphasized and 
elaborated upon will ultimately generate more personal salience than aspects which 
receive abbreviated discussion and/or are excluded from news coverage altogether. 
     Previous research into the framing of the US government’s use of armed drones has 
indicated that drone strikes are predominantly portrayed by the US media in a positive 
manner. Using the Vanderbilt Television News Archives, Cohen (2014) analyzed the 
evening news coverage of NBC, ABC, CBS, CNN, and FOX for a 14-year period starting 
January 1, 2000 and ending January 1, 2014. His sample included 248 broadcasts, the 
large majority of which occurred after 2010. In coding these broadcasts for analysis, 
Cohen developed several conceptual frames including a ‘National Security Frame’ in 
which the focus was primarily placed on drones as an effective tool of counterterrorism 
and those killed in drone strikes were portrayed as terrorists, and a ‘Human Rights 
Frame’ where violations of human rights and civilian deaths were the central elements. 
Cohen’s analysis also included a ‘Technology Frame’ in which drones were portrayed as 
a “fascinating” new technology designed to enhance national security in general, a 
‘Law/Sovereignty Frame’ which focused on drones as a threat to domestic and/or 
international law and to the sovereignty of other states, and a ‘Foreign Drone Frame’ that 
focused on the possession of drone technology by other nations.16 Cohen found that the 
‘National Security Frame’ was used over three times as much as the next closest frame 
(Law/Sovereignty Frame), and five times as much as the ‘Human Rights Frame’.  
                                                          
16 Other frames examined were: Blowback Frame-drones create more enemies than they kill; Domestic 
Use Frame-focuses on the use of drones inside the United States. Categories of ‘other’ and ‘ambiguous’, 
were used for references to drones not fitting any of the prescribed frames.    
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     In an examination of national differences, Jones, Sheets, and Rowling (2011), 
hypothesized that American journalists would be more likely to frame US drone strikes 
as effective, legal, and precise, while simultaneously downplaying civilian casualties, 
than would foreign journalists. To test this hypothesis, they conducted a content analysis 
of three media sources: The New York Times (American), the Guardian (British), and 
Dawn (Pakistan). The study focused on the one-year period from January 1, 2009 to 
December 31, 2009, and included editorials, features, analyses, profiles, and 
commentaries17 dealing with US drone policy.  From a total sample of 1,404 articles, 251 
were randomly selected for analysis. The researchers coded each selected article in its 
entirety to determine if the article framed the use of armed drones by the US government 
as “efficient and effective” or “illegal and inhumane.” 
     The results of this analysis indicated that the New York Times was far more likely to 
frame drone strikes as an effective tool against terrorism (78.3% of the articles examined) 
than were the Guardian or Dawn (34.8% and 27.3% respectively), and far less likely to 
mention civilian casualties related to drones strikes than were the other two publications. 
In the case of the New York Times only 3.2% of the articles examined referenced civilian 
casualties. This same trio of researchers later used a nearly identical methodology to 
compare website news coverage from CNN (American), BBC (British), Al Jazeera and 
Al Arabiya (Arab) for the period of January 1, 2009 to November 6, 2012, and again 
found US news coverage of drone strikes to be largely positive and significantly less 
likely to discuss civilian casualties than foreign news sources (Sheets, Rowling, and 
Jones, 2015). Other researchers who have found positive framing effects in the US 
                                                          
17 Letters to the editor were not included 
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media’s coverage of drone strikes include Susko (2014), Dar and Ali (2015), and Davies, 
Schulzke, and Almond (2018).  
          Framing and agenda-setting work together to influence public opinion. Before any 
aspect on an issue can be effectively framed, the public must first be made aware of the 
issue. The way the news media makes the public aware of an issue, and convinces the 
public that the issue is important, is through agenda-setting.  By “setting the agenda” the 
news media selects the topics of public discourse and begins the process of public 
opinion formation. Only after the agenda is set, do frames become the central organizing 
ideas for news content, and become significant influencers of public opinion ((McCombs, 
2004).  
     As illustrated above, it appears that between 2006 and 2017 both the New York Times 
and the Wall Street Journal were setting the agenda on drone strikes. As their coverage of 
drone strikes increased, so did public interest. While the relationship demonstrated is 
correlational and the possibility that the news media’s coverage is following public 
interest and not leading it cannot be ruled out, a half of a century of empirical research 
into the agenda-setting effects of media coverage suggests this is unlikely. Regardless, if 
the purpose of agenda setting is to arouse the public’s interest so that selected aspects of 
an issue can be effectively framed, the near-perfect correspondence between publication 
and public interest suggests that how the news media framed drone strikes during this 
timeframe, likely had a significant influence on public opinion. 
     Previous research has indicated that US news media sources are far more likely to 
frame drone strikes as an effective tool against terrorism, and far less likely to mention 
civilian casualties related to drones strikes. The research detailed in the following 
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sections, represents my attempt to determine how drone strikes are presented in terms of 
targeting terrorists and producing civilian casualties. Unlike the previous research 
discussed above, I will not be coding individual frames within my sample based on 
valence or accordance with pre-constructed frames. Rather, I will be contrasting word 
frequency between two opposing categories of terms designed to draw inference 
regarding how often drone strikes are reported as having killed legitimate targets, and 
how often strikes are reported as having killed innocent victims.  
     The use of word counts as opposed to valence measures or pre-constructed frames 
allows me to systematically assess a larger sample and produces results that are easily 
replicable. I also examine the sample for references related to the concept of the 
“PlayStation Mentality,” an anti-drone narrative that expresses the belief that because of 
the design of the aircraft controls, and the great distances that separate drone operators 
from the battlefield, drone strikes make killing feel like a video game.18 Since this 
narrative has often been associated with the idea that drone strikes, by making operators 
indifferent to the effects of their actions, leads to civilian death, I include it in my 
analysis.      
Method 
     In order to discover how the US government’s use of armed drones was most often 
characterized in the news in regards to who dies in drone strikes, I conducted a word 
frequency analysis of 1286 articles published over a twelve-year period by two major US 
news sources. By constructing several ‘keyword categories’ I examined the degree to 
which… 
                                                          
18 This narrative, along with two other narratives which focus on the effects of drone strikes, will be 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
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1) Those killed in US drone strikes are characterized as legitimate targets 
2) Those killed in US drone strikes are characterized as innocent civilians 
3) The use of armed drones is described as a video game 
     My use of word frequency to examine media framing represents a break from 
traditional frame analysis methods in that instead of reading each article and looking for 
specific references to predefined concepts (i.e. frames), I use individual words as 
indicators of the concept of interest. Again, this allows me to systematically assess a 
larger sample and produces results that are easily replicable. This method also removes 
any subjectivity about what is and is not counted as a representation of the concept of 
interest. This method does present some challenges that traditional methods of frame 
analysis do not. I address those challenges in a later section.         
Sampling 
     Newspaper articles and editorials dealing with the US use of armed drones overseas 
were collected from the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal via online databases 
(Nexis Uni for the NYT and ProQuest for the WSJ) using the search terms “drone” and 
“strike”. The time-period covered by the sample ranges from January 1st, 2006 to 
December 31st, 2017, and consists of 1286 articles (NYT=758, WSJ=528) totaling 
1,125,284 words (NYT=716,108, WSJ=409,176).  All articles returned by these searches 
that met the selection criteria were included in the sample. The selection criteria for 
articles is as follows. 
1) Articles must include the word “drone” at least twice within the combined 
text of the headline and story. Articles making only a single reference to drones, 
regardless of context, were excluded from the sample. 
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2)Articles must be either news stories (including short press releases) or 
editorials. No book or movie reviews, or letters to the editor were included in the 
sample. 
3) Articles must directly address the United States’ use of armed drones 
overseas. For the purpose of this study, an article “directly addresses” the United 
States’ use of armed drones overseas if it gives details of a specific strike or 
discusses the tangible effects of US drone strikes in general. Articles dealing 
with other government’s use of armed drones, or the use of armed drones by 
terrorist actors were not included in the sample. Articles dealing with the 
domestic use of government drones, commercial drones, or recreational drones 
were also excluded.  
4) Articles where the discussion of drone use was primarily abstract such as 
coverage of Senator Rand Paul’s 13-hour anti-drone filibuster or references to 
2012 presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s general position on the use of armed 
drones were excluded from the sample, as were articles that consisted primarily 
of speculation about the use of armed drones in the future. 
5) Duplicate articles were removed from the sample, except in cases where 
publication of the duplicated articles was more than two days apart. 
     Every article meeting the selection criteria was copied into a WORD document, 
stripped of all byline information, and re-copied into a second WORD document 
(both documents were retained). Articles were collated by year and then analyzed at 
that level.19 Limiting the sample to articles that include the word drone at least twice 
                                                          
19 Due to the small number of articles for 2006, 2007, and 2008, these years were combined for analysis. 
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was a concession towards making the sample size manageable. The rationale for 
excluding book and movie reviews is that most of these articles review works of 
fiction. Since the focus of this analysis is media framing, letters to the editor were 
excluded because they represent the opinions of media consumers, not media 
producers. The New York Times and the Wall Street Journal were selected as sources 
because they represent two large, reputable, nationally circulated newspapers with a 
significant online presence, and are generally viewed as having differing ideological 
perspectives. 
Analysis and Coding 
     To test for the prevalence of messages that communicate the idea that operating a 
combat drone is like playing a video game, I created the keyword category videogame, 
which included the words video, game[s], joystick[s], and PlayStation.20 To test for the 
prevalence of messages that communicate the idea that the victims of drone strikes are 
terrorists and messages that communicate the idea that victims of drone strikes are 
civilians, I created two contrasting keyword categories: targets and victims. Words 
included in the targets category were terrorist[s], militant[s], insurgent[s], Qaeda, and 
Taliban. Words included in the victims category were civilian[s], woman, women, child, 
children, grandchildren, and schoolchildren.21 Importantly, the word wedding[s] was 
considered for inclusion in this category. However, the concept captured by wedding(s) is 
                                                          
20 The words “button(s)”, “Xbox”, and “Nintendo” were also considered for this category but were 
excluded based on an extremely low-level of occurrence; button(s) occurs only 12 times in the entire 
sample, and Xbox and Nintendo occur only once each.       
21 The word “elderly” was also considered for this category but was excluded based on an extremely low-
level of occurrence; the word elderly occurs only five times in the entire sample. Additionally, the concept 
captured by wedding(s) is a bit problematic as it refers to an event and not people. While it is likely that a 
reference to a drone strike directed against a wedding would suggest the killing of innocent civilians, it is 
also likely that those killed would be more directly referenced in other sections of the article. Such 
references could potentially lead to double-counting.        
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a bit problematic as it refers to an event and not people. While it is likely that a reference 
to a drone strike directed against a wedding would strongly suggest the killing of 
innocent civilians, it is also likely that those killed would be more directly referenced in 
other sections of the article. So while the salience of the word wedding(s) is likely quite 
strong in regards to public perceptions of who is being killed in drone strikes, the 
inclusion of it in a category designed to measure the repetition of the concept would 
potentially equate to double-counting.22 Additionally, there were only 30 occurrences of 
the word wedding(s) in the entire sample, and the majority of these occurrences appear to 
be in reference to a strike occurring in Yemen in December of 2013.          
     A control keyword category consisting of the word people, was also included in this 
part of the analysis, as were two keyword categories designed to test the validity of the 
article selection process. These validity categories included the words drone[s], 
airstrike[s], strike[s], and missile[s] (V1), and kill[s], killed, killing, death[s], and dead 
(V2). Using RapidMiner data science software, I examined the entire sample (1,286 
articles totaling 1,125, 284 words) for relative and absolute word-usage in all keyword 
categories. 
     The words chosen for each keyword category were based on my best assessment of 
the words most likely to indicate the presence of frames representing the key concepts of 
the narratives discussed in Chapter Two. Prior to data-mining the text, I created word-
                                                          
22 For example, the following is an excerpt from a 2013 NYT article reporting on a drone strike conducted 
in Yemen against vehicles that were part of a wedding convoy, “Most of the dead appeared to be people 
suspected of being militants linked to Al Qaeda, according to tribal leaders in the area, but there were 
also reports that several civilians had been killed” 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/world/middleeast/drone-strike-in-yemen-hits-wedding-convoy-
killing-11.html 
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clouds of each year’s data using WordItOut word-cloud creation software.23 These word-
clouds provided a general sense of which terms were being used most frequently in the 
sample of articles, allowing me to refine my categories and select the most relevant 
terms. The reasoning behind the keyword categories targets and victims is the assumption 
that if my sample does indeed represent reports and discussions of the US government’s 
use of armed drones to conduct lethal operations overseas, then those being killed by 
these strikes should be referenced in one of two ways: either as legitimate targets of 
aggressive action or as unintended victims. The inclusion of the category people was to 
test this assumption that those being killed in drone strikes were likely being referred to 
as either targets or victims and not a more neutral term. The creation of the validity 
categories was to insure the articles selected were actually discussing drones and military 
strikes and not just counter-terrorism in general (V1), and that these strikes were 
referencing lethal outcomes (V2).  
Results 
Sample Validity 
     For the articles collected from the New York Times (N=758), the word frequency 
rates24 for the validity categories were .0122 for V1 (drone[s], airstrike[s], strike[s], 
missile[s]) and .0061 for V2 (kills[s], killed, killing, death[s], and dead). When 
compared to the word frequency rate for the category targets (terrorist[s], militant[s], 
insurgent[s], Qaeda, and Taliban) which was .0109, this suggests that the articles 
selected from the New York Times are as much about drones and drone strikes as they are 
                                                          
23 free at https://worditout.com/ 
24 Derived by dividing the total occurrences of all words in the category combined by the total number of 
words in the sample.  
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about terrorism in general, and that the lethal consequences of drone strikes are being 
frequently discussed. For the articles collected from the Wall Street Journal, the word 
frequency rates for the validity categories were .0141 for V1, .0066 for V2, and .0131 for 
targets. These frequency rates suggest that the articles selected from the Wall Street 
Journal for this analysis are also as much about drones and drone strikes as they are 
about terrorism in general, and that the lethal consequences of drone strikes are being 
frequently discussed.   
Drones are Like Video Games 
     When the entire sample was examined the word joystick[s] appeared only 11 times 
(NYT=9, WSJ=2) and the word PlayStation only three (NYT=3, WSJ=0). With 369 total 
occurrences the word video appeared significantly more (NYT=281, WSJ=88), but 
considering that in order to communicate the essence of the narrative being examined it 
would need to be used in concert with the word game[s], the maximum number of times 
a reference to a “video game” or “video games” could have appeared in the sample is 78 
(NYT=57, WSJ=21). Taken as a whole, the words in this category constitute, at best, 92 
references to the use of an armed drone being somehow similar to playing a video game. 
Even if one assumes that every use does indeed represent such a reference, and that each 
reference occurs in a separate article, articles containing such a reference would still 
represent only 7% of the entire sample. This indicates that neither the New York Times 
nor the Wall Street Journal often framed the US government’s use of armed drones as 
being similar to playing video games. For that reason, no further analysis was conducted 
on this keyword category. 
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Legitimate Targets vs. Innocent Victims  
     When articles collected from the New York Times (N=758) were examined for 
references to victims being either terrorists or civilians, the category targets had a word 
frequency rate of .0109, while the categories of victim and people had word frequency 
rates of .0023 and .0015, respectively. In relative terms, this translates into a usage ratio 
of more than 4:1 in favor of targets over victims. This indicates that those killed by US 
government drone strikes are far more likely to be described in news media coverage as 
legitimate targets than as innocent civilians. Additionally, since the word frequency rate 
of the category people is lower than the word frequency rate for either targets or victims, 
this indicates that journalists are not often defaulting to a neutral term to describe those 
killed in drone strikes.  
     When articles collected from the Wall Street Journal (N=528) were examined for 
references to victims being either terrorists or civilians, the category targets had a word 
frequency rate of .0131, while the categories of victim and people had word frequency 
rates of .0015 and .0013, respectively. In relative terms, this translates into a usage ratio 
of more than 8:1 in favor of targets over victims, again indicating that those killed by US 
government drone strikes are far more likely to be described in news media coverage as 
legitimate targets than as innocent civilians. Additionally, since the word frequency rate 
of the category people is once again the lowest of the three categories, this indicates that 
journalists writing for the Wall Street Journal are also not defaulting to a neutral term to 
describe those killed in drone strikes. Graphic representations of these results are 
depicted in Figures 2.4 and 2.5.  
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Figure 2.4. Category Comparison NYT 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Category Comparison WSJ 
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category, they do so consistently. Graphic representations of these results are depicted in 
Figures 2.6 and 2.7. 
     When expressed as relative percentages, the gap between the keyword category 
targets and the keyword category victims never drops below 40 percentage points for the 
New York Times. For the Wall Street Journal, this gap never drops below 58 percentage 
points. Year after year, the majority of articles in this analysis appear to portray those 
killed in drone strikes as legitimate targets and not innocent victims. This indicates that, 
at least in terms of who is killed, drone strikes are not generally being framed by the 
media in a negative manner. According to the New York Times and the Wall Street 
Journal, drones kill terrorists. 
 
 
Figure 2.6. NYT Keywords Over Time 
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Figure 2.7. WSJ Keywords Over Time 
 
       In Chapter 1, I presented evidence that concerns over terrorism and a desire to protect 
US military personnel motivate public support for drone strikes, but that these 
motivations can be overridden by concern for the lives of foreign civilians. If frames 
provide issue context, and repetition is the primary way the media communicates what is 
important to the public, then the predominant message being sent to the public by the 
New York Times and the Wall Street Journal between 2006 and 2017 was that drone 
strikes are an effective means of killing terrorists and collateral damage in the form of 
civilian casualties is relatively rare. This suggests that the average American reading the 
news receives the message that drones are weapons being effectively used against 
terrorists, not instruments of civilian death. In effect, the messages being delivered to the 
American public by the US news media regarding the US government’s use of armed 
drones are largely messages that should encourage public support.  
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     While these findings coincide with previous research, considering the changes in 
public support discussed in the last chapter, they are also a bit puzzling. If the US news 
media has consistently, and by a wide margin, framed those killed in drone strikes as 
terrorists and not innocent civilians then why has support for drone strikes steadily 
declined, while opposition for drone strikes steadily increased? If public support for 
drone strikes is largely based on concerns over terrorism and avoiding US military 
casualties, and opposition is based on concern for the lethal effects of drone strikes on 
foreign civilians, then we should not be seeing this trend.  
     There are of course a few obvious explanations. First it may simply be that despite 
corresponding well with previous research, my method of examining how the US news 
media frames the effects of drone strikes is fundamentally flawed. A word-count analysis 
differs in some very significant ways from traditional framing-analysis procedures. It 
may be that my analysis is fine, but that in reality, coverage of an issue by the New York 
Times and the Wall Street Journal is just not that relevant in the formation of public 
opinion. A recent report from the Pew Research Center states that fully 68 percent of 
American adults get at least some of their news from social media (Matsa and Shearer, 
2018). And while 57 percent of these people say they expect this news to be largely 
inaccurate, this still raises questions as to what role traditional news sources now play in 
the formation of public opinion. However, it could also be that repetition of a frame is not 
as important as the salience of a frame. It may be that there is a distinct difference in how 
the message that drone strikes target and kill terrorists, and the message that drone strikes 
lead to the death of innocent civilians are being presented to the public. Each of these 
explanations will be examined and discussed in the final section of this chapter.  
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Discussion and Further Analysis 
     The primary assumption made in any word count analysis is that the words which are 
mentioned most often reflect the greatest concern. While this assumption is often valid, 
there are pitfalls in this approach that must be accounted for. The use of synonyms may 
lead to the underestimation of an important concept. Similarly, the problem of multiple 
meanings can also create an obstacle to correct interpretation (Stemler, 2001). The 
primary assumption of my analysis goes slightly beyond reflections of greatest concern 
and predicts that certain word choices indicate specific informational frames. This makes 
the problems presented by synonyms and multiple meanings especially relevant. As 
previously discussed, I have attempted to compensate for the complication of synonyms 
by using categories of words as units of analysis, and by creating word-clouds to help 
guide my choice of words to be placed into each specific category. As for the 
complications multiple meanings might present, one of my validity categories includes 
the word “strike.” While the word strike can refer to a violent kinetic action, it can also 
mean an organized protest in which employees refuse to work, or a baseball pitch that is 
swung at and missed, fouled off, or allowed to pass through the “strike zone” 
uncontested. Considering the article selection criteria used and the relative frequency 
with which the word strike appears in relation to other words used in this analysis such as 
drone and missile, it is unlikely that many of the uses of the word strike refer to either 
baseball or organized labor. Again, the careful selection of data and keyword categories 
helps mitigate this concern. It is important to understand however, that when a word 
count methodology is used problems such as these cannot be completely eliminated, only 
alleviated.  
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     Another potential pitfall of word count analysis that is much harder to overcome than 
either synonyms or multiple meanings is context. Again, my analysis assumes that every 
use of the word civilian occurs in the context of claims of civilian casualties. A complete 
reading of a 2010 article from The New York Times focusing on the C.I.A.’s involvement 
in US drone strikes shows that this is not the case.  
The strikes, carried out from a secret base in Pakistan and controlled by 
satellite link from C.I.A. headquarters in Virginia, have been expanded by 
President Obama and praised by both parties in Congress as a potent weapon 
against terrorism that puts no American lives at risk. That calculation must be 
revised in light of the Khost bombing, which revealed the critical presence of 
C.I.A. officers in dangerous territory to direct the strikes. Some legal scholars 
have questioned the legitimacy under international law of killings by a civilian 
agency in a country where the United States is not officially at war (Shane and 
Schmitt, 2010) 
While the reference here is clearly not a positive framing of US drone strikes, it also is 
clearly not a reference to drones causing civilian casualties. In this case, the word civilian 
will be taken out of context by a word count analysis. Other instances of faulty 
interpretation due to context occur when the reference to the concept being assumed is a 
negative one. For example, a 2012 Wall Street Journal article contained the following 
passage… 
Mr. Obama recently defended the secretive drone program, saying "drones have 
not caused a huge number of civilian casualties" (Lee and Entous, 2012). 
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Here, the denial of civilian casualties acts to negate the frame and leads to the faulty 
assumption that the reference is to drone strikes killing civilians. Similarly, even when 
the use of a word does appear in the predicted context, the text surrounding the word can 
dampen or even negate the valence of the framing.  
By emphasizing drone strikes, Mr. Obama need not bother with the tricky issues 
of detention and interrogation because terrorists tracked down on his watch are 
generally incinerated from the sky, not captured and questioned (Baker, 2013). 
Here, while the context is correct, and the use of the word “terrorists” is being used to 
represent the idea that drone strikes kill terrorists, the discourse regarding President 
Obama’s motivations for using drones for this purpose makes the reference negative. 
Since my word count analysis assumes that references to terrorists, militants, insurgents, 
etc. will frame drone strikes in a positive light, passages such as these, where the frame is 
negated and/or valence reversed, can lead to the over- or underestimation of critical 
concepts. Ideally however, such instances of missed context will, in the end, even out, 
and a largely accurate picture will emerge. Denials of civilian casualties will 
approximately equal denials of terrorist activity, as will criticisms that skew context. 
Considering the large disparity found between the use of the words in the “target” and 
“victim” categories, I feel confident that the results of my analysis accurately represent 
how drone strikes are most often framed by the US media. However, in order to better 
address concerns of context, I performed a more traditional framing analysis on a 
randomly selected sub-sample of articles. 
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     I selected 10 percent of the articles published in 2013 from both the New York Times 
and the Wall Street Journal (15 articles from the NYT, 10 articles from the WSJ).25 I 
examined each article for references to those being targeted and/or killed by drone strikes 
and found that approximately 62 percent of the time, those being referred to were 
described using words from the target category used in my analysis. Thirty-four percent 
of the time those being referenced as targeted and/or killed by drone strikes were referred 
to using words from the victim category, and four percent of the time they were referred 
to as people. While the disparity of references to drone strikes killing terrorists vs. drone 
strikes killing civilians is not as high in this sample as the overall word count analysis 
suggests, it still represents a nearly two-to-one ratio and therefore supports the basic 
conclusion that drones are usually being framed as a weapon used against terrorists, not a 
killer of women and children.  
     In regards to context, there were ten instances of frame negation (seven for the idea 
that drones kill terrorists and three for the idea that drones kill civilians) and three out of 
context uses of the word civilian (civilian court, civilian aircraft, civilians killed by 
militants). Interestingly, two somewhat common framings found in this sample were the 
idea that drone strikes contribute to the growth of terrorism (11 references), and the idea 
of a need for greater transparency regarding drone strikes (8 references). There were no 
framings of drones as a means of protecting pilots, and only one framing that referenced 
any element of the “PlayStation Mentality” narrative. Considering that both the idea that 
drone strikes contribute to the growth of terrorism and the idea that the US government is 
not forthcoming in regards to who is actually being targeted and killed in drone strikes 
                                                          
25 2013 was chosen because in addition to being the year the most articles were published by each news 
outlet it was also the year GOOGLE trends indicated the most public interest in drone strikes.  
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are negative framings, it is possible that overall, US news media coverage of drone 
strikes is much more balanced (at least for 2013) than my word count analysis indicates. 
However, considering that out of the 25 articles examined six focused almost entirely on 
strikes that killed specific terrorists or targeted specific terrorist groups and only one 
focused exclusively on civilians killed in drone strikes, it seems that while negative 
framing is certainly present, drones are most often presented as effective weapons against 
terror.     
     Considering the relatively small number of people who have any first-hand knowledge 
of the US government’s drone program it is highly unlikely that public opinion is being 
driven by relevant personal experience, or through conversations with people who have 
first-hand knowledge or experience. Again, public opinion formation is a communicative 
process, so this still leaves the mass media as the most likely medium through which 
people receive information about drone strikes. It may be that public opinion is being 
largely driven by messages communicated through the media, just not through the news 
media. As stated earlier, 68 percent of American adults now get at least some of their 
news from social media, and while more than half are skeptical of the accuracy of the 
news they receive, the reason most often cited for using this medium to gather 
information is “convenience” (Matsa and Shearer, 2018).  
    Without knowing how large the presence is of traditional news sources on social media 
platforms and/or how frequently these platforms are used to connect to traditional media 
sources, it is extremely difficult to estimate what impact publications such as the New 
York Times and the Wall Street Journal may actually be having on the formation of 
public opinion. Additionally, drones are frequently featured in film and television, quite 
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often in a less than favorable light. Self-styled documentaries like National Bird (2016), 
Drone (2014), and Dirty Wars (2013) present a decidedly negative view of US drone 
strikes, as do feature films such as Drones (2013), Good Kill (2014), and London Has 
Fallen (2016). The fourth season of the popular TV series Homeland begins with a 
“successful” drone strike that, in addition to its intended target, also kills 40 innocents at 
a wedding. Therefore, it is possible that drone strikes are being framed far more 
negatively by other forms of mass media.  
     Finally, although repetition has generally been considered as one of the most 
important ways the media communicates what is important, framing is more than 
repetition. Framing is a way of promoting a particular “problem, definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993, 
pg.52). If civilian deaths caused by drone strikes are being framed in a way that presents 
a moral evaluation that is significantly negative and significantly salient, these frames 
may be more influential on public opinion, than frames which simply describe terrorists 
being killed in a very straightforward and objective fashion. Compare the following. 
     This excerpt from the New York Times describes a drone strike conducted against 
Taliban leader Wali ur-Rehman. 
    Two Pakistani security officials, one speaking from Peshawar, the regional 
capital, said that Mr. Rehman was among five people killed when missiles fired 
from a drone struck a house outside Miram Shah, the main town in the tribal 
district of North Waziristan, about 3 a.m. Wednesday. A local resident, reached 
by phone, said that shortly after the strikes, three pickup trucks carrying fighters 
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rushed to the site to retrieve bodies and look for wounded militants. Two Uzbek 
militants were also killed, Pakistani officials said (Mazzatti and Walsh, 2013). 
The coverage of this strike makes it clear that Mr. Rehman was a Taliban commander, 
and strongly suggests that those killed along with him were Taliban fighters. This excerpt 
is typical of how the US news media communicates the message that drones kill 
terrorists. Contrast this with an excerpt from opinion editorial published a week earlier by 
The New York Times denouncing the President Obama’s use of drone strikes in the war 
on terror. 
     When Barack Obama ran for president of the United States in 2008, his 
message of hope and change gave us, the citizens of lesser republics, hope that 
he would close Guantánamo and shut down programs where extrajudicial 
killing or bribing foreign heads of state with American taxpayer dollars had 
become standard practice. 
     Instead, a few days after his inaugural address, a C.I.A.-operated drone 
dropped Hellfire missiles on Fahim Qureishi's home in North Waziristan, killing 
seven of his family members and severely injuring Fahim. He was just 13 years 
old and left with only one eye, and shrapnel in his stomach. There was no 
militant present. A recent book revealed that Mr. Obama was informed about 
the erroneous target but still did not offer any form of redress, because in 2009, 
the United States did not acknowledge the existence of its own drone program in 
Pakistan. 
     Sadaullah Wazir was another victim of hope and change. His house in North 
Waziristan was targeted on Sept. 7, 2009. The strike killed four members of his 
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family. Sadaullah was 14 years old when it happened. A few days after the 
attack, he woke up in a Peshawar hospital to the news that both of his legs had 
to be amputated and he would never be able to walk again. He died last year, 
without receiving justice or even an apology. Once again, no militant was 
present or killed (Akbar, 2013). 
Here, the message is much more detailed and graphic. Those killed are clearly innocent, 
and those who survive are children, left broken and disfigured. When deaths of innocent 
civilians are framed in this manner, the images created are far more vivid than those 
created by a standard new report. This makes the frame much more salient and, I believe, 
much more likely to influence public opinion.  
          At the beginning of this chapter, I introduced Zaller’s RAS model of public opinion 
formation. In explaining his model, Zaller argues that the messages people receive from 
the popular media, originate with political elites. He defines political elites as, 
“politicians, higher-level government officials, journalists, some activists, and many 
kinds of experts and policy specialists” ((1992, pg.6). In the next chapter I examine the 
discourse of elites involved in the debate over drone strikes. I believe that the messages 
which ultimately influence public opinion the most on this issue, are communicated to the 
public in the form of narratives. In the next chapter, I derive three distinct transitive 
narratives from the elite discourse surrounding drone strikes and test the effectiveness of 
each narratives central message on influencing public opinion. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DRONE DISCOURSE: A NARRATIVE APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING 
PUBLIC OPINION AND DRONE STRIKES  
     In the preceding chapter, I introduced Zaller’s RAS model of public opinion 
formation. The RAS model argues that people first receive messages about a political 
issue, then accept those messages based on how well they conform with prior beliefs, and 
finally sample from the messages they have accepted based on which of those messages 
are currently salient. The model further asserts that the messages which ultimately 
influence public opinion are produced by the discourse of political elites and 
disseminated to the public by the popular media. 
     Zaller defines political elites as, “politicians, higher-level government officials, 
journalists, some activists, and many kinds of experts and policy specialists” (1992, pg. 
6). As discussed in the previous two chapters, journalists have tended to frame public 
support for drone strikes as high and explain this support as the result of concerns over 
terrorism and avoiding US military casualties. Additionally, the US news media tends to 
report that those killed in drone strikes are terrorists and militants, not women and 
children. Since the viewpoints presented by journalists have already been explored, the 
viewpoints examined in this chapter will be the viewpoints of other political elites. 
Narrative Communication 
     A narrative is a spoken or written account of connected events. Narratives differ from 
frames in that whereas frames communicate certain aspects of an issue, narratives 
communicate a complete and encompassing story about an issue. An act of narrative 
communication however, involves a bit more than just telling a story. The defining 
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feature of narrative communication is that it produces messages which impart a transitive 
view of the world (Coste, 1989). A transitive relationship is one where, if A is equal to B, 
and B is equal to C, then A must also be equal to C. In the case of drone strikes, if drone 
strikes = killing terrorists, and killing terrorists = keeping the United States safe from 
terrorist attacks, then drone strikes = keeping the United States safe from terrorist 
attacks. I believe that in regards to the issue of drone strikes, it is this type of narrative 
that characterizes the effect of elite discourse on public opinion. 
     Writing in the context of war policy, Kubiak (2014) argues that narratives tell stories 
that construct the political environment, define actors, and cast roles. While drone strikes 
do not qualify as war policy as Kubiak defines it, they are a part of the US “War on 
Terror” and as such we might expect that the narratives surrounding drone strikes serve 
similar functions. Narratives designed to increase support for drone strikes construct a 
political environment where the United States is under the constant threat of terrorist 
attack. Those being killed by drone strikes are “bad guys” who want to kill as many 
Americans as they can, while those who operate the drones are the “good guys” who 
protect the nation and its citizens. Narratives designed to increase opposition to drone 
strikes construct a political environment where foreign civilians live in constant fear and 
danger. Those killed by drone strikes are innocents, and those doing the killing are 
cowards. These narratives represent two distinct stories, constructed with the goal of 
influencing opinion. The factor that decides which of these stories resonates is, I argue, 
individual moral attitudes.     
     In this chapter I derive three distinct transitive narratives from the elite discourse 
surrounding drone strikes; the “Drones Kill Terrorists” narrative, the “Drones Kill 
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Civilians” narrative, and the “PlayStation Mentality” narrative. These narratives represent 
my attempt to organize the elite discourse surrounding the issue of drone strikes. With the 
exception of the “PlayStation Mentality” the names of these narratives are my own 
creation. The substance of the narratives is extracted directly from elite discourse 
surrounding drone strikes, and to the best of my knowledge, the suite of beliefs that each 
of these narratives represent have never been grouped and categorized as transitive 
narratives before. 
     The purpose of creating these narratives, is to allow for the operationalization and 
testing of the effect of elite discourse on public opinion. I believe that the narratives I 
have created encapsulate the messages that have the greatest impact on the shaping of 
public opinion on drone strikes. While the individual effects of these messages will be 
examined in a later chapter, the focus in this chapter is on evaluating the effectiveness of 
each narrative at communicating its primary message.  
     The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: first, I examine the elite discourse 
surrounding the issue of drone strikes and derive the three narratives to be tested. Next, I 
develop a series of hypotheses based on the idea that the best way to observe the 
effectiveness of each narrative is to test its ability to create an implicit association 
between drone strikes and the narratives primary element. Finally, I test these hypotheses 
using a survey-experiment.   
   Elite Discourse and the Creation of Three Drone Strike Narratives 
     Although the large-scale use of weaponized drones is a relatively recent development, 
a spirited, and at times contentious, debate has arisen over their use. Disagreements 
between politicians, activists, academics, government officials and others over the 
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legality, morality, and effectiveness of using armed drones to further US security interests 
has led to a number of claims and counter-claims varying widely in validity and 
coherence. While many claims about drone strikes do not hold up under serious scrutiny, 
there are legitimate concerns regarding the use of armed drones that are both relevant and 
unique. Unfortunately, a dispassionate discussion of these legitimate concerns is 
something that rarely characterizes these debates. Instead, elite discourse regarding the 
use of armed drones has traditionally taken the form of competing narratives, and while 
the back-and-forth over the use of armed drones among elites has not devolved into a 
purely zero-sum competition of advocacy, a clear division of opinion exists between 
those who support drone strikes and those who oppose them. 
     Those who support drone strikes, point to the fact that drones reduce the risk to US 
military personnel by eliminating the need to send pilots and aircrew into harm’s way. 
They argue that drones are extremely precise in their targeting and represent an efficient 
and effective method of combatting terrorism. Opponents dispute these claims, arguing 
that drone strikes are imprecise, and have caused the death of hundreds of innocent 
civilians while killing only a handful of high-level terrorists. They further argue that the 
ill-will created by drone strikes generates support for the groups being targeted, 
increasing their ability to recruit new members. Opponents of drone strikes also contend 
that despite the benefit of reducing potential risks to US military personnel, the fact that 
drone operators face no real danger, could make leaders too quick to resort to force, and 
drone operators too callous about killing. 
     The discourse created by these differences of opinion often takes the form of narrative 
communication. An act of narrative communication imparts a transitive view of the world 
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through the use of connected elements (Coste, 1989). Not every narrative involved in the 
elite discourse surrounding drone strikes is, in this sense, narrative communication. The 
argument that using drones to strike terrorist targets protects the lives of pilots and 
aircrew is a narrative, but it does not promote a transitive view of the world. Instead this 
narrative is very direct. Because drones do not require pilots and aircrew, pilots and 
aircrew are not placed at risk. The relationship described here is a simple A = B 
relationship. There are no transitive elements in this narrative.  
     As discussed in Chapter 1, the concern for avoiding military casualties does appear be 
a motivating factor for those who support drone strikes This indicates that a narrative 
does not have to be transitive in nature in order to have an effect on public opinion. As 
such, I will be including this narrative along with the three narratives discussed below in 
my empirical testing.   
The War on Terror and the “Drones Kill Terrorists” Narrative 
     The “Drones Kill Terrorists” narrative encourages public support for drone strikes by 
linking the use of armed drones to the ongoing “War on Terror”.  In this narrative drone 
strikes are not only extremely effective for targeting terrorists, they are necessary for 
protecting the United States from terrorist attack. The primary messages communicated 
by this narrative are that those targeted by drone strikes are terrorists, that drone strikes 
are necessary for protecting the United States from terrorist attack, and that drone strikes 
are precise. The transitive relationship expressed by the “Drones Kill Terrorists” narrative 
is, if drone strikes = killing terrorists, and killing terrorists = keeping the United States 
safe from terrorist attacks, then drone strikes = keeping the United States safe from 
terrorist attacks. The message that drone strikes are precise works to support the idea that 
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those killed by drone strikes are terrorists and refute the idea that drone strikes kill 
civilians. Effectively, the “Drones Kill Terrorists” narrative is a sub-narrative of the “War 
on Terror” narrative which began under the presidency of George W. Bush. Therefore, to 
understand how the transitive relationship expressed in this narrative was created, we 
need to look back at President Bush’s response to the attacks of 9/11.  
     Following the events of September 11th, 2001, Americans needed a way to make sense 
of what had occurred. They needed to know who had attacked and why, as well as how to 
feel and what to do. Most importantly, Americans needed a way to feel safe and in 
control again. The “War on Terror” narrative, filled those needs. In a speech given nine-
days after the attack, President George W. Bush began helping Americans make sense of 
the tragedy that had occurred.  
On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our 
country. Americans have known wars, but for the past 136 years they have been 
wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the 
casualties of war, but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. 
Americans have known surprise attacks, but never before on thousands of 
civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day, and night fell on a 
different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack. Americans have 
many questions tonight. Americans are asking, ``Who attacked our country?'' 
(Washington Post, 2001).  
The President answered his rhetorical question by informing Americans that those 
responsible for the attacks had been members of a loosely affiliated terrorist organization 
known as al Qaeda. He went on to inform the American public that in addition to hating 
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democracy and freedom, the terrorists who attacked the United States wanted to drive 
Israel out of the Middle East and Christians and Jews out of parts of Asia and Africa. 
According to President Bush, al Qaeda’s goal was not only to end lives, but disrupt a way 
of life. In the end, al Qaeda stands against America because America stands in its way. 
     President Bush ended his speech by asking Americans to continue to live their lives 
just as they had before the attacks. The President acknowledged Americans fears and 
instructed them to “hug your children.” He urged Americans to uphold their values and 
warned that the United States was in a fight for its principles. Importantly, the President 
insisted that no one should be “singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because 
of their ethnic background or religious faith. In short, although the United States had been 
attacked by a network of religiously motivated terrorists, who hate America for the 
freedoms it represents, the United States was not at war with Muslims, it was at war with 
terrorists. President Bush then promised to, “…direct every resource at our command--
every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law 
enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war--to the 
destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network” (Washington Post, 2001). The 
United States was now at war, the objective of which was nothing less than the complete 
destruction of those who attacked us. 
     President Bush would repeat these themes many times over the course of the next 
seven years of his presidency. Although every bit as metaphorical as the “War on Drugs” 
or the “War on Poverty”, the “War on Terror” differed in that there was an actual armed 
enemy force to be dealt with. While the concept of “terror” may have been an abstraction, 
al Qaeda and the Taliban were real, and destroying them meant applying large-scale 
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military force. A narrative that portrayed the enemy not just as evil and unjust, but also as 
an existential threat to the American way of life, ensured continued public support for 
military operations.26 Even today 73 percent of Americans continue to view combatting 
terrorism as a “top priority” for the President and Congress (Pew, 2018a).  
     Upon taking office President Barack Obama would continue the “War on Terror” 
narrative and explicitly link it to the use of armed drones. In a May 23, 2013 address to 
the National Defense University, President Obama directly defended the use of armed 
drones against terrorist organizations. 
So it is in this context that the United States has taken lethal, targeted action 
against al Qaeda and its associated forces, including with remotely piloted 
aircraft commonly referred to as drones. As was true in previous armed 
conflicts, this new technology raises profound questions — about who is 
targeted, and why; about civilian casualties, and the risk of creating new 
enemies; about the legality of such strikes under U.S. and international law; 
about accountability and morality.  So let me address these questions.  
     To begin with, our actions are effective.  Don’t take my word for it.  In the 
intelligence gathered at bin Laden’s compound, we found that he wrote, “We 
could lose the reserves to enemy’s air strikes.  We cannot fight air strikes with 
explosives.”  Other communications from al Qaeda operatives confirm this as 
well. Dozens of highly skilled al Qaeda commanders, trainers, bomb makers and 
operatives have been taken off the battlefield.  Plots have been disrupted that 
                                                          
26 Including the 2003 US Invasion of Iraq which 72% of Americans originally supported. 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/8038/seventytwo-percent-americans-support-war-against-iraq.aspx 
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would have targeted international aviation, U.S. transit systems, European cities 
and our troops in Afghanistan. Simply put, these strikes have saved lives. 
Moreover, America’s actions are legal. We were attacked on 9/11.  Within a 
week, Congress overwhelmingly authorized the use of force.  Under domestic 
law, and international law, the United States is at war with al Qaeda, the 
Taliban, and their associated forces.  We are at war with an organization that 
right now would kill as many Americans as they could if we did not stop them 
first.  So this is a just war — a war waged proportionally, in last resort, and in 
self-defense (New York Times, 2013). 
     While the president’s one-hour address was a speech on US counter-terrorism efforts 
and covered much more than just drone strikes (including the terrorist detention center at 
Guantanamo Bay), it was the President’s comments on the use of armed drones that, for 
many, seemed to define the speech.  The New York Times headlined its publication of the 
speech transcripts, “Obama’s Speech on Drone Policy”, with writers for, the Atlantic, 
Human Rights Watch, and the Council on Foreign Relations all following suit (Reeve, 
2013; Prasow, 2014; Zenko, 2014).  
     Given the timing of the speech, it is somewhat understandable why many would 
choose this characterization. As presented in the last chapter, 2013 was the height of both 
media and public interest in drone strikes. So while the President’s speech may have 
ostensibly been about counter-terrorism in general, the overall effect was not only to link 
drones strikes to the “War on Terror” but also to endorse the idea that by killing 
terrorists, drone strikes have been extremely effective at preventing further attacks 
against the United States. These are two of the key messages promoted by the “Drones 
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Kill Terrorists” narrative, and when presented together in the context of the greater “War 
on Terror” they create a transitive connection between drone strikes and protecting the 
United States from future terrorist attack. 
     President Obama is not the only high-level government official to endorse the primary 
messages promoted by the “Drones Kill Terrorists” narrative. White House counter-
terrorism adviser John Brennan (NPR, 2012) characterized drone strikes as a matter of 
“national self-defense” and described the ability of drones to precisely target enemy 
combatants and minimize “collateral damage” as “unprecedented.”  White House Press 
Secretary Jay Carney argued that drone strikes were both “precise” and “lawful” (Mali, 
2013). And in 2016, while addressing members of the U.S. Senate Armed Service 
Committee, General Herbert J. Carlisle, Commander of the US Air Force Air Combat 
Command, described drone strikes as being, “instrumental” to protecting national 
security. Here again we see key elements of the “Drones Kill Terrorists” narrative being 
expressed in elite discourse.   
     Outside of those speaking for the government, the ability of drones to limit collateral 
damage, and the effectiveness of drone strikes at protecting the United States from 
terrorist attacks are the two messages most often communicated. Byman notes that, even 
the most unfavorable estimates of the number of civilians killed in drone strikes are lower 
than what one would expect from other forms of strikes, and that drones can “…keep 
Taliban leaders on the run and hinder al Qaeda’s ability to plot another 9/11” (Byman, 
2013, pg.43). Stern writes that drones are, “…significantly more discriminating than any 
other weapon fired from afar” (2015, pg.64). And both Jordan (2014) and Johnston and 
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Sarbahi (2015) argue that drone strikes have hampered terrorists’ abilities to carry out 
attacks on the West. 
     The key messages promoted by the “Drones Kill Terrorists” narrative can all be found 
in the discourse above and in discourse like this. Drone strikes are precise, they kill 
terrorists, and they are necessary for protecting the United States from terrorist attack. 
These are the messages government officials, academics, and policy experts 
communicate when they seek to encourage support for drone strikes. When 
communicated together, these messages create a transitive relationship between drone 
strikes and protecting the United States from terrorist attack.  
Blowback, Distinction and the “Drones Kill Civilians” Narrative 
     The “Drones Kill Children” narrative encourages public opposition to drone strikes by 
focusing on the impact of drone strikes on civilian populations. This narrative provides a 
direct counter to the “Drones Kill Terrorists” narrative, and claims that large numbers of 
civilians, many of them women and children, are being killed due to the inaccurate nature 
and/or indiscriminate use of “drone” technology. Additionally, this narrative argues that 
drone strikes kill relatively few terrorists and, because of the ill-will they engender, drone 
strikes make the United States less safe by increasing terrorist recruitment and 
encouraging retaliation. This narrative promotes the perception that dead civilians are the 
inevitable outcome of drone strikes, and that these deaths are random, pointless, and 
frequent. The primary messages communicated by this narrative are that drone strikes are 
inaccurate, that many more civilians than terrorists are killed by drone strikes, and that 
drone strikes contribute to the growth of terrorism. The transitive relationship expressed 
by this narrative is, if drone strikes = killing civilians, and killing civilians = an immoral 
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act, then drone strikes = an immoral act. While the messages promoted by the “Drones 
Kill Civilians” narrative are rarely communicated by high-level government officials, 
they are frequently communicated by policy experts, academics (especially those 
involved with international law), and activists.  
    In an editorial for the New York Times, policy experts David Kilcullen and Andrew 
Exum made the claim that for every terrorist leader killed by a “drone”, fifty civilians 
also die. Citing “press reports” and Pakistani news sources, Kilcullen and Exum allege 
that between 2006 and 2009 approximately 700 civilians died from drone strikes while 
only 14 terrorist leaders were killed. According to Kilcullen and Exum, every 
noncombatant killed, “…represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and 
more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes 
have increased.” Arguing that the use of drones to separate violent extremists from the 
population has been ineffective, Kilcullen and Exum conclude that al Qaeda and its 
Taliban allies must be defeated by “indigenous forces”, not forces from the United States 
(2009).  
     This short editorial represents one of the earliest employments of the “Drone Kill 
Civilians” narrative, and although Kilcullen and Exum’s argument was more about the 
strategic effectiveness of US drone strikes in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA), than about how many innocent civilians actually die in drone strikes, two 
of the key messages promoted by the “Drones Kill Civilians” narrative are present. The 
message that drone strikes contribute to the growth of terrorism (also known as 
“blowback”), and the message that drone strikes kill large numbers of innocent civilians.  
Kilcullen and Exum’s claim of a 50 to 1 civilian/terrorist death ratio strongly promotes 
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the idea that most of those killed by drone strikes are civilians.27  Additionally, the 
“blowback” argument counters the idea that drone strikes protect the United States from 
terrorist attacks, undermining one of the key messages promoted by the “Drones Kill 
Terrorists” narrative. 
     One significant area of debate surrounding drone strikes is their legality. O’Connell 
concedes to the legality of drone strikes in areas of recognized armed conflict (2010a, 
pg.1 and 2014, pg.522), but denounces US drone strikes occurring in Pakistan and 
Yemen as violations of international law. O’Connell contends that in addition to violating 
Pakistani and Yemeni sovereignty, US drone strikes violate the jus in bello principles of 
distinction and proportionality (2010b, 2011, 2014). 
     The principle of distinction stipulates that, “The parties to a conflict must at all times 
distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against 
combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians” (ICRC, 2019) . According 
to O’Connell, drone strikes violate this customary rule of International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL) because of the inherently unreliable nature of drone cameras and missile 
guidance systems. O’Connell also claims that drone pilots often defer targeting 
judgments to the “computer” (2010b).  
                                                          
27 This 50 to 1 ratio is not only unconscionable, it is logically and empirically unsustainable. Estimates from 
both the New America Foundation and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism put civilian to terrorist 
death ratios during this time much lower, with the number of terrorists killed outstripping the number of 
civilians by at least a factor of 3. Additionally, by limiting their definition of terrorists to only high-level 
leaders, Kilcullen and Exum are being disingenuous. Limiting the definition of terrorist to only high-level 
leaders is the equivalent of limiting the definition of soldier to only Generals. High-level Taliban and al 
Qaeda leaders are the commanders of irregular military forces. Those they command to fight government 
forces and carry out attacks on the local population are lawful combatants, and as such can be legally 
targeted by drone strikes. Leaving these combatants out of the equation allows Kilcullen and Exum to 
create a sensationalistic statistic, that bolsters their primary argument. 
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     Considering O’Connell’s testimony before Congress in which she declared drones to 
be, “…more protective of civilian lives than high aerial bombing or long-range artillery” 
adding that drone cameras “can pick up details about the presence of civilians” and that 
“[d]rones can fly low and target more precisely using this information” (2010a) her 
subsequent claims regarding how drone strikes violate the principle of distinction are 
perplexing. Additionally, deferring targeting decisions to the drone’s “computer” is not 
something that is not technologically possible.28 Regardless, the majority of O’Connell’s 
discourse on the issue of drone strikes (and it is extensive) communicates two key 
messages of the “Drones Kill Civilians” narrative. The first is, of course, that drone 
strikes kill civilians, the second is that these civilians die because drones cannot hit what 
they are aiming at, and/or, because of glitches in the technology, often make invalid 
targeting decisions. The communication of this message directly rebuts the message 
promoted by the “Drones Kill Terrorists” narrative that drone strikes are accurate.  
     While both policy experts and academics routinely communicate key messages of 
the “Drones Kill Civilians” narrative, those who communicate this narrative most 
effectively are human rights activists. In 2012, the International Human Rights and 
Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School and the Global Justice Clinic at New 
York School of Law jointly published a report titled, Living Under Drones: Death, 
Injury, and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan. Drawing on 
interviews with the victims of three alleged drone attacks, as well as other “corroborating 
evidence” the report concludes that US drone strikes are “damaging and 
                                                          
28 Judging from her footnotes, O’Connell appears to draw her erroneous conclusion regarding pilots 
deferring to the RPA computer from a discussion by Peter W. Singer of the Aegis weapons systems found 
on US Navy warships.  
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counterproductive.” The report argues directly against the key messages promoted by the 
“Drones Kill Terrorists” narrative, by referring to these beliefs as the US government’s 
narrative and stating simply, “[t]his narrative is false” (pg. v.).  
     Although the stories related in this report are quite detailed in the accounts of the 
injuries sustained and the hardships endured, they are fairly sparse in terms of evidence 
indicating that the strikes in question were the result of US drone strikes, and/or that 
those killed were actually civilians. For the most part “corroborating evidence” of the 
authors’ conclusions take the form of US government denials that those killed in the 
strikes in question were civilians (proof that the strike did occur) and claims from those 
interviewed that those killed were civilians (proof that those killed were civilians). In 
effect, US government accounts will be believed only insofar as they confirm that a strike 
did occur. What type of aircraft delivered the strike, and the civilian status of those who 
are killed and injured, are details left to be affirmed by those residing in Pakistan. 
     In 2013 Amnesty International published a similar report titled, Will I Be Next? US 
Drone Strikes in Pakistan. On the cover is a picture of a young, sad-eyed Pakistani girl, 
and inside the report is the heart-breaking story of Manama Bibi, a 68-year-old 
grandmother who was allegedly killed by a drone strike as her grandchildren watched in 
horror. A second anecdote relates the tale of 18 laborers who were also allegedly killed 
by drone strikes, as they returned from a day working in the chromite mines. Twenty-two 
others were reported to have been wounded in these strikes, but only an 8-year-old girl 
(Shehrbano) was identified by name.   
     Using women and children as proxies for all civilian victims of drone strikes activates 
the normative assumption that women and children are innocent and vulnerable, creating 
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a victim frame that resonates with the “moral language” of donors, belligerents, and the 
media (Carpenter, 2005).  It is this activation of people’s moral objection to the harming 
of innocents, that makes activists’ communication of the “Drones Kill Civilians” 
narrative so effective. In addition to directly rebutting every message communicated by 
the “Drones Kill Civilians” narrative, activist discourse goes beyond just the primary 
connection of drone strikes = killing civilians and creates the transitive relationship of 
drone strikes = an immoral act.   
Drone Operators as Cowards: The “PlayStation Mentality” 
     A second narrative designed to encourage public opposition to drone strikes is the 
“PlayStation Mentality” narrative. This narrative equates the operation of a combat drone 
to playing a video game and claims that because operators sit far removed from the 
battlefield, drone strikes are unfair to those being targeted. It calls into question the 
military ethics and personal courage of drone operators. The key messages promoted by 
this narrative are that operating a drone is like playing a video game, and that because of 
the distance drone operators sit from the battlefield they 1) cannot comprehend the 
serious nature of their actions and 2) are cowards. The transitive relationship created by 
this narrative is, if drone strikes = being removed from the battlefield, and being removed 
from the battlefield = detachment and cowardice, then drone strikes = detachment and 
cowardice. 
     In a 2010 report to the UN General Assembly, UN Human Rights Council Special 
Rapporteur Philip Alston stated, “…because (RPA) operators are based thousands of 
miles away from the battlefield, and undertake operations entirely through computer 
screens and remote audiofeed, there is a risk of developing a “PlayStation” mentality to 
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killing” (pg.25).  While negative attitudes toward the use of drones in combat certainly 
precede Alston’s statement to the UN General Assembly, the Special Rapporteur’s use of 
the term “PlayStation mentality” seems to have struck a harmonious chord among many 
major media outlets. Within a week the New York Times, the BBC, Reuters, and the 
Guardian all ran stories citing Alston’s remarks, apparently attempting to embed the idea 
among the general public that killing with a “drone” is more like a playing a game than 
fighting a war (Savage, 2010; BBC, 2010; Nebehay, 2010; Walsh, 2010). 
     Although some might argue that Alston’s comments constitute only a few lines of a 
much larger report intended to assess the legality of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan and 
therefore should not be seen as a serious concern but rather as a tertiary musing, that 
argument is undermined by comments Alston made nearly six months earlier in an 
opinion piece featured in the Guardian. In this piece Alston made similar remarks 
regarding the “PlayStation mentality” asking how, “[y]oung military personnel raised on 
a diet of video games” could possibly understand the consequences of their actions. 
Alston also makes several references to “killer drones” and called for greater 
transparency on the part of governments who use drones in combat situations (Alston and 
Shamsi, 2010).  
     While Alston appears to have been the originator of the “PlayStation Mentality” 
narrative, the promotion of this narrative by those working for the United Nations did not 
end with Alston’s departure from his post. Christof Heyns, Alston’s successor, states that 
the issue is still one of relevance. “The concern here is that many of those operating 
drones are many thousands of miles away from the battlefield, outside harm's way, and so 
they are removed from the realities of violence and war on the ground and often in 
94 
 
situations where there is not an appropriate emphasis on international humanitarian law” 
(Jepson, 2010). While the primary focus of both Alston and Heyns in their role as UN 
Special Rapporteurs was the investigation of the legality of U.S. and British drone strikes, 
both also demonstrated a willingness to speculate about mental effects of killing from a 
remotely operated platform. In doing so these high-level government officials 
communicated all but one of the messages promoted by the “PlayStation Mentality” 
narrative. Despite the intense focus of Alston and Heyns discourse on the detachment 
drone operators may develop, neither Alston or Heyns make any reference to cowardice.     
     Perhaps the most cited (and improperly cited) author when it comes to “drone 
warfare” is Peter W. Singer. Anti-drone activist Madea Benjamin cites Singer, arguing 
that those “deeply involved in the military’s UAV programs” explicitly attempt to appeal 
to the youth gaming culture by designing drone controls to simulate those of a 
PlayStation (2013). However, if one examines the passage Benjamin cites, it is clear that 
Singer is not referring to combat drones, but rather a portable ground unit used by the 
Marines called the Dragon Runner (Singer, 2009, pg. 68). Dragon Runners are small, 
tracked vehicles used for surveillance and counter-IED (improvised explosive device) 
operations. They weigh between 10 and 20 pounds and do not carry any type of weapon 
or offensive ordnance (QinetiQ, 2018). So while the Marines operating the Dragon-
Runner may be doing so with a control interface modeled after PlayStation controllers, 
they are not using it to kill people. Therefore, the “PlayStation mentality” that Alston and 
Heyns have speculated about, and that Benjamin seems eager to endorse, could hardly 
apply in this situation.  
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     Still, Benjamin’s claim that the U.S. Air Force explicitly targets “gamers” in its 
recruitment of drone operators has become a common and accepted part of the 
“PlayStation Mentality” narrative. In addition to communicating the message that 
operating a military drone is like playing a video game, this image of drone operators as 
“gamers” contributes to creation of the transitive relationship between drone strikes and 
cowardice. By communicating the message that drone operators are kids recruited for 
their skills at playing video games and implying that many of them may view killing as 
nothing more than an extension of those games, an image of drone operators is created 
that is in direct contrast to the image most Americans hold of the military members they 
admire and respect. Others go even farther in communicating the message that drone 
strikes are cowardly 
     Retired USAF fighter pilot Shane Riza argues that drones represent a serious 
challenge to the “warrior ethos.” According to Riza, the immunity from retaliation that 
drone operators enjoy takes the “heart” out of killing and in doing so discounts the “awful 
complexity” of war. This total “impunity” from the risks associated with war negatively 
impacts the “…conversation among combatants engaged in the game of mortal combat,” 
and threatens to destroy the moral foundations of warfare (Riza, 2013, pg. xiv). This 
message communicated by Riza’s discourse is similar to the discourse of activists 
promoting the “Drones Kill Civilians” narrative in that it makes a transitive connection 
between drone strikes and an immoral act. What is different however is that in the case, 
the focus is not on the act, but on those committing it. Just as the in the Iliad where the 
Greeks mocked Paris’ courage due to his reliance on a bow, so too is Riza questioning 
the courage of drone operators. They face no risk, they kill without “heart” and they 
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“destroy the moral foundations of warfare.” Although Riza never uses the word, his 
message is clear. Drone operators are cowards.  
     By emphasizing the fact that drone operators sit far-removed from the battlefield and 
conflating the operation of a military drone with the playing of video games, the 
PlayStation Mentality narrative creates an image of drone operators that is in direct 
contrast to the image most Americans hold of the military members drones are supposed 
to protect. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 depict cartoons taken from the internet that vividly 
illustrate this contrast. While these cartoons may not make direct reference to cowardice, 
they make a clear distinction between “heroes” and drone operators. The message 
communicated by illustrations such as these is clear: drone operators are not real 
members of the military, and deserve ridicule not respect. 
 
   
Figure 3.1. Fighter Pilot vs. Drone Pilot (by sinann @ from toonpool.com) 
97 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. War Heroes (assets.amuniversal.com) 
 
 
Testing the Effectiveness of Drone Strike Discourse 
     As discussed in Chapter 1, public opinion is the aggregation individual opinions. 
Individuals form their opinions through a process of collective discourse, facilitated by 
the popular media. By supplying people with a variety of competing and complementing 
viewpoints, the media provides the primary framework on which individual opinions are 
constructed. These competing and complementary viewpoints are derived from the 
discourse of elites. From this discourse I have identified three distinct lines of argument, 
each communicating a related set of messages designed to encourage either support or 
opposition to drone strikes. From these lines of argument, I have constructed three 
transitive narratives which I argue significantly influence public opinion. 
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     The “Drones Kill Terrorists” narrative encourages public support for drone strikes by 
linking the use of armed drones to the ongoing “War on Terror”. This narrative creates a 
transitive relationship between drone strikes and keeping the United States safe from 
terrorist attack. The messages communicated by this narrative are that those targeted by 
drone strikes are terrorists, that drone strikes are necessary for protecting the United 
States from terrorist attack, and that drone strikes are precise. 
     The “Drones Kill Children” narrative encourages public opposition to drone strikes by 
focusing on the impact of drone strikes on civilian populations. This narrative creates a 
transitive relationship between drone strikes and the commission of an immoral act. The 
messages communicated by this narrative are that drone strikes are inaccurate, many 
more civilians than terrorists are killed by drone strikes, and drone strikes contribute to 
the growth of terrorism. The “Drones Kill Civilians” narrative serves as a direct counter 
to the “Drones Kill Terrorists” narrative. 
     The “PlayStation Mentality” narrative also encourages public opposition to drone 
strikes. This narrative equates the operation of a military drone to playing a video game 
and claims that because operators sit far removed from the battlefield, drone strikes are 
unfair to those being targeted, and calls into question the military ethics and personal 
courage of drone operators. The “PlayStation Mentality” narrative creates a transitive 
relationship between drone strikes and the detachment and cowardice of drone operators. 
The messages promoted by this narrative are that operating a drone is like playing a video 
game, and that because of the distance drone operators sit from the battlefield they 1) 
cannot comprehend the serious nature of their actions and 2) are cowards.  
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     In this section, I test the effectiveness of these three narratives using a survey 
experiment designed to measure how successful each of these narratives has been at 
communicating its central message to the public. To be clear, the central message of these 
narratives are not the transitive relationships they create, but rather the initial explicit 
connection they use to create the transitive relationship. For example, fully diagrammed, 
the transitive relationship for the “Drones Kill Terrorists” narrative is, if drone strikes = 
killing terrorists, and killing terrorists = keeping the United States safe from terrorist 
attacks, then drone strikes = keeping the United States safe from terrorist attacks. Here 
the initial explicit connection is that drone strikes kill terrorists. Therefore, this is the 
central element of the narrative. Similarly, the central element of the “Drones Kill 
Civilians” narrative is that drone strikes kill civilians, and the central element of the 
“PlayStation Mentality” narrative is that conducting a drone strike is like playing a video 
game. I argue the effectiveness of a narrative can be judged by how successful it has been 
at turning explicit communication into implicit association.  
Implicit Associations and the Effectiveness of Narrative 
     Implicit associations are mental connections between concepts that lie outside of 
conscious awareness (Gawronski and De Houwer, 2014). Implicit associations are the 
result of implicit social cognition, more commonly referred to as implicit bias. Implicit 
bias is an attitude or stereotype that affects a person’s understanding, actions, and 
decisions in an unconscious manner. Since they reside in the subconscious, implicit 
biases, and the associations they create, are not accessible to introspection. Implicit 
associations do not necessarily align with declared beliefs or reflect stances a person 
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explicitly endorses. Implicit associations are believed to be the result of early life 
experiences and/or popular media and news programming (Kirwan Institute, 2019).  
     Since implicit associations affect people’s decisions in an unconscious manner, I 
believe any narrative that can establish its central element as an implicit association, is 
more effective at influencing public opinion than a narrative that must rely on the explicit 
communication of its central element to produce an effect. For example, the central 
element of the “Drones Kill Terrorists” narrative is the message that drone strikes kill 
terrorists, and the desired effect of the explicit communication of this message is to 
increase public support for drone strikes. If support for drone strikes can be increased by 
simply communicating the message of terrorist threat, with no reference to drones or 
drone strikes, then this suggests that an implicit association has been established between 
drone strikes and terrorist threat.  
     Because previous research has shown that the introduction of the potential for foreign 
civilian casualties into scenarios designed to measure support for drone strikes tends to 
reduce support (Kreps, 2014; Schneider and Macdonald, 2016), I predict that the “Drones 
Kill Civilians” narrative has been more effective than the “Drones Kill Terrorists” 
narrative at establishing its central element as an implicit association. This prediction 
leads to my first two formal hypotheses. 
H1:  The “Drones Kill Civilians” narrative has been successful at establishing its central 
element as an implicit association. As such, exposure to a stimulus making conflict-
related civilian death salient, but not mentioning drones or drone strikes, will elicit an 
increase in opposition to drone strikes.  
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H2:  The “Drones Kill Terrorists” narrative has not been successful at establishing its 
central element as an implicit association. As such, exposure to a stimulus making 
terrorist threat salient, but not mentioning drones or drone strikes, will not elicit a 
decrease in opposition to drone strikes.  
    Because the results of the content analysis conducted for Chapter 2 indicated that the 
messages promoted by the “PlayStation Mentality” narrative are very rarely 
communicated to the public by the US news media, I predict that the “PlayStation 
Mentality” narrative has not been successful in establishing its central element as an 
implicit association. This prediction leads to my third formal hypothesis. 
H3:  The “PlayStation Mentality” narrative has not been successful at establishing its 
central element as an implicit association. As such, exposure to a stimulus making a link 
between military operations and video games salient, but not mentioning drones or drone 
strikes, will not elicit an increase in opposition to drone strikes.  
    As discussed earlier, not every narrative that has the potential to influence public 
opinion on drone strikes is a transitive narrative. The narrative that drone strikes protect 
pilots and aircrew is a direct narrative consisting of only one element. However, that 
element is an explicit message and the communication of it could create an implicit 
association between drone strikes and avoiding US military casualties. As such, I include 
this direct narrative in my testing as an experimental condition. I do not however, make 
any predictions as to the effectiveness of this narrative to establish its central element as 
an implicit association. 
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Experimental Design 
Method                                                                                                                                                
      To test the narratives above for the ability to establish the central element of the 
narrative as an implicit association, I conducted a survey-experiment using subjects 
recruited from Arizona State University’s School of Politics and Global Studies student 
subject pool. Like an experiment, survey experiments compare a “treatment” condition 
with a “control” condition. Subjects in the treatment condition receive a specific stimulus 
that those in the control condition do not. The outcomes are measured and differences 
between the two groups are noted. Because of random assignment, any differences in 
outcomes can be attributed to the application of the treatment. In most cases, survey 
experiments provide “the best of both worlds” in that they combine the generalizability 
and external validity of a survey with the valid causal inference and internal validity of an 
experiment (Nock and Guterbock, 2010). 
     The experiment was conducted online using Qualtrics survey software. Subjects were 
first asked to complete a short demographics questionnaire, followed by a 30 question 
moral attitudes inventory (the reason for this inventory will be discussed in the next 
chapter). Next, subjects were randomly sorted into either one of four treatment conditions 
or the control condition. In each condition subjects read a short news report 
(approximately 500 words) that served as the treatment stimulus.29 Finally, subjects were 
asked to answer a series of questions designed to measure their opposition to various uses 
of military force (including drone strikes), and beliefs about the use of armed drones. All 
                                                          
29 The CONTROL group read a news report of approximately equal length describing the awarding of the 
2028 Summer Olympics. This news report also did not contain the word “drone.” 
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news reports were stripped of any source identification and edited for length. Each 
subject group consisted of approximately 100 subjects. 
     To test the effectiveness of the “Drones Kill Civilians” narrative, a treatment condition 
(CIVCAS) was created to make the idea of civilian deaths due to military action 
immediately salient. The treatment stimulus for this condition is a news report focusing 
on civilian deaths caused by the ongoing civil war in Syria. Importantly, the civilian 
deaths in this condition are not attributed to drone strikes, nor is there any mention of 
drones anywhere in news report.  
     To test the effectiveness of the “Drones Kill Terrorists” narrative, a treatment 
condition (TERRORIST) was created which primes subjects with a news report 
discussing ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks and detailing several recent terrorist attacks that 
have occurred on US soil. As in the CIVCAS condition, the news report in this condition 
makes no mention of drones or drone strikes. 
     To test the effectiveness of the “PlayStation Mentality” narrative, a treatment 
condition (VIDEOGAME) was created which primes subjects with a news report 
detailing the US military’s use of video games to train military personnel. As in the two 
above conditions, no mention of drones or drone strikes appeared in the treatment 
stimulus. And finally, to test the effectiveness of the message that drone strikes protect 
pilots and aircrew, a treatment condition (MILCAS) was created which primes subjects 
with the idea of military casualties. In this treatment condition subjects read a news report 
describing the deaths of four US soldiers killed in a fire-fight with ISIS-backed militants 
in Niger. As in all other conditions, the news report made no mention of drones or drone 
strikes. 
104 
 
Results and Discussion                                                                                                                          
To test hypotheses H1-H3, subjects were asked… 
Do you support or oppose the United States conducting strikes from pilotless 
aircraft, commonly referred to as drones, to target extremists in other 
countries? 
Response options for this question were “strongly support”, “support”, “somewhat 
support”, “somewhat oppose”, “oppose”, and “strongly oppose.” Responses were coded 1 
through 6 in the order listed for analysis. When comparisons of mean opposition were 
conducted between the treatment conditions and the control condition, only the CIVCAS 
condition elicited an increase in opposition to drone strikes. Therefore, all three 
hypotheses were supported. The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 3.1.       
 
Table 3.1. Opposition to US Drone Strikes 
Experimental Conditions 
   N 
   Mean   Std. Dev. 
 p-
value 
CONTROL   98 3.00 1.143  
CIVCAS**  101 3.47 1.566 0.031 
VIDEOGAME   98 3.15 1.608 0.484 
TERRORIST  101 3.22 1.635 0.321 
MILCAS  99 3.24 1.546 0.257 
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01 
       
     When primed with a news report detailing civilian casualties in Syria (CIVCAS), 
respondents were significantly more likely to oppose the use of armed drones to target 
extremists in other countries. This sustains H1 and supports the conclusion that the 
“Drones Kill Civilians” narrative has been effective in creating an implicit connection 
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between conflict-induced civilian casualties and drone strikes. Additionally, as part of the 
post-treatment questionnaire, subjects were asked if they support or oppose, 1) US-led 
efforts to fight terrorism, 2) deploying large numbers of conventional military forces to 
target terrorists in other countries, 3) using military special operations forces to target 
terrorists in other countries, 4) using manned aircraft to target terrorists in other countries, 
and 5) using long range missiles to target terrorists in other countries. While increased 
opposition to “US-led efforts to fight terrorism” was somewhat significant (p =.053), an 
increase in opposition to the use of other types of the military force was not observed (see 
appendix B).  
     Again, the civilian casualties described in the treatment stimulus were not attributed to 
drone strikes, so the effects of the treatment stimulus appear to be drone specific. This 
indicates there is a connection being drawn between civilian deaths and drone strikes that 
is not being drawn between civilian deaths and the use of other types of military force. 
This provides support for the conclusion that the effect observed is indicative of an 
implicit association between civilian casualties and drone strikes, and not simply a 
negative association between civilian casualties and all uses of military force.  
     The terrorist threat (TERRORIST) condition did not significantly decrease opposition 
to drone strikes. This sustains H2 and suggests that the “Drones Kill Terrorists” narrative 
has not been effective at establishing its central element an implicit association. In fact, 
while the change in opposition was not significant, respondents appear to be slightly 
more opposed to drone strikes in this condition. This may suggest that the “Drones Kill 
Civilians” narrative has also been effective at establishing the connection between drone 
strikes and terrorist recruitment/retaliation. Again, this increase in opposition was not 
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statistically significant. However, it does raise questions regarding the effectiveness of 
narratives designed to maintain support for the use of armed drones against terrorists.   
     The video game (VIDEOGAME) condition produced no significant increase in 
opposition to drone strikes. This sustains H3 and suggests that the “PlayStation 
Mentality” narrative has not been effective at establishing its central element as an 
implicit association. Since implicit associations are believed to be the result of early life 
experiences and/or popular media and news programming, this narrative’s lack of 
effectiveness may be due to the fact that it is not often promoted in the US news media’s 
coverage of drone strikes. 
     The military casualty (MILCAS) condition did not significantly decrease opposition. 
While I made no predictions regarding this treatment condition, if an implicit association 
had been created between drone strikes and avoiding military casualties, the logical 
conclusion would be that opposition to drone strikes would be decreased. However, it 
may be that the connection between drone strikes and protecting pilots and aircrew is so 
intuitive, the association between the two is already implicit. In effect, the ability of 
drones to protect pilots and aircrew is understood as a feature of drone strikes. As such, 
this association is already “baked in” to individual decisions on support or opposition. 
Conclusion       
     In this chapter, I examined the elite discourse surrounding the debate over drone 
strikes. I identified three distinct lines of argument, each communicating a related set of 
messages designed to encourage either support or opposition to drone strikes. From these 
lines of argument, I constructed three transitive narratives and tested those narratives for 
the ability to establish the narrative’s central element as an implicit assumption.  
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     The results of this testing indicate that only the “Drones Kill Civilians” narrative has 
been effective at establishing its central element—that drone strikes kill civilians—as an 
implicit association. Since implicit associations reside in the subconscious, they are not 
accessible to introspection, and do not necessarily align with a person’s declared beliefs. 
The implicit association created between drone strikes and civilian casualties by the 
“Drones Kill Civilians” narrative, appears to be capable of reducing support for drone 
strikes even among those who otherwise would be inclined to support drone strikes.  
     Zaller argues that it is the messages produced by elite discourse that drives public 
opinion. If this is the case, I argue that public opinion on drone strikes is driven by the 
messages promoted by the narratives examined above.  Here I have presented evidence 
that the “Drone Kill Civilians” narrative has been much more effective at promoting its 
central message than have other narratives. This, I believe, establishes the “Drones Kill 
Civilians” narrative as the most effective narrative in the debate over drone strikes, and 
indicates that the discourse of opposition is resonating more with the American public 
than the discourse of support.  
     I believe however, that in order to fully understand how people’s opinions develop on 
the issue of drone strikes, we must move beyond the narrative level and attempt to study 
the opinion formation process at the message level. Zaller’s RAS model of public opinion 
formation is predicated on the effects of messages, so I will use the RAS model as the 
basis for my investigation. However, the RAS model characterizes opinion formation as a 
highly cognitive process. In the case of public opinion formation on the issue of drone 
strikes, I believe the process is largely an affective one. I argue that the key step in the 
process of opinion formation is the acceptance of messages. Once a message is accepted, 
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it becomes a belief. Beliefs are what drive people’s understanding and opinion. 
Therefore, the best way to predict a person’s opinion is to understand what he or she 
believes, and to understand why he or she believes it. I argue that the way people decide 
what they believe about drone strikes, is by filtering the messages they receive from the 
popular media through their individual moral predispositions. Messages that are 
discordant with these moral predispositions will not be accepted, and therefore will not 
become beliefs. Since only accepted messages, are sampled from in the final step of the 
RAS process, only beliefs influence individual opinion. In the following chapters, I 
expand more fully on this idea, and test its validity. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPLAINING OPPOSITION TO US DRONE STRIKES 
     As discussed in Chapter 1, while the reasons most often given to explain public 
support for drone strikes would seem to predict that a majority of Americans should 
support drone strikes, many journalists treat majority support for drone strikes as 
something both puzzling and troubling. For example, Cillizza attributes public support 
for drone strikes to the perception that drone strikes are effective at targeting terrorists 
without placing US military lives at danger. He then goes on to write “To be sure the 
average American isn’t paying close attention to the issue of drones and how they are 
being used,” and that the debate over what the government can and cannot do using 
drones, as well as what it should be required to tell the public, is a “worthy” one. Cillizza 
concludes by asserting that, “making policy decisions based on what the public wants (or 
thinks it wants) is a dangerous game” (2013). Implicit in this commentary, is the idea that 
if the American public was paying closer attention, its perceptions would change. That 
there are things about drones and drone strikes that the public is unaware of which, if 
brought to its attention, would dampen public enthusiasm for drone strikes.  
     Similarly, while both Fuller and LaFranchi attribute public support for drone strikes to 
the average American’s desire to fight terrorism and keep US military personnel safe 
while doing so,   when Fuller writes, “Drone airstrikes look a lot different when you are 
exporting the strikes instead of expecting them” (2014), and LaFranchi refers to President 
Obama’s use of drones to target terrorist leaders as an “aggressive campaign” that has 
“generated controversy overseas and among counterterrorism experts” (2013), both are 
attempting to give the public information about drone strikes that they feel are reasons 
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Americans should reconsider their support. Overall, one gets the sense that these 
journalists aren’t so much surprised that a majority of Americans support drone strikes, 
but rather disheartened.  
     What comments such as these suggest, is that journalists have a different set of beliefs 
about drone strikes than do most members of the public. Whereas a majority of the 
American public seem to believe that drones strikes are effective at combatting terrorism, 
the above comments from journalists suggest that this conclusion should, at the very 
least, be questioned. These comments also suggest that there is much that the public is 
unaware of regarding drone strikes. This raises the question as to what it is these 
journalists believe they know about drone strikes that the general public does not?  
     In this chapter I argue that the beliefs which lead journalists and others to characterize 
support for drone strikes as high, are the same beliefs that encourage public opposition to 
drone strikes, namely the belief that drone strikes are not effective at combatting 
terrorism, and relatedly, that drone strikes kill an inordinate number of innocent civilians. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the “Drones Kill Civilians” narrative is a narrative promoted 
by those opposed to drone strikes which argues that drone strikes lead to the deaths of 
large numbers of innocent civilians, and as a result contributes to the growth of terrorism 
by enhancing terrorist recruitment. I argue it is the salience of this narrative that explains 
opposition to drone strikes. As discussed in earlier chapters, research on public opinion 
and drone strikes has tended to focus exclusively on explaining support. No attempts 
have been made to explain opposition. Whether this unitary focus on support is the result 
of how public opinion polls have been framed in the media, or because researchers have 
tended to share the same set of beliefs about drone strikes as those reporting on these 
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polls is a point for speculation and will not be addressed here. Instead I will simply 
attempt to fill the gap in the small body of research dealing with public opinion and drone 
strikes, by putting forth and testing a theory that explains both support and opposition.  
Why Explain Opposition? 
     Support among the American public for the US government’s use of armed drones 
against terrorists in other countries has been explained as the effect of biased poll 
questions (Kreps, 2014), the result of a lack of effective criticism from international 
organizations and non-governmental organizations (Kreps and Wallace, 2016), a desire to 
keep military pilots and aircrew out of harm’s way (Walsh, 2015; Schneider and 
Macdonald, 2016), and as an anger response to the threat of terrorist attack (Fisk, 
Merolla, and Ramos, 2018). To the best of my knowledge, no attempts have been made at 
explaining opposition. As discussed in Chapter 1, considering the reasons most often 
given for supporting drone strikes—that they keep the United States safe from terrorist 
attack and protect the lives of US military pilots and aircrew while doing so—the 
question which needs to be answered is not why a majority of Americans support drone 
strikes, but rather why such a large minority oppose them? 
     It is not methodologically sound to assume that what explains opposition to drone 
strikes is simply the opposite of whatever explains support. Although it could be argued 
that in the context of public opinion, support and opposition are distinct opposites, and 
that if “X” explains support for drone strikes the absence of “X” explains opposition, at 
the causal level such assumptions are unlikely to hold. For example, while a desire to 
avoid US military casualties may explain support for drone strikes, ambivalence 
regarding US military casualties is almost certainly not the reason people oppose drone 
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strikes. In short, opposition is not the reciprocal of support, or a default position. Just as 
people have specific reasons for supporting drone strikes, they have specific reasons for 
opposing them. If the purpose of studying public opinion on drone strikes is to 
understand how opinions are formed on this issue, then explaining support represents 
only half the puzzle.     
The RAS Model of Public Opinion Formation  
     Since public opinion is an aggregated outcome of individual processes, the key to 
understanding public opinion regarding the use of armed drones to attack terrorist 
overseas is to focus on this process.  Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model is 
designed to help examine the process of political opinion formation. According to Zaller 
individuals receive messages about a political issue, accept those messages based on how 
well they conform with prior beliefs, and then sample from the messages they have 
accepted based on which of those messages are currently salient (1992). Building on 
earlier work by Converse (1962) and McGuire (1968), Zaller takes the position that 
messages transmitted by the mass media have powerful effects on the formation of public 
opinion. “To an extent that few like but none can avoid, citizens in large societies are 
dependent on unseen and usually unknown others for most of their information about the 
larger world in which they live” (Zaller, 1992, pg.6). As discussed in Chapter 3, these 
“others”, according to Zaller, are political elites, and they include politicians, high-level 
government officials, various experts and policy specialists. Even when an individual 
learns about an issue from a friend or family member, he or she is most likely receiving 
second-hand information that originated with an elite. According to Zaller, elite discourse 
113 
 
is “never pure” but rather is an attempt to create messages that are, “sufficiently simple 
and vivid” for ordinary people to grasp (1992, pg.13). 
     The first step of the RAS model is the reception of messages. This step is governed by 
the Reception Axiom which states… 
The greater a person’s level of cognitive engagement with an issue, the more likely he 
or she is to be exposed to and comprehend—in a word, to receive—political messages 
concerning that issue (Zaller, 1992, pg.42).     
As discussed above, messages are generated by the discourse of elites, and disseminated 
to the public via the popular media. To receive a message an individual must be both 
exposed to the message and understand the message.  
     The second axiom of the RAS model is the Resistance Axiom and it states… 
People tend to resist arguments that are inconsistent with their political 
predispositions, but they do so only to the extent that they possess the contextual 
information necessary to perceive a relationship between the message and their 
predispositions.  
This axiom deals with the acceptance of received messages. While an individual may 
receive a message (i.e. be exposed to and understand it), he or she may not accept it. 
When a person resists a message it does not get considered (i.e. sampled) when he or she 
is later tasked with formulating an opinion.  
     The third axiom is the Accessibility Axiom and it asserts… 
The more recently a consideration has been called to mind or thought about, the 
less time it takes to retrieve that consideration or related consideration from 
memory and bring them to the top of the head for use. 
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This axiom is essentially a description of the “priming effect”, where exposure to an 
initial stimulus influences the response to a subsequent stimulus. This axiom is most 
often applied to the study of public opinion through the use of a survey-experiment, 
which compares a treatment group to a control group. In this type of experiment, the 
treatment group receives a stimulus designed to make certain “considerations,” or 
messages, salient. The control group does not receive this stimulus. Since individuals are 
randomly assigned to each group, any observed differences between the groups can be 
attributed to the stimulus “bringing” those messages to the “tops of the heads” of survey 
respondents. 
     The fourth and final axiom of the RAS model is the Response Axiom and it states… 
 Individuals answer survey questions by averaging across considerations that 
are immediately salient or accessible to them. 
This axiom is tied closely to the Accessibility Axiom, but goes beyond the idea of 
priming, in that it considers individuals may have numerous messages accessible to them 
at the same time. The Response Axiom allows for the “averaging” of received messages, 
and would be applied if one wished to test the varying strength of beliefs directly against 
one another. 
Which Messages Matter? 
     While every step in the RAS model is critical for the process of opinion formation, I 
believe that the second step is the most important. The second step of the RAS process is 
the acceptance of received messages, and this step is governed by the Resistance Axiom, 
which states… 
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People tend to resist arguments that are inconsistent with their political 
predispositions, but they do so only to the extent that they possess the contextual 
information necessary to perceive a relationship between the message and their 
predispositions. 
So while people may receive messages (i.e. be exposed to and comprehend them), they 
may not necessarily accept them. If a message is inconsistent with their predispositions, 
and they understand it to be inconsistent, then that message will be resisted, and therefore 
unlikely to influence opinion. 
     Zaller refers to the discourse produced by elites as “messages” or “considerations” 
throughout the RAS process. Messages are created by elites, disseminated to the public 
by the popular media, then accepted or resisted by the public on an individual level. Only 
accepted messages play a significant role in the opinion formation process. I argue that 
once a message has been accepted, it should be considered a belief. No matter how well 
something may accord with an individual’s “political predispositions”, people tend to 
resist (or outright reject) information they believe to be false. This isn’t to say that people 
only accept messages that are true. Many people believe things that are demonstrably 
false. Rather, I am arguing that once a message is accepted, it becomes a belief, 
regardless of its veracity. Once a message is accepted, the person accepting it believes it 
to be true. Since only accepted messages factor into the end-product of the RAS model, 
opinions are ultimately formed based on beliefs.  
Knowledge, and Belief 
     Knowledge, is the combination of truth and belief (Zagzebski, 2017). Truth accords 
with reality. Beliefs on the other hand, may or may not accord with reality. When 
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someone believes something that is true, that belief constitutes knowledge. When 
someone believes something that is not true, that belief does not constitute knowledge. 
Knowledge and belief are not synonymous. It is perfectly possible for a person to believe 
something that is not true. From the perspective of the individual however, belief is truth.  
As such, when a person acts in accordance with a belief, they are acting in accordance 
with reality as they know it.          
Belief Without Knowledge  
     The RAS model is designed to explain the formation of political opinion, and presents 
the opinion making process as a process of cognitive engagement. According to Zaller, 
affective engagement is likely to affect opinion formation only when it leads to 
intellectual engagement. While people tend to resist the acceptance of messages that are 
inconsistent with their political predispositions, they do so only when they possess the 
necessary information to perceive a relationship between those messages and their 
predispositions (1992, pg.44). That is, while emotion and/or intuitions may play a role in 
the opinion formation process, its role is secondary at best. In the RAS model, deciding 
what to believe is an intellectual endeavor, dependent on individual knowledge. 
     Importantly, Zaller’s operational measure of cognitive engagement (which he 
alternately refers to as political awareness) is a test of general public affairs knowledge, 
and not an individual’s direct knowledge of any particular issue. Zaller acknowledges 
that this measurement strategy is “less than ideal”, and that the use of issue specific 
measures of knowledge would be better suited as a measure of cognitive engagement. 
Out of practical concerns however, Zaller proceeds with the assumption that people who 
are knowledgeable about politics in general (i.e. politically aware), will also be attentive 
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and informed about specific issues as well (1992, pg.42-43). In the case of public opinion 
and US drone strikes, there is good reason to question this assumption. 
     Previous research has shown that the US public has a very weak understanding of the 
capabilities and uses of armed drones. In a survey designed to measure the US public’s 
knowledge of the differences between drones and manned aircraft, researchers found that 
more than half (54%) of respondents were unable to correctly identify either the MQ-1 
Predator, or the MQ-9 Reaper as a drone aircraft. Additionally, over a quarter of the 
respondents (26%) expressed the belief that the Global Hawk, an unmanned, high-
altitude surveillance drone, is capable of launching airstrikes. A slightly smaller 
percentage (21%) believed that the F-16 fighter jet is a drone, and nearly one-third (32%) 
of respondents were misinformed regarding the ordnance payloads of drones, believing 
that drones drop much larger bombs than they are actually capable of delivering.  A 
significant number of respondents (31%) were under the impression that drones used 
guns to attack their targets. In terms of how drones are used, a majority (60%) of 
respondents indicated that they believe drones are more likely to launch airstrikes than 
manned aircraft, and half (50%) believed that drones are governed by different rules of 
engagement than manned aircraft (Schneider and Macdonald, 2016).  
     Since none of these beliefs are true, and since there is no good reason to assume that 
those responding to Schneider and Macdonald’s surveys were any less likely to be 
politically aware than the average American, this would seem to indicate that overall the 
US public is not very well informed regarding even the most basic facts related to US 
drone strikes. If a significant portion of the public is ill-informed about the specifics of 
drone strikes, then it is unclear how a cognitive process such as the one the RAS model 
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stipulates can be driving opinion. Knowledge-based deliberation on drone strikes, 
requires an understanding of the basic capabilities and operational standards of armed 
drones. For this reason, I suggest that, at least when it comes to forming opinions on the 
use of armed drones, we should rethink subordinating affective processes to cognitive 
ones. While general political knowledge may be useful in forming opinions on traditional 
political issues, it is unlikely that knowledge regarding how government works or who is 
currently in political office will be useful in deciding whether or not one should support 
drone strikes. The issue of drone strikes is a relatively new point of contention in 
American politics, and when this novelty is coupled with a lack of knowledge regarding 
the most basic facts, any cognitive engagement that follows will likely be driven by 
heuristic thinking not deductive reasoning.   
Beliefs About the Use of Armed Drones that Correlate with Opposition    
     As demonstrated in the previous chapter, simply priming subjects with a news report 
about conflict-induced civilian casualties is enough to increase opposition to drone 
strikes. This, along with previous research, strongly suggests that the messages promoted 
by the “Drones Kill Civilians” narrative have been accepted (i.e. internalized as beliefs) 
by a significant number of Americans. Three of the messages communicated by the 
Drones Kill Civilians” narrative will be tested here. The first is that drone strikes kill far 
more civilians than terrorists (Kilcullen and Exum, 2009). The second is that drones are 
inherently inaccurate. Even when those targeted are terrorists, the unreliability of the 
drone’s cameras and targeting systems (O’Connell, 2010b) and/or the distance from 
which drone strikes occur (Holewinski, 2015), places civilians at high risk. The third 
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message is that because of the civilian casualties they cause (or are reported to cause) 
drone strikes lead to an increase in terrorist recruitment (Cronin, 2015).                                                                                                         
     I argue that once accepted, these three messages become beliefs, and these beliefs are 
the key predictors of opposition to US drone strikes. These beliefs are the messages that 
individuals sample from when they choose to oppose drone strikes. Those who have 
accepted these beliefs will oppose drone strikes, those who haven’t accepted these beliefs 
will not. Stated as a formal hypothesis… 
H1: Opposition to drone strikes will be positively correlated with the belief that (A) 
drone strikes cause more civilian casualties than do strikes from manned aircraft, and 
(B) drone strikes contribute to the growth of terrorism, but negatively correlated with the 
belief that (C) drones are more precise in hitting their intended targets than are manned 
aircraft. 
Additionally, since the “Drones Kill Civilians” narrative serves as a direct rebuttal to the 
“Drones Kill Terrorists” narrative I also predict that those who oppose drone strikes will 
have rejected the message that drone strikes are necessary for protecting the United States 
from terrorist attack. Stated as a formal hypothesis… 
H2: Opposition to drone strikes will be negatively correlated with the belief that drone 
strikes are necessary for protecting the United States from terrorist attack. 
Experimental Design 
Method    
      To test the arguments above, as well as the arguments that follow in the next chapter, 
I conducted a survey-experiment. Like an experiment, survey experiments compare a 
“treatment” condition with a “control” condition. Subjects in the treatment condition 
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receive a specific stimulus that those in the control condition do not. The outcomes are 
measured and differences between the two groups are noted. Because of random 
assignment, any differences in outcomes can be attributed to the application of the 
treatment. In most cases, survey experiments provide “the best of both worlds” in that 
they combine the generalizability and external validity of a survey with the valid causal 
inference and internal validity of an experiment (Nock and Guterbock, 2010). 
     Subjects for this experiment were recruited from Arizona State University’s School of 
Politics and Global Studies student subject pool. The experiment was conducted online 
using Qualtrics survey software. Subjects were first asked to complete a short 
demographics questionnaire, followed by a 30 question moral attitudes inventory (the 
reason for this inventory will be discussed in Chapter 5). Next, subjects were randomly 
sorted into either one of four treatment conditions or the control condition. In each 
condition subjects read a short news report (approximately 500 words) that served as the 
treatment stimulus.30 Finally, subjects were asked to answer a series of questions 
designed to measure their opposition to various uses of military force (including drone 
strikes), and beliefs about the use of armed drones. All news reports were stripped of any 
source identification and edited for length. Each subject group consisted of approximately 
100 subjects. 
     In order to test the above hypotheses and assess the effect of beliefs on opposition to 
US drone strikes, subjects were asked if they believed the following statements were 
“true”, “mostly true”, “somewhat true” “somewhat false” “mostly false” or “false.”  
                                                          
30 The CONTROL group read a news report of approximately equal length describing the awarding of the 
2028 Summer Olympics. This news report also did not contain the word “drone.” 
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1) The use of drones causes more civilian casualties than does the use of 
manned aircraft in similar situations     
2) Drones are necessary for protecting the United States from terrorist attacks. 
3) When it comes to hitting their intended targets, drones are more precise than 
manned aircraft. 
4) The use of drones contributes to the growth of terrorism by encouraging 
people to join terrorist organizations. 
Responses were scored on a scale of 1 to 6, and reverse-coded for analysis. Additionally, 
subjects were asked about their opposition to drone strikes.31 Regression analysis was 
conducted using opposition to drone strikes as the dependent variable32 and the questions 
regarding the beliefs about drones strikes as independent variables. Because these 
questions were presented post-treatment, the four treatment conditions were entered into 
the regression model as controls. Since sex and political ideology have been strongly 
correlated with opposition to the US drone strikes, these two variables were also entered 
into the regression as controls. The results of the regression analysis are displayed in 
Table 4.1. 
Results and Discussion 
     In regards to support for drone strikes, 59 percent of respondents expressed support 
and 41 percent expressed opposition.33 Fifty-seven percent of respondents endorsed the 
                                                          
31 Subjects were asked, “Do you support or oppose the United States conducting strikes from pilotless 
aircraft, commonly referred to as drones, to target extremists in other countries? Response options for this 
question were “strongly support”, “support”, “somewhat support”, “somewhat oppose”, “oppose”, and 
“strongly oppose.” Responses were coded 1 through 6 in the order listed. 
32 Subjects were asked, “Do you support or oppose the United States conducting strikes from pilotless 
aircraft, commonly referred to as drones, to target extremists in other countries?” 
33 The response categories “strongly support”, “support”, and “somewhat support” were collapsed, as 
were the response categories “strongly oppose”, “oppose”, and “somewhat oppose.”  
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belief that drone strikes kill more civilians than do strikes from manned aircraft, and 45 
percent endorsed the belief that drone strikes contribute to the growth of terrorism. 
Conversely, 69 percent of respondents endorsed the belief that drone strikes are more 
precise than strikes from manned aircraft, and 63 percent endorsed the belief that drone 
strikes are necessary for protecting the United States from terrorist attack. Overall, these 
numbers are not surprising in that the percentage of respondents endorsing beliefs 
associated with support is higher than the percentage of respondents endorsing beliefs 
associated with opposition. However, since the percentages of respondents endorsing 
beliefs associated to support and opposition are in all cases respectively higher than the 
percentage of respondents expressing support or opposition, this suggests that many 
respondents endorse what appear to be contradictory beliefs. This accords with Zaller’s 
Response Axiom which states that individuals average across the messages that are 
“immediately salient or accessible to them.” If individuals did not hold competing beliefs, 
then there would be nothing to average across, and immediate salience would almost 
certainly have no effect.  
     The results of the regression analysis sustain H1(A), as the belief that drone strikes 
cause more civilian casualties than do manned aircraft is positively correlated with 
opposition to US drone strikes. H1(B) is also sustained as the belief that drone strikes 
contribute to the growth of terrorism is positively correlated with opposition.  H1(C) is 
sustained in that there is a significant negative correlation between beliefs about the 
accuracy of armed drones and opposition to drone strikes. However, this correlation is at 
the absolute lowest level of significance. H2 is sustained as the belief that drones are 
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necessary for protecting the United States from terrorist attack is negatively correlated 
with opposition to drone strikes.  
Table 4.1. Beliefs and Opposition to US Drone Strikes     
 
Dependent Variable: Do you support or oppose the United States conducting strikes from 
pilotless aircraft, commonly referred to as drones, to target extremists in other countries?34 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Sig.  B Sig. B 
       
Sex   .235** .027  
ideology   -.185*** .000  
CIVCAS .304* .059 .336** .037  
VIDEOGAME .245 .131 .239 .139  
TERRORIST .179 .264 .189 .241  
MILCAS .370** .023 .354** .029  
More Civilian Casualties .310*** .000 .237*** .000  
Necessary -.618*** .000 -.565*** .000  
More Precise  
More Terrorism 
-.073* 
.211*** 
.100 
.000 
-.049 
.184*** 
.274 
.000 
 
 
*p < .1;  **p < .05;  ***p < .01 
 
 
          Interestingly, although the means comparison presented in the previous chapter 
indicated that only the CIVCAS condition differed from the CONTROL condition in 
terms of opposition to drone strikes, regression analysis indicates that both the CIVCAS 
and MILCAS conditions are predictors of opposition. This result is theoretically 
unexpected. If concern for avoiding US military casualties is a primary motivator for 
supporting drone strikes, then the salience of US military casualties should lead to the 
                                                          
34 Measured on a scale of 1 to 6 with 1 being “strongly support” and 6 being “strongly oppose” 
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sampling of beliefs connecting drone strikes and the avoidance of military casualties. 
This immediate salience effect should increase support for drone strikes. That it instead 
increases opposition is somewhat puzzling. 
     When a second regression model is constructed including sex and ideology as control 
variables, the correlations between beliefs and opposition are essentially unchanged, 
indicating that beliefs are strong predictors of opposition to drone strikes. The one 
exception being the negative correlation between accuracy and opposition. As noted 
above this correlation was significant at the absolute lowest level, and when sex and 
ideology are added to the model this correlation disappears. Additionally, since Sex was 
coded “0” for male and “1” for female, and ideology was scored on a scale from 1-7 
beginning with “extremely liberal” and extending to “extremely conservative”, these 
results indicates that being female, and being liberal, are both positively correlated with 
opposition to drone strikes. These findings align with public opinion polls which show 
females and those identifying as politically liberal being more opposed to drone strikes 
than males and those identifying as politically conservative (Pew Research Center, 
2013b).        
Conclusion 
     Previous research into public opinion and support for the US government’s use of 
armed drones to attack terrorists overseas has focused almost exclusively on explaining 
support. This chapter has attempted to explain opposition. The results of the above 
analysis indicate that opposition to drone strikes is significantly correlated with beliefs 
promoted by the “Drones Kill Civilians” narrative. Opposition is positively correlated 
with the belief that drone strikes kill more civilians than do strikes from manned aircraft, 
and the belief that drone strikes contribute to the growth of terrorism. Opposition is 
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negatively correlated with the belief that drone strikes are necessary for protecting the 
United States from terrorist attack. The results of this analysis align with those of the 
previous chapter, in suggesting that the “Drones Kill Civilians” narrative is effective in 
creating opposition to drone strikes. It appears that the messages promoted by the 
“Drones Kill Civilians” narrative have been received and accepted, by a significant 
portion of those who oppose drone strikes.  
     As discussed in Chapter 2 the US news media tends to frame drone strikes as an 
effective means of combatting terrorism, and my analysis of drone strike coverage by the 
New York Times and the Wall Street Journal indicates that those killed in drone strikes 
are predominantly described as terrorists, militants, or insurgents, not civilians. In light of 
this treatment of drone strikes by the US news media, as well as the fact that over 68 
percent of my respondents endorsed the belief that drone strikes were more precise than 
strikes from manned aircraft, how is it that 57 percent of my respondents believe that 
drone strikes kill more civilians than do strikes from manned aircraft? Additionally, how 
can almost 55 percent of my respondents believe that drone strikes contribute to the 
growth of terrorism, when nearly 63 percent believe that drone strikes are necessary for 
protecting the United States from terrorist attack? Looked at from a purely cognitive 
perspective, these beliefs are expressly incongruent.   
     While it is certainly possible for a person to hold conflicting beliefs (the concept of 
cognitive dissonance), according to Zaller, opinion formation is a predominantly 
cognitive process. People are exposed to messages, assess the value and validity of those 
messages, and then store those messages away in their minds. When later tasked with 
forming an opinion, people base that opinion on the messages that are currently most 
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salient. While this explains the increase in opposition to drone strikes observed in the 
CIVCAS treatment condition, it doesn’t explain how the messages communicated by the 
“Drones Kill Civilians” narrative, and other narratives as well, come to be part of a 
person’s mental inventory.  
     The analysis above indicates there are strong correlations between messages 
communicated by the “Drones Kill Civilians” narrative and opposition to drone strikes. 
Again, I argue that the most important part of the RAS process is the acceptance of 
messages. Once accepted, a message becomes a belief. So why do some people accept 
the messages of the “Drones Kill Civilians” narrative and subsequently endorse the 
beliefs associated with these messages while others do not?   
     Again, the second axiom of the RAS model is the Resistance Axiom and it states that 
people tend to resist arguments that are inconsistent with their political predispositions. 
Haidt argues that when it comes to opinion formation, “intuitions come first, strategic 
reasoning second” (2012, pg.1). Haidt also argues that intuition frequently takes the form 
of moral judgments. In the next chapter, I argue that the “political predispositions” that 
matter when it comes to forming an opinion on drone strikes, are moral in nature.   
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CHAPTER 5 
WHY CONSERVATIVES SUPPORT DRONE STRIKES AND LIBERALS DON’T 
     The RAS model predicts that once a message is received, it is either accepted or 
resisted. Only messages that are accepted are later available to be sampled from and 
incorporated into the opinion formation process. I contend that only messages that are 
believed will be accepted. Messages that individuals find to be untrue, will not simply be 
resisted, but rejected. Therefore, only messages which a person believes to be true will 
factor into their opinion. When a person is tasked to form an opinion on an issue, what 
they are sampling from, is their beliefs. So, if you want to understand how a person came 
to hold a particular opinion on an issue, you first need to understand how they came to 
hold their beliefs on that issue. 
     In the last chapter I presented evidence that opposition to the US government’s use of 
armed drones to attack terrorists in other countries is significantly correlated with the 
acceptance of messages communicated by the “Drones Kill Children” narrative discussed 
in Chapter 3. In this chapter I go beyond just the beliefs communicated by the “Drones 
Kill Civilians” and examine how beliefs associated with other narratives correlate with 
the decision to support or oppose drone strikes.  
     The second axiom of Zaller’s RAS model is the Resistance Axiom and with it he 
argues that people will resist arguments that do not accord with their political 
predispositions, but that they do so, “…only to the extent that they possess the contextual 
information necessary to perceive a relationship between the message and their 
predispositions” (1992, pg.44). According to this axiom, a person may receive a message 
(i.e. be exposed to and understand it), but he or she may not accept it. As discussed in the 
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preceding chapter, previous research has shown that the average American has a very 
poor understanding of the basic capabilities and employment of armed drones. Therefore, 
what “contextual information” are people are using to decide which messages to accept 
and which messages to resist? If a large portion of the public is ill-informed about the 
factual details of drone strikes, it is unclear how cognitive processes can be driving the 
opinion formation process on this issue.   
     Knowledge is the combination of truth and belief (Zagzebski, 2017). Truth accords 
with reality. Beliefs on the other hand, may or may not accord with reality. When 
someone believes something that is true, that belief constitutes knowledge. When 
someone believes something that is not true, that belief does not constitute knowledge. 
Knowledge and belief are not synonymous. It is perfectly possible for a person to believe 
something that is not true. From the perspective of the individual however, belief is truth.  
As such, when a person acts in accordance with a belief, they are acting in accordance 
with reality as they know it. However, since not everything people believe is actually 
true, it must be the case that believing is not dependent on the acquisition of knowledge. 
In effect, people do not form their opinions based on what is true, but rather on what they 
believe to be true. Since the average American has a very poor understanding of the facts 
surrounding the issue of drone strikes, I argue when people choose what to believe about 
drone strikes, they choose based on their moral predispositions. Whereas Zaller’s RAS 
model stipulates that public opinion formation is a predominantly cognitive process, I 
contend that, at least in the case of public opinion and drone strikes, the process is largely 
an affective one. 
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Morals as a Substitute for Information     
     The RAS model is designed to explain the formation of political opinion, and frames 
the opinion making process as a process of cognitive engagement. According to Zaller, 
affective engagement is likely to affect opinion formation only when it leads to 
intellectual engagement. While people tend to resist the acceptance of messages that are 
inconsistent with their political predispositions, they do so only when they possess the 
necessary information to perceive a relationship between those messages and their 
predispositions. That is, while emotion and/or intuitions may play a role in the opinion 
formation process, its role is secondary at best. In the RAS model, deciding what to 
believe is an intellectual endeavor, dependent on individual knowledge. 
     Importantly, Zaller’s operational measure of cognitive engagement (which he 
alternately refers to as political awareness) is a test of general public affairs knowledge, 
and not an individual’s direct knowledge of any particular issue. While Zaller 
acknowledges that this measurement strategy is “less than ideal”, and that the use of issue 
specific measures of knowledge would be better suited as a measure of cognitive 
engagement, out of practical concerns Zaller proceeds on the assumption that people who 
are knowledgeable about politics in general (i.e. politically aware), will also be attentive 
and informed about specific issues as well (1992, pg.42-43). As previously discussed, in 
the case of public opinion and US drone strikes, there is good reason to question this 
assumption. 
     However, political awareness is only one of two key individual level variables in 
Zaller’s model, the other is political values. According to Zaller, political values are 
general and enduring standards in a person’s belief systems that hold a more central 
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position than do attitudes, and that lead people to take to take particular positions on 
social issues (1992, pg.23). In an earlier work, Zaller stated that, “Values may be rooted 
in personality, philosophy, ideology, gender, experience, religion, ethnicity, occupation, 
or interest (among other things)” (1991, pg.1216).  While Zaller does not specifically 
mention morality, moral values would certainly seem to fit within the boundaries of 
political values.  
     Zaller further argues that when elites divide and take up clear and differing positions 
on an issue, “…members of the public tend to follow the elites sharing their general 
ideological or partisan predisposition” (1992, pg.9). In regards to the issue of US drone 
strikes, elites have divided and created two distinct positions, with those who support 
drone strikes championing the idea that drones are an effective weapon for killing 
terrorists, and those in opposition countering with the assertion that drone strikes kill 
large numbers of civilians. Since few Americans are predisposed to oppose killing 
terrorists or support killing civilians, the pertinent question becomes exactly what 
predispositions are Americans appealing to when they form an opinion on US drone 
strikes. 
Partisanship and Political Ideology    
     In the Resistance Axiom of the RAS model, Zaller indicates that people will “resist” 
messages that do not accord with their political predispositions. Polls measuring US 
public opinion on drone strikes have consistently indicated that there is a sizable gap 
between Democrats and Republicans, with Democrats being far more likely to express 
opposition to drone strikes than Republicans (Brown and Frank, 2013; Pew, 2013b; Pew, 
2015). Large differences between political liberals and political conservatives have also 
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been recorded, with liberals being far more likely to oppose drone strikes than 
conservatives (Pew, 2013b). In my sample Democrats were significantly more likely to 
oppose drone strikes (and all other uses of force) than were Republicans, and political 
ideology was significantly correlated with opposition to drone strikes in the expected 
directions (i.e. liberals being more opposed, conservatives being less). So perhaps Zaller 
is correct, and when making the decision of whether or not to oppose drone strikes people 
are simply deferring to their political proclivities. However, this still leaves unanswered 
the question of why using armed drones to attack terrorist overseas appeals to 
Republicans and conservatives, but not to Democrats and liberals. 
Drones and Moral Judgment   
     Jonathan Haidt argues that when it comes to opinion formation, “intuitions come first, 
strategic reasoning second” (2012, pg.1). In Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Mode, intuition 
precedes judgment, and unlike the RAS model, there is no clear distinction made between 
emotion and cognition. Having an emotional response is a type of information 
processing, and as such is considered to be cognition. According to Haidt, cognition 
comes in two forms, intuition and reasoning, with intuition frequently taking the form of 
moral judgments. Moral judgments are subtler than emotions, in that people do not have 
to have a noticeable (even to themselves) emotional reaction in order to form an 
immediate and morally based judgment. Moral judgments are “rapid” and “effortless”, 
and most importantly, generally take the lead in the decision-making process (Haidt, 
2012, pg.53).  
     Moral conviction—the absolute belief that a position is right or wrong (Skitka, 2002; 
Skitka and Mullen, 2002)—produces a host of effects on people’s ability to reason and 
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deliberate on an issue. When people experience moral conviction, they not only think in 
terms of absolute right and wrong, they believe their judgments are, “…equally valid 
everywhere and as objective as 2 + 2 = 4” (Morgan, Skitka, and Lytle, 2014). People 
experiencing moral conviction tend to display strong negative emotions towards those 
who disagree with them (Ryan, 2014), and they may also tolerate, or even engage in, 
transgressive advocacy, which is, “advocacy that involves norm-violating means to 
achieve preferred ends” (Mueller and Skitka, 2017).  Moral conviction increases the 
difficulty of resolving conflicts, and can even lead to increased physical distance between 
people who disagree, (Bauman and Skitka, 2009).  
     One way to identify a moral issue is to examine the debate that surrounds it. 
According to Mooney and Schuldt, a moral issue is one where, at least one side of the 
debate defines the issue as one that threatens its “core values” (2008, pg.201). Haider-
Markel and Meier apply similar criteria, defining a moral issue as one where at least one 
side portrays the issue as one of morality and uses moral arguments to make its case 
(1996, pg.333). A second approach is to identify a moral issue by the attitudinal 
responses it elicits. Biggers defines moral issues as ones that elicit attitudes based on 
values that are “central” to one’s primary identity (2011, pg.8).  
     Many of those opposed to drone strikes have defined the issue as one that threatens 
core values and principles. Claims of excessively high levels of civilian death and 
reckless disregard for the lives of innocents (Amnesty International, 2013; Brunstetter 
and Braun, 2013; Kilcullen and Exum, 2009; O’Connell, 2010b; Scahill, et.al., 2016; 
Stanford Law School and NYU School of Law, 2012), are obviously claims based on 
core values. Americans oppose the slaughter of innocents on the grounds of moral 
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principle. Arguing that drone strikes wantonly kill large numbers of civilians, many of 
them women and children, is a moral argument. Similarly, aspersions and innuendos 
regarding the military ethics and personal bravery of drone operators (Cole, Dobbing, and 
Haliwood, 2010; Contratto, 2011; McCrisken, 2011; O’Connell, 2010b; Riza, 2016) 
strike a particular chord with most Americans. Honor, duty, courage, and sacrifice are 
more than just words to many Americans, they are moral precepts. Arguments that drones 
violate these precepts, are moral arguments. 
      As for the attitudinal responses these claims tend to evoke, they exhibit several 
properties that scholars have attributed to morally based beliefs, such as high salience 
(Grummel, 2008; Haider-Markel, 1998), persistence and simplicity ((Frank, 2005; 
Tatalovich, Smith and Bobic, 1994), and immunity from evidence and reason (Dye, 
1984). While these attitudes are best illustrated by those who actively protest the use of 
drones, one should expect that as with many issues generally accepted as moral issues 
(abortion, the death penalty, etc.), not everyone who has strong persistent beliefs, will 
actively protest. I argue that for many, drone strikes have become a moral issue.   
Drone Strikes and Moral Attitudes  
     Ultimately, the US government’s use of armed drones to target terrorists overseas falls 
under the umbrella of foreign policy. Therefore, some might feel that claiming drone 
strikes are a moral issue and not a political issue, is going too far. However, moral 
conviction can be experienced in response to issues that have not traditionally been 
considered moral issues, such as labor relations laws and Social Security reform (Ryan, 
2014). Furthermore, one does not have to appeal to full-blown moral conviction to posit 
that morality may be having a significant effect on people’s opinions regarding drone 
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strikes. Just as people vary in the certainty of their beliefs, people may also vary in the 
amount of moral engagement they have with a particular belief.  
     Haidt and his colleagues posit that there are five “moral foundations” that people 
appeal to when forming opinions on issues with moral implications, these are: care/harm; 
fairness/reciprocity; in-group/loyalty; authority/respect; purity/sanctity (Graham, Haidt, 
and Nosek, 2009). Political ideology correlates strongly with how much moral 
importance an individual imparts to the different foundations. Specifically, those who are 
liberal in their politics tend to reason primarily along just two of the foundations; the 
care/harm foundation and the fairness/reciprocity foundation, with the harm/care 
foundation generally taking precedence. Those who identify politically as conservatives 
however, tend to reason along all five of the foundations approximately equally.35 For 
liberals, the most sacred moral value is caring for victims of oppression, for conservatives 
the most sacred moral value is preserving the institutions and traditions that sustain a 
moral community (Haidt, 2012, pgs.351-57).   
     The correlation between these moral foundations and political ideology (and political 
partisanship) is extremely robust. Since previous polling has indicated there is a 
significant divide between liberals, and conservatives in regard to the opposition of drone 
strikes (Pew 2013b), this ideological divide could be an indication that when people 
decide to oppose or support US drone strikes, they are making a morally intuitive 
decision. If this is the case, then opinions on drone strikes should be strongly associated 
with specific moral foundations.  
                                                          
35 Libertarians were also included in Haidt’s political categories and they tended to have the most 
constrained moral reasoning, with the liberty/oppression foundation being essentially the only one that 
mattered.   
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Testing the Moral Foundations of Drone Support and Opposition 
     The diagnostic tool developed by Haidt and his colleagues to measure an individual’s 
moral foundations is a thirty-two question survey which asks respondents to rate on a 
scale of 0 to 5, with 5 being “extremely relevant” and 0 being “not at all relevant”, how 
relevant certain considerations are to their thinking when they decide what is “right” and 
what is “wrong”.  Respondents are also presented with several statements relating to 
moral beliefs and asked to what degree they agree with each statement.  
     The survey includes a set of items to measure the importance of conforming to rules 
and avoiding acts that cause chaos and disorder. These items are designed to represent the 
authority/respect dimension of morality. People who score high on the authority/respect 
index place moral significance on showing respect to parents, teachers, and others in 
positions of authority. The survey also includes a set of items to measure the importance 
of group solidarity and taking pride in one’s nation and its accomplishments. These items 
represent the in-group/loyalty dimension of morality. People who score high on the in-
group/loyalty index tend to place moral significance on being loyal to one’s group and 
protecting the group from outsiders. A third set of items on the survey measures the 
importance of avoiding causing harm to innocents and providing care for the weak and 
vulnerable. These items represent the harm/care moral dimension, and people who score 
high on this index tend to be largely unidimensional in their morality. For them, morality 
is synonymous with avoiding harm and providing care. These individuals also care about 
fairness, but primarily in the sense that everyone is treated equally, not in the reciprocal 
sense that people should get what they have earned (Haidt, 2012). 
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     Considering two of the most common reasons given to explain support for US drone 
strikes—that they protect members of the in-group (US military personnel) and kill 
members of the out-group (terrorists)—I put forth the following hypothesis… 
H1: There is a significant, positive correlation between support for US drone strikes and 
the in-group/loyalty dimension of morality 
Considering that US drone strikes are actions sanctioned by the authority of the United 
States federal government aimed at thwarting acts of terror (incidents of extreme chaos 
and disorder), I put forth the following hypothesis… 
H2: There is a significant, positive correlation between support for US drone strikes and 
the authority/respect dimension of morality. 
Finally, considering the findings of previous chapters which indicate that opposition to 
drone strikes is closely associated with the belief that drones cause more civilian 
casualties than manned aircraft, and that opposition to drone strikes can be significantly 
increased by priming respondents with reports of conflict-induced civilian casualties, I 
put forth the following hypothesis…   
H3: There is a significant positive correlation between opposition to US drone strikes 
and the harm/care dimension of morality.  
     To test these hypotheses, I draw on data collected from the survey experiment 
described in Chapter 3. This time however I incorporate data from the diagnostic tool 
described above (Haidt’s moral foundation survey) which was administered to all 
subjects pre-treatment. Since respondents were queried post-treatment about their 
opposition/support for the use of armed drones, treatment conditions were added to the 
regression analysis as a way of insuring that any observed correlations were not treatment 
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specific. Since sex and ideology have repeatedly been shown to correlate with opinions 
on the use of drones, these variables were also added to the analysis. The results of this 
analysis are displayed in Table 5.1.     
 
Table 5.1. Opposition to US Drone Strikes and Moral Attitudes 
Dependent Variable: Do you support or oppose the United States conducting strikes from 
pilotless aircraft, commonly referred to as drones, to target extremists in other 
countries?36 
                              
Model 1           Model 2 
Sig.  B 
                 
Sig.   B 
       
Sex   .347** .013  
ideology   -.242*** .000  
CIVCAS .525*** .007 .486** .015  
VIDEOGAME .143  .461 .152 .439  
TERRORIST .101 .605 .090 .648  
MILCAS .249 .199 .179 .361  
harm .064*** .000 .024 .121  
authority -.074*** .000 -.044** .015  
in-group 
 
-.077*** 
 
.000 -.054*** 
 
.002 
 
 
 
 *p < .1;  **p < .05;  ***p < .01 
 
   
                                                          
36 Measured on a scale of 1 to 6 with 1 being “strongly support” and 6 being “strongly oppose” 
138 
 
     Based on the finding that there is a strong positive correlation between the in-
group/loyalty dimension of morality and the authority/respect dimension of morality and 
support for US drone strikes, I put forth the following hypotheses…  
H4: Individuals who score high on the in-group/loyalty dimension of morality will tend to 
accept positive beliefs about drone strikes and reject negative beliefs about drone strikes. 
H5: Individuals who score high on the authority/respect dimension of morality will tend 
to accept positive beliefs about drone strikes and reject negative beliefs about drone 
strikes.   
Based on the findings in the previous chapter linking opposition to the use of drones to 
the salience of civilian casualties, I put forth the following hypothesis… 
H6: Individuals who score high on the harm/care dimension of morality will tend to 
reject positive beliefs about drone strikes and accept negative beliefs about drone strikes.     
Testing and Results  
     To test these hypotheses, three items from the post-treatment survey dealing with 
beliefs about the necessity of using drones to fight terrorism, the superior accuracy of 
drones, and the ability of drones to limit US military casualties were selected as 
representative of positive beliefs about armed drones.37 Four items from the post-
treatment survey dealing with beliefs about the number of civilian casualties caused by 
drones, the potential for drone strikes to encourage people to join terrorist organizations, 
the similarity of operating drones to playing video games, and the idea that drone strikes 
                                                          
37 Drones are necessary for protecting the United States from terrorist attacks; Using drones to kill enemy 
combatants saves the lives of US military personnel; When it comes to hitting their intended targets, 
drones are more precise than manned aircraft.  
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are cowardly, were selected as representative of negative beliefs about armed drones.38 
For each of these seven items, respondents were asked if they believed the statement was 
“true”, “mostly true”, “somewhat true” “somewhat false” “mostly false” or “false.” 
Responses were scored on a scale of 1 to 6, and reverse-coded for analysis (i.e. “true” = 
6, “mostly true” =5, etc.).   
     Pearson analysis indicates that individuals scoring high in the in-group/loyalty 
dimension of morality are significantly more likely to believe that drones are necessary to 
protect the United States from terrorist attack, that the use of drones saves the lives of 
American military personnel, that drone strikes are more accurate than strikes from 
manned aircraft, and that operating a combat drone is like playing a video game (p = 
.000, .000, .011 and .002 respectively). These individuals were significantly less likely to 
believe that drone strikes cause more civilian casualties than strikes from manned 
aircraft, contribute to the growth of terrorism, and are cowardly (p = .000, .000, and .005 
respectively). Beliefs among those scoring high in the authority/respect dimension of 
morality were the same as those in with high scores on the in-group loyalty dimension of 
morality but with mostly stronger significance levels (p = .000 for all beliefs, except the 
belief that operating a combat drone is like playing a video game, where p = .004). 
Individuals scoring high in the harm/care moral dimension were significantly less likely 
to believe that drones are necessary to protect the United States from terrorist attack (p = 
.000), and significantly more likely to believe that drone strikes cause more civilian 
casualties than do strikes from manned aircraft, and that drones contribute to the growth 
                                                          
38 The use of drones causes more civilian casualties than does the use of manned aircraft in similar 
situations; The use of drones contributes to the growth of terrorism by encouraging people to join 
terrorist organizations; Operating a drone is like playing a video game; Using drones for combat is 
cowardly because the operators sit far removed from the battlefield and are in no personal danger. 
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of terrorism (p = .000 and .000 respectively). There was no significant correlation 
between high scores on the harm/care dimension of morality and beliefs about drones 
saving the lives of American military personnel, being more accurate, being cowardly, or 
being similar to playing a video game. The results of this analysis can be viewed in 
Appendix E. 
     Because respondents were queried about their beliefs regarding armed drones post-
treatment, there is the possibility that these correlations are treatment driven. To test for 
this possibility, regression analyses were conducted using the four treatment conditions 
along with sex and ideology as controls. The results of this analysis are displayed in 
Tables 5.2 through 5.3.  
     The results on positive beliefs indicate that individuals scoring high on the in-
group/loyalty index are significantly more likely to believe that drone strikes are 
necessary for protecting the United States from terrorist attack, but not significantly more 
likely to believe that using drones protects the lives of US military personnel, or that 
drones are more precise in their targeting than manned aircraft. Individuals scoring high 
on the authority/respect index are significantly more likely to endorse all these beliefs. 
Individuals scoring high on the harm/care index are significantly less likely to believe 
that drone strikes are necessary for protecting the United States from terrorist attack, but 
significantly more likely to agree that using drones protects the lives of US military 
personnel. They were neither more nor less likely to believe drones are more precise than 
manned aircraft.  
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Table 5.2.  Drone Strikes Are Necessary for Fighting Terrorism                
Dependent Variable: Drones are necessary for protecting the United States from terrorist 
attacks. 
 Model 1            Model 2 
Sig B Sig B 
      
Sex   -.076 .537 
ideology   .055 .213 
CIVCAS -.236 .160 -.197 .262 
VIDEOGAME .152 .365 .143 .411 
TERRORIST .054 .748 .091 .602 
MILCAS .146 .383 .239 .168 
harm -.061*** .000 -.052*** .000 
authority .060*** .000 .048*** .003 
ingroup .076*** .000 .074*** .000 
*p < .1;  **p < .05;  ***p < .01 
 
Table 5.3. Drone Strikes Protect Pilots and Aircrew 
Dependent Variable: Using drones to kill enemy combatants saves the lives of US military 
personnel 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
   Sig.  B Sig. B 
       
Sex   -.326*** .007  
ideology   .086** .048  
CIVCAS -.007 .965 -.050 .772  
VIDEOGAME .178 .281 .134 .431  
TERRORIST .149 .366 .172 .313  
MILCAS .156 .344 .179 .292  
harm .005 .658 .026** .047  
authority .066*** .000 .061*** .000  
ingroup -.077 .632 -.019 .195  
    *p < .1;  **p < .05;  ***p < .01 
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Table 5.4. Drone Strike Are More Precise Than Strikes from Manned Aircraft 
Dependent Variable: When it comes to hitting their intended targets, drones are more 
precise than manned aircraft. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Sig . B Sig. B 
       
Sex   -.063 .611  
ideology   .115*** .010  
CIVCAS -.310 .070 -.212 .230  
VIDEOGAME -.112 .515 -.061 .730  
TERRORIST -.165 .334 -.123 .486  
MILCAS .178 .298 .291 .098  
harm -.013 .229 .003 .834  
authority .057*** .000 .039** .016  
ingroup -.010 .468 -.015 .319  
*p < .1;  **p < .05;  ***p < .01 
  
     In regards to negative beliefs, individuals scoring high on the in-group/loyalty index 
were not less likely to endorse negative beliefs about drone strikes. Those scoring high on 
the authority/respect index however, were less likely to believe that drone strikes cause 
more civilian casualties than manned aircraft, contribute to the growth of terrorism, or 
that drone operators are cowards. Conversely, those scoring high on the harm/care index 
were more likely to believe that drone strikes cause more civilian casualties than manned 
aircraft, and that drone strikes contribute to the growth of terrorism. They were not 
however, more likely to believe that drone operators are cowards. Interestingly, the belief 
that operating a drone is like playing a video game did not correlate significantly with 
any moral dimension. 
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Table 5.5. Drone Strikes Kill More Civilians than Strikes from Manned Aircraft 
Dependent Variable: The use of drones causes more civilian casualties than does the use of 
manned aircraft in similar situations 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Sig . B Sig. B 
       
Sex   .212* .100  
ideology   -.146*** .002  
CIVCAS .135 .449 .095 .606  
VIDEOGAME -.001 .996 .008 .965  
TERRORIST -.077 .663 -.080 .659  
MILCAS .007 .969 -.049 .785  
harm .061*** .000 .034** .015  
authority -.050*** .001 -.032* .058  
ingroup .013 .369 .003 .843  
*p < .1;  **p < .05;  ***p < .01 
 
Table 5.6. Drone Strikes Contribute to the Growth of Terrorism 
Dependent Variable: The use of drones contributes to the growth of terrorism by 
encouraging people to join terrorist organizations. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Sig . B Sig. B 
       
Sex   -.321** .023  
ideology   -.200*** .000  
CIVCAS .465** .016 .381 .057  
VIDEOGAME .123 .520 .116 .558  
TERRORIST -.136 .478 -.098 .620  
MILCAS .297 .121 .286 .148  
harm .049*** .000 .037** .015  
authority -.114*** .000 -.085*** .000  
ingroup .008 .601 .013 .463  
*p < .1;  **p < .05;  ***p < .01 
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Table 5.7. Operating a Drone is Like Playing a Video Game 
Dependent Variable: Operating a drone is like playing a video game. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Sig . B Sig. B 
       
Sex   -.178 .264  
ideology   .110* .055  
CIVCAS -.119 .581 -.164 .469  
VIDEOGAME .242 .264 .269 .232  
TERRORIST -.207 .338 -.237 .293  
MILCAS .013 .953 .022 .923  
harm -.010 .483 .013 .448  
authority .021 .271 .012 .549  
ingroup .026 .148 .020 .302  
*p < .1;  **p < .05;  ***p < .01 
 
Table 5.8. Drone Operators Are Cowards 
Dependent Variable: Using drones for combat is cowardly because the operators sit far 
removed from the battlefield and are in no personal danger. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Sig . B Sig. B 
       
Sex   .288* .075  
ideology   -.068 .236  
CIVCAS .209 .342 .267 .244  
VIDEOGAME .096 .661 .201 .376  
TERRORIST -.146 .506 -.065 .774  
MILCAS .020 .928 .066 .772  
harm -.001 .970 -.019 .281  
authority -.047** .015 -.039* .062  
ingroup -.009 .618 -.001 .966  
*p < .1;  **p < .05;  ***p < .01 
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     In regards to hypotheses H4, H5, and H6, H4 is not sustained as only one of the seven 
beliefs tested conformed to predictions. H5 is mostly sustained in that six of the seven 
beliefs tested conformed to predictions, and H6 is partially sustained with three of the 
seven beliefs tested conforming to predictions. These results appear to indicate that the 
relationship between moral predispositions and beliefs is neither absolute nor 
straightforward. Despite being strongly correlated with support for drone strikes, scores 
on the in-group/loyalty index were not strong predictors of any of the beliefs tested, with 
the exception of believing that drone strikes are necessary for protecting the United States 
from terrorist attack. Placing moral significance on being loyal to one’s group, and 
protecting the group from outsiders, seems to have little effect on what a person believes 
about drone strikes.  
     High scores on the harm/care index seem mostly to affect beliefs related to the 
“Drones Kill Civilians” narrative discussed in Chapter 2. Scoring high on this index is a 
strong predictor that a person will accept the beliefs that drone strikes cause more civilian 
casualties than do manned aircraft and that drone strikes contribute to the growth of 
terrorism, and will reject the belief that drone strikes are necessary for protecting the 
United States from terrorist attack. While these correlations all conform to predictions, 
scoring high on the harm/care index was also a good predictor of accepting the belief that 
using drones saves military lives. This, coupled with the fact that high scores on this 
index are not correlated with beliefs about drones being similar to video games or drone 
operators being cowardly, indicates that the relationship between the harm/care 
dimension of morality and beliefs about drone strikes isn’t as simple as “accept the 
negative, reject the positive.”  
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     Of the three moral dimensions tested, the authority/respect dimension conforms most 
closely to expectations. High scores on this index were a strong predictor of the 
acceptance of all positive beliefs, as well the rejection of the belief that drone strikes 
contribute to the growth of terrorism. Additionally, high scores on the authority/respect 
index were a good indicator that a person would reject the beliefs that drone strikes kill 
more civilians than do manned aircraft, and that drone operators are cowardly. In the 
authority/respect moral dimension, the relationship between it and beliefs about drone 
strikes actually does seem to be simple and straightforward. Positive beliefs will be 
accepted, negative beliefs rejected. 
Conclusion 
     The RAS model characterizes the opinion formation process as one that is largely 
cognitive. According to Zaller, affective considerations come into play only insofar as 
they lead to cognitive engagement. In the case of public opinion on US drone strikes, 
affective considerations seem to be playing a much more significant role than the RAS 
model predicts. The correspondence between the in-group/loyalty and the 
authority/respect dimensions of morality and support for drone strikes is extremely 
robust. Additionally, the correspondence between the authority/respect and the 
harm/care dimensions of morality and several key beliefs about drone strikes is also 
extremely robust. Those scoring high on the authority/respect dimension were much 
more likely to accept positive beliefs about drone strikes, and reject negative beliefs. 
Those scoring high on the harm/care dimension were much more likely to accept 
negative beliefs and reject the idea that drone strikes are necessary for protecting the 
United States from terrorist attack. Working off the assumption that all these individuals 
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are equal in regards to the potential to be exposed to the various messages generated by 
elite discourse and disseminated by the popular media,39 it stands to reason that if the 
process of deciding which messages to accept (i.e. deciding what to believe) is a 
primarily cognitive process, then these strong correlations would not exist.  
     Of course, as mentioned earlier, there is a strong correlation between the dimensions 
of morality and political ideology. This correlation is observed in my analysis, and it is 
quite strong. Additionally, we know that political partisanship is highly correlated with 
these dimensions of morality. Therefore, maybe Zaller is correct when he asserts that 
when faced with conflicting messages people default to their political predispositions. 
Republicans tend to support drone strikes, while Democrats tend to oppose them. 
Republicans accept positive beliefs about drones because they are Republicans, do the 
“cognitive math”, and decide to support drone strikes. Democrats do essentially the 
reverse. The problem with this formulation is that it tells us absolutely nothing about why 
Republicans tend to accept those positive beliefs in the first place. What political 
predispositions are they appealing to? Same with Democrats, what predispositions are 
they appealing to? When political ideology is controlled for, the effects of the moral 
dimensions are still present. Additionally, it is unlikely that people choose their political 
party affiliation based on their support or opposition to drone strikes. It is however likely 
that a person’s moral predispositions affect his or political party preference. In the 
concluding chapter I will explore some ways in which the relationships between political 
                                                          
39 One could argue here that confirmation bias, the act of seeking out information that one already 
believes, could lead to those with differing moral predispositions to seek out different information, 
leading to different levels of exposure to certain messages. This is a fair objection, but it fails to explain 
how the initial belief that is being followed was formed.      
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ideology, partisanship, moral predispositions, and support/opposition for drone strikes 
might be better untangled. 
     Putting the results of this chapter together with the previous chapter presents a picture 
of opinion formation on drone strikes that could be considered either optimistic or 
disheartening, depending on one’s perspective. Despite the hyperbole, an objective 
analysis of public polling on drone strikes indicates that drone strikes are, at best, 
supported only slightly more than the use of other forms of military force against 
terrorists. Considering that drone strikes are very often portrayed as an effective means of 
protecting the United States from terrorist attack while keeping US military personnel out 
of harm’s way, the fact that a majority of Americans approve of drone strikes should not 
be surprising. That the majority is as slim as it is, and the fact that experimental results 
(mine and others) indicate that support for drone strikes can be significantly reduced by 
the introduction of concerns for the safety of foreign civilians, suggests that for most 
Americans the decision to support or oppose drone strikes is not being made frivolously. 
Americans are weighing the information they receive about drone strikes and deciding 
accordingly. This is encouraging. What is disheartening is that these decisions seem to be 
filtered through individual moral attitudes.   
     The information that people receive regarding drone strikes is the direct product of 
competing lines of elite discourse. And while my experiments have been designed to 
measure the effect of moral attitudes on the acceptance of beliefs and the subsequent 
formation of opinion among the general public, there is little reason to suspect that elites 
are immune to this process. There is also very little reason to suspect that most elites are 
significantly better informed about drone operations than are the general public. If the 
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messages being generated by elite discourse are being guided by individual morality (i.e. 
journalists, reporters, academics believe stories that accord with their moral 
predispositions and reject those that conflict), then the emergence of directly competing 
narratives, and a decidedly divided public, is a foregone conclusion. Worse, if the beliefs 
of those constructing the narratives are dependent on individual morality, the narratives 
received by the public are likely to be moral narratives. Moral narratives lead to moral 
conviction. 
     Again, when a person acts from moral conviction, he or she is certain in their beliefs. 
And while they may or may not engage in transgressive advocacy, their acceptance (and 
promotion) of those beliefs will be steadfast. Therefore, issues characterized by 
competing moral narratives will not only become divisive, they will become intractable. 
Even when presented with factual information, people will reject knowledge, and cling to 
belief.  
     In this dissertation, I have shown that public opinion on drone strikes is most affected 
by the beliefs promoted in two competing narratives…the “Drones Kill Terrorists” 
narrative and the “Drones Kill Civilians” narrative. These are moral narratives, and as 
such the one people choose to accept appears to be the one that resonates most strongly 
with an their moral predispositions. Importantly however, this study also demonstrates 
that salience has an effect. Similar to previous research, the introduction of the image of 
civilians being killed in conflict increased opposition to drone strikes. Unlike previous 
research however, I was able to elicit this effect with no mention of drones. Therefore, it 
seems that the connection between drone strikes and civilian death so heavily promoted 
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by the “Drones Kill Civilians” narrative has been exceptionally effective. This is not 
surprising. 
     As discussed earlier, those who are liberal in their politics tend to reason primarily 
along just two of the five moral foundations; the care/harm foundation and the 
fairness/reciprocity foundation, with the harm/care foundation generally taking 
precedence. Those who identify politically as conservatives however, tend to reason 
along all of the foundations approximately equally. This suggests that both liberals and 
conservatives view the deaths of innocent civilians as a moral issue. As such, both 
liberals and conservatives are susceptible to moral narratives centered around the death of 
civilians.  
     Importantly, this should not be taken to suggest that liberals are not susceptible to 
moral narratives centered around the threat of terrorism. Terrorists are generally viewed 
as people who harm others, including innocents. I suspect that liberals are, by and large, 
just as opposed to terrorism as are conservatives. However, considering that for liberals, 
the most sacred moral value is caring for victims of oppression, it is likely that they are 
able—at least morally—to totally separate opposition to terrorism and support for drone 
strikes. For liberals, both feel wrong. In short, just because liberals tend to accept 
negative beliefs about drones, does not mean they reject negative beliefs about terrorists. 
While I was unable to elicit a decrease in opposition to drone strikes by priming my 
subjects with a news story detailing terrorist attacks, this does not mean that a more direct 
prime (a news story detailing a drone attack against terrorists) would not elicit such an 
effect.  
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     Again, the acceptance and rejection of beliefs is not absolute. People are quite capable 
of holding contradictory beliefs. What morality does is influence how strongly certain 
beliefs are held. It does not negate the effect of salience it simply mediates it. As such, it 
is important to understand how individual morality affects public opinion…not just on 
drone strikes but on other politically divisive issues as well. Examining politically 
divisive issues in terms of partisanship gives, at best, an incomplete picture. The vast 
majority of US drone strikes occurred under the presidency of Barack Obama. Despite 
this, there is a clear divide among Democrats and Republicans on this issue, with 
Democrats being significantly more opposed to drone strikes than Republicans. This 
strongly suggests that opinion on drone strikes are not dependent on which party is in 
office. 
     However, despite the election of Donald Trump, who has increased drone strikes and 
signed an executive order overturning the Obama administration’s commitment to 
publicly release information detailing the number of civilians killed by US drone strikes 
(Dilanian and Kube, 2019), public opposition to drone strikes does not appear to have 
increased. While public interest in drone strikes was significantly waning even before 
Trump announced his candidacy, it seems that President Trump’s increased use of drones 
and return to secrecy are the least of his political opponents worries. Arguably, President 
Trump is the most politically divisive figure to be elected to the presidency in American 
history. And while there has been no shortage of criticism directed at the President (by 
Democrats and others) much of it has centered around Trump’s perceived personal 
shortcomings, his irregular approach to foreign policy (particularly his embrace of 
authoritarian leaders), and his policies/proposed policies regarding immigration. So while 
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drone strikes appear to be more a moral issue than a political issue, it also appears to be 
an issue that can quickly lose significance in the face of other issues.  
     This does not mean that the significance of moral attitudes should be discounted as a 
relevant factor in the formation of public opinion. While the issue of drone strikes may be 
flying under the radar at this time, this does not mean the underlying attitudes that lead 
people to oppose or support drone strikes have disappeared, or that the narratives 
constructed to shape opinion on this issue have ceased to have an effect. If elites once 
again decide to elevate the issue of drone strikes to one of public importance, we can 
expect moral narratives to be a primary feature of their discourse. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 CONCLUSIONS 
     The goal of this study was twofold: to examine the factor(s) that shape public 
opposition to drone strikes, and to argue that in the case of drone strikes, where factual 
information is low and there are directly competing narratives, moral attitudes should be 
given more weight than cognitive processing in the formation of public opinion. To 
achieve these goals, this study examined the history and public polling on drone strikes, 
previous research seeking to explain public support for drone strikes, the media’s 
portrayal of those killed in drone strikes, the elite discourse surrounding the issue of 
drone strikes, and the relationships between personal belief, moral attitudes, and 
opposition/support for drone strikes 
Findings 
     In Chapter 1, I demonstrated that despite giving explanations which should suggest 
significantly higher levels of support among the American public for drone strikes than is 
actually observed, journalists reporting on polls measuring support for drone strikes have 
doggedly portrayed public support for drone strikes as unwaveringly high. Additionally, I 
examined the small number of empirical studies directed at explaining support for drone 
strikes and concluded that while there is support for the reasons given by journalists to 
explain public approval of drone strikes, these studies also suggest that support for drone 
strikes can be significantly reduced by making the potential for civilian casualties salient 
to survey respondents. 
     In Chapter 2, I conducted a content analysis of 12 years of drone strike coverage by 
the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal aimed at determining how these two 
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major US news media outlets have tended to portray those killed in US drone strikes; as 
terrorists and insurgents, or as innocent victims. The results of this analysis indicated that, 
by a wide margin, those killed in US drone strikes are predominantly portrayed as 
terrorists, insurgents, or militants, not as innocent civilians.  
     In Chapter 3, I examined the elite discourse surrounding drone strikes and derived 
three narratives which I argue encapsulate the beliefs that shape public opinion on drone 
strikes. To test these narratives, I conducted a survey-experiment designed to measure the 
effectiveness of these narratives at increasing/decreasing opposition to drone strikes. The 
results of this experiment indicated that the “Drones Kill Civilians” narrative has been 
effective at creating an implicit connection between drone strikes and the deaths of 
civilians in conflict.  
     In Chapter 4, I used data collected from this same survey experiment to establish a 
relationship between certain beliefs about drone strikes and opposition to drone strikes. 
The results of this analysis indicated that opposition to drone strikes is strongly correlated 
with the belief that drone strikes cause more civilian casualties than do strikes from 
manned aircraft, and the rejection of the belief that drone strikes are necessary for 
protecting the United States from terrorist attack. In Chapter 5 I used additional data 
collected from this survey experiment to demonstrate strong correlations between moral 
attitudes, beliefs about drone strikes, and opposition and support for drone strikes. The 
results of this analysis indicated that moral attitudes can be strong predictors of what 
individuals believe about drone strikes, and whether or not they choose to oppose or 
support them. 
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Implications 
     Because this study utilizes a convenience sample, it is unclear how much external 
validity my experimental findings carry. My subjects were college students, 
predominantly under the age of 25. Since survey data shows that younger people tend to 
be more liberal in their politics (Pew 2018b), in an important sense my sample was likely 
not representative of the American public at large. Still, this study raises a number of 
implications for both public support for drone strikes and the process of public opinion 
formation in general. As discussed in Chapter 4, previous research has shown that the US 
public has a very weak understanding of the capabilities and uses of armed drones. And 
as demonstrated in Chapter 3, elite discourse surrounding US drone strikes is represented 
by competing narratives.  
     In my experiment the presence of these competing narratives appears to combine with 
a lack of information and produce an opinion formation process which is largely directed 
by moral attitudes, not a cognitively-based assessment of the facts. Since there is little 
reason to suspect that college students and the general public are differentially exposed to 
narratives about drone strikes, it is not unreasonable to assume that the process my 
findings depict occurs among the general public just as it does among college students. 
However, because of the limited nature of my sample, the possible effects of age and 
education on this process cannot be tested.   
     Haidt argues that when it comes to opinion formation, “intuitions come first, strategic 
reasoning second” (2012, pg.1). He also argues that intuition frequently takes the form of 
moral judgments. I have argued that because of the way drone strikes have been 
presented to the public—as either a necessary tool for keeping the United States safe 
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from terrorist attack or as a wanton and indiscriminate killer of innocent civilians—this 
issue has, for many Americans, become a moral issue, not a political issue. The findings 
in this study suggest that in the case of drone strikes, American opinions are significantly 
impacted by their moral attitudes. These attitudes determine not just whether an 
individual supports or opposes drone strikes, but also what they believe to be true about 
drone strikes.   
     Moral conviction—the absolute belief that a position is right or wrong (Skitka, 2002; 
Skitka and Mullen, 2002)—produces a host of effects on people’s ability to reason and 
deliberate on an issue. When people experience moral conviction, they not only think in 
terms of absolute right and wrong, they believe their judgments are, “…equally valid 
everywhere and as objective as 2 + 2 = 4” (Morgan, Skitka, and Lytle, 2014). People 
experiencing moral conviction tend to display strong negative emotions towards those 
who disagree with them (Ryan, 2014), and they may also tolerate, or even engage in, 
transgressive advocacy, which is, “advocacy that involves norm-violating means to 
achieve preferred ends” (Mueller and Skitka, 2017).  
     The extremely polarized discourse surrounding many issues that are ostensibly 
political (global warmings, healthcare, immigration, the minimum wage, etc.) may 
indicate that like drone strikes, these issues are, at least in the minds of the American 
public, moral issues. If this is the case, and opinion on these issues are largely driven by 
moral attitudes, cognitive approaches to influencing opinion are likely to be ineffective. 
In short, presenting the public with more and better information will not change their 
beliefs.  
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Avenues for Further Research  
     To better understand the effect of moral attitudes on the formation of political 
opinions several things need to occur. First, more research needs to be directed at 
uncovering what Americans actually believe about polarized issues. Second, more 
research needs to be directed at correlating moral attitudes with these beliefs and 
correlating these beliefs with competing positions on an issue. Just knowing that 
Republicans or conservatives support and issue while Democrats and liberals oppose it is 
superficial. Understanding why certain issue narratives resonate with different groups is a 
necessary first step to understanding how political issues become polarized along partisan 
lines. 
     Additionally, more thought needs to be given to how moral attitudes interact with the 
personal salience of political issues. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the peak of public 
interest in US drone strikes was 2013. During this year there were more polls taken and 
news articles written than any other year. After 2013, a steady decline in polling and 
reporting occurs, along with a drop in public interest. Whether public interest in leading 
or lagging media coverage is unclear. What does seem to be evident however, is that even 
during the height of news media coverage, public opinion did not mirror the most often 
communicated messages. Despite being largely described as an effective weapon against 
terrorism, public support for drone strikes steadily declined. This suggests that the 
media’s influence on political issues is not entirely (or possibly even largely) the effect of 
repetition. What may be more important than how many times a person hears a message, 
is how well that message resonates. 
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     Returning to the idea that narratives construct political environments (Kubiak, 2014), 
if the resonance of such narratives relies largely on individual moral attitudes, then 
examining how narratives regarding climate change, immigration, and government 
spending define political actors and assign roles is necessary first step in understanding 
why certain narratives resonate with some individuals and not others. All of these issues 
are characterized by a strong ideological and partisan divide. Is it possible this partisan 
divide is an artifact of individual moral attitudes?  
     Among Republicans, discussion of immigration almost always focuses on the legal 
status of the immigrants. Among Democrats the discussion almost focuses on the 
conditions the immigrants are fleeing from. Looked at from the standpoint of individual 
moral attitudes, this difference in rhetoric makes perfect sense. Republicans are far more 
likely to have what Haidt (2012) describes as a conservative morality. Those with a 
conservative morality place a significant degree of moral significance on obeying the 
law. Democrats on the other hand are far more likely to have what Haidt describes as a 
liberal morality. Those with a liberal morality do not consider obeying the law to be a 
moral issue. Morality is defined strictly in terms of alleviating human suffering. 
Therefore, if opinions on immigration are being formed by individual morality, this is 
exactly the kind of partisan framing we should expect. After all, despite what some cable 
news network hosts might claim, it is not as if Republicans are heartless or Democrats are 
anarchists. Rather, it is simply that individuals are seizing on the narratives that resonate 
with their moral predispositions. 
     To be clear, my connection between individual moral attitudes and opinions on 
immigration are purely speculative at this point. Research would have to be conducted to 
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confirm such a relationship. From a purely political perspective however, it might be 
advantageous for those in a position to influence public opinion (i.e. elites) to at least 
consider that those they are opposed to are genuine in their stated concerns and are not 
just making excuses for their immorality. If the goal of those opposed to immigration 
really is to insure the sanctity of the rule of law, and the goal of their opponents and 
detractors really to alleviate human suffering, then a compromise can surely be reached. 
Again, Republicans are not heartless and Democrats are not anarchists. 
     In regards to the specific issue of drone strikes, future research should be directed at 
replicating this study on a larger, more diverse sample. With a larger sample, within 
condition effects of morality could be assessed, allowing for an examination of possible 
interaction effects. That is, is it possible that making specific elements of the drone strike 
debate immediately salient changes reported beliefs on drone strikes? Will those exposed 
to a scenario describing civilians being killed in conflict be significantly more likely to 
not only oppose drone strikes (as this study indicated), but also significantly more likely 
to believe that drones are unnecessary for protecting the United States from terrorist 
attack? Will those exposed to a scenario describing terrorist threats be more likely to 
believe that drone strikes kill fewer civilians than manned aircraft? Or are those beliefs 
largely set in the acceptance stage of opinion formation as I have argued here? 
     While the importance of the issue of drone strikes may be waning, it is a near certainty 
that as military technology progresses similar issues will arise. Additionally, if the effects 
demonstrated in this study are generalizable to other politically polarized issues, it may 
be necessary for scholars to rethink how they approach the study of public opinion 
formation.        
160 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Akbar, Mirza Shahzad. 2013. “Obama’s Forgotten Victims.” New York Times, May 23rd   
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/opinion/the-forgotten-victims-of-obamas-
drone-war.html 
 
Almond, Gabriel. 1950. “The American People and Foreign Policy.” Harcourt Brace:   
New York, NY. 
 
Alston, Philip. 2010. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, United Nations General Assembly. 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Ad
d6.pdf 
 
Alston, Philip and Hina Shamsi. 2010. “A Killer Above the Law?” The Guardian,  
February 8th 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/feb/08/afghanistan-drones-
defence-killing 
 
Amnesty International. 2013. Will I Be Next? US Drone Strikes in Pakistan. 
https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/asa330132013en.pdf 
 
Baker, Peter. 2013. “Obama’s Turn in Bush’s Bind.” New York Times, February 9th  
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/10/world/obamas-turn-in-bushs-bind-with-
defense-policies.html 
 
Bauman, Christopher W. and Linda J. Skitka. 2009. “In the Mind of the Perceiver:  
Psychological Implications of Moral Conviction.” In, The Psychology of Learning 
and Motivation, Vol. 50, eds. Daniel M. Bartels, Christopher W. Bauman, Linda J. 
Skitka, and Douglas L. Medin. Academic Press: Burlington, MA. 
 
BBC. 2010. “UN Official Criticises US Over Drone Attacks.”  
https://www.bbc.com/news/10219962 
 
Benjamin, Medea. 2013. Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control. Verso: Brooklyn,  
NY. 
 
Bergen, Peter L., and Daniel Rothenberg. 2015. Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict,  
Law, and Policy. Cambridge University Press: New York, NY. (edited volume).  
 
Biggers, Daniel R. 2011. ‘‘When Ballot Issues Matter: Social Issue Ballot Measures and  
Their Impact on Turnout.’’ Political Behavior 33[1]: pgs. 3–25. 
 
Brunstetter, Daniel R. and Megan Braun. 2013. “State of the Union: A Decade of Armed  
Drones.” Brown Journal of World Affairs, 19[11]: pp. 81-95. 
 
161 
 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 2017. Drone Wars: The Full Data.  
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-01-01/drone-wars-the-full-
data  
 
Burnstein, Paul and William Freudenberg. 1978. “Changing Public Policy: The Impact of  
Public Opinion, Antiwar Demonstrations, and War Costs on Senate Voting on 
Vietnam War Motions.” American Journal of Sociology, 84[1]: pp. 99-122. 
 
Byman, Daniel. 2013. “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of  
Choice.” Foreign Affairs, 92[4]: pp.32-43. 
 
Carlisle, Herbert J. 2016. “Hearing to Receive Testimony on Army Unmanned Aircraft  
Vehicle and Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft Enterprises in Review of the 
Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal year 2017 and the Future Years Defense 
Program.” https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/16-32_3-16-
16.pdf 
 
Carpenter, R. Charli. 2005. “Women, Children and Other Vulnerable Groups: Gender,  
Strategic Frames and the Protection of Civilians as a Transnational Issue.” 
International Studies Quarterly, 49: pp.295-334 
 
Chesney, Robert. 2016. “Shift to JSOC on Drone Strikes Does Not Mean CIA Has Been  
Sidelined.” Lawfare, June 16th. https://www.lawfareblog.com/shift-jsoc-drone-
strikes-does-not-mean-cia-has-been-sidelined 
 
Cilizza, Chris. 2013. “The American Public Loves Drones.” The Washington Post, Feb.  
6th. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/02/06/the-american-
public-loves-drones/?utm_term=.b0f4c417d5ed 
 
Cohen, Grant. 2014. “Public Opinion & Drones: The Formation of American Public  
Opinion Regarding the Use of Drones as a U.S. Foreign Policy Tool.” Available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2476118 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2476118  
 
Cole, Chris, Mary Dobbing and Amy Hailwood. 2010. “Convenient Killing: Armed  
Drones and the ‘Playstation Mentality’.” Drone Wars UK. 
https://dronewarsuk.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/conv-killing-final.pdf 
 
Contratto, Michael R. 2011. “The Decline of the Military Ethos and Profession of Arms:  
An Argument Against Autonomous Lethal Engagements.” Air and Space Power 
Journal, Maxwell AFB: Montgomery, AL. 
http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-26_Issue-
1/Research-Contratto.pdf 
 
Converse, Philip. 1962. “Information Flow and the Stability of Partisan Attitudes.”  
Public Opinion Quarterly, 26: pp. 578-599. 
162 
 
 
Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2013. “Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy.” Foreign  
Affairs, 92[4]: pp.44-54. 
 
Dann, Carrie. 2017. “Democrats Now Give the CIA Higher Marks than the Republicans  
Do. That’s a Really Big Shift.” https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-
read/democrats-now-give-cia-higher-marks-republicans-do-s-really-n703206 
 
Dar, Atiya and Shahzad Ali. 2015. “How Pakastani and the US Elite Print Media Painted  
Issue of Drone Attacks: Framing Analysis of the News International and the New 
York Times.” Global Media Journal: Pakistan Edition, 8[2]: pp.1-17. 
 
Davies, Graeme A.M., Marcus Schulzke, and Thomas Almond. 2018. “Sheltering the  
President from Blame: Drone Strikes, Media Assessments and Heterogeneous 
Responsibility 2002-2014.” The British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, 20[2]: pp. 477-496. 
 
Dilian, Ken and Courtney Kube. 2019. “Trump Cancels Obama Policy of Reporting  
Drone Strike Deaths.” https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-
cancels-obama-policy-reporting-drone-strike-deaths-n980156 
 
Dizard, Wilson. 2015. “Poll Finds Strong Support for Drone Strikes Among Americans.”  
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/5/28/drones-support.html  
 
Dye, Thomas R. 1984. Understanding Public Policy. Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs,  
NJ. 
 
Eaton Jr. Howard. 1989. “Agenda Setting with Bi-Weekly Data On Content of Three  
National Media.” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 66[4]: pp. 942-
948. 
 
Entman, Robert M. 1993. “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.”  
Journal of Communication, 43[4]: pp.51-58. 
 
Frank, Thomas. 2005. What’s the Matter with Kansas?: How Conservatives Won the  
Heart of America. Reprint ed. Holt Paperbacks: New York, NY. 
 
Franke, Ulrike Esther. 2018. The Unmanned Revolution: How Drones are  
Revolutionising Warfare. Bodleian Libraries: University of Oxford.  
 
Fisk, Kerstin, Jennifer L. Merolla, and Jennifer M. Ramos. 2018. “Emotions, Terrorist  
Threat, and Drones: Anger Drives Support for Drone Strikes.” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, https://doi-org.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/10.1177/0022002718770522  
 
Fuller, Jaime. 2014. “Americans Are Fine with Drone Strikes. Everyone Else in the  
World? Not So Much.” Washington Post, July 15th.  
163 
 
 
Gartner, Scott Sigmund. 2008. “The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for  
War: An Experimental Approach.” American Political Science Review, 102[1]: 
pp.95-106. 
 
Gawronski, Bertram and Jan De Houwer. 2014. “Implicit Measures in Social and  
Personality Psychology.” In H.T. Reis and C.M Judd (eds.), Handbook of 
Research Methods in Social and Personality Psychology (2nd edition). Cambridge 
University Press: New York, NY. 
 
Gelpi, Christopher, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler. 2006. “Success matters: Casualty  
Sensitivity and the War in Iraq.” International Security, 30[3]: pp. 7-46.  
 
Graham, Jesse, Jonathan Haidt and Brian A. Nosek. 2009. “Liberal and Conservatives  
Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations.” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 96[5]: pp. 1029-1046. 
 
Grijalva, Raul M. 2014. “CPC Co-Chairs Call for Constructive Engagement on Drones:  
Human Rights Must Be a Priority.” https://grijalva.house.gov/press-releases/cpc-
cochairs-call-for-constructive-engagement-on-drones-human-rights-must-be-a-
priority/ 
 
Grummel, John A. 2008. “morality Politics, Direct Democracy, and Turnout.” State  
politics and Policy Quarterly, 8[3]: pp. 282-292. 
 
Haider-Markel, Donald P. 1998. “The Politics of Social Regulatory Policy: State and  
Federal Hate Crime Policy and Implementation Effort.” Political Research 
Quarterly, 51[1]: pp. 69-88. 
 
Haider-Markel, Donald P., and Kenneth J. Meier. 1996. ‘‘Politics of Gay and Lesbian  
Rights: Expanding the Scope of the Conflict.’’ Journal of Politics, 58[2]: pgs. 
332–49. 
 
Haidt, Johnathan, 2012. The Righteous Mind: Why Good people are Divided by Politics  
and Religion. Pantheon Books: New York, NY. 
 
Hartley, Thomas and Bruce Russett. 1992. “Public Opinion and the Common Defense:  
Who Governs Military Spending in the United States?” The American Political 
Science Review, 86[4]: pp. 905-915. 
 
Heyns, Christof. 2013. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or  
Arbitrary Executions, Christof Heyns, United Nations General Assembly. 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session
23/A-HRC-23-47_en.pdf 
 
 
164 
 
Heyns, Christof. 2015. “Preface: Coming to Terms with Drones.” In David Cortright,  
Rachel Fairhurst, and Kristen Wall (eds.), Drones and the Future of Armed 
Conflict.  University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL. 
 
Holewinski, Sarah. 2015. “Just Trust Us: The Need to Know More About the Civilian  
Impact of US Drone Strikes.” in Drone Warfare: Transforming Conflict, Law, 
and Policy, Bergen and Rothenberg, (eds.). Cambridge University Press: New 
York, NY.  
 
Holsti, R. Ole. 1996. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. The University of  
Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, MI.  
 
Jepson, Kris. 2010. “CIA Drone Strikes: A legal War?” Channel 4 News  
https://www.channel4.com/news/cia-drone-strikes-a-legal-war 
 
Johns, Robert and Graeme A.M. Davies. 2019. “Civilian Casualties and Public Support  
for Military Action: Experimental Evidence.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
61[1]: pp. 251-281. 
 
Johnston, Patrick B. and Anoop K. Sarbahi. 2016. “The Impact of US Drone Strikes on  
Terrorism in Pakistan.” International Studies Quarterly, 60[2]: pp.203-219. 
 
Jones, Timothy and Sheets, Penelope and Rowling, Charles. (2011). “Differential News  
Framing of Unmanned Aerial Drones: Efficient and Effective or Illegal and 
Inhumane?” APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1900579 
 
Kaag, John and Sarah Kreps. 2013. “Drones and Democratic Peace.” The Brown Journal  
of World Affairs, 19[11]: pp. 97-109. 
 
Kennedy, Brian. 2016. “Most Americans Trust the Military and Scientists to Act in the  
Public’s Best Interest.” http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/18/most-
americans-trust-the-military-and-scientists-to-act-in-the-publics-interest/ 
 
Kilcullen, Davis and Andrew Exum. 2009. “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below.”  
The New York Times, May, 16th 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html 
 
Kirwan Institute. 2019. “Understanding Implicit Bias.” Ohio State University.  
http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/research/understanding-implicit-bias/  
 
Kreps, Sarah. 2014. “Flying Under the Radar: A Study of Public Attitudes towards  
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.” Research and Politics, April-June: pp. 1-7. 
 
 
 
165 
 
Kreps, Sarah and Geoffrey PR Wallace. 2016. “International Law, Military Effectiveness,  
and Public Support for Drone Strikes.” Journal of Peace Research, 53[6]: pp. 
830-844. 
 
Kubiak, Jeffrey. 2014. War Narratives and the American National Will in War. Palgrave  
Macmillan: New York, NY. 
LaFranchi, Howard. 2013. “American Public Has Few Qualms With Drone Strikes, Poll  
Finds.” The Christian Science Monitor, June 3rd. 
https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2013/0603/American-public-has-few-
qualms-with-drone-strikes-poll-finds 
 
Larson, Eric V. 1996. Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in  
Domestic Support for U.S. Military operations. RAND: Santa Monica, CA. 
 
Lee, Carol E. and Adam Entous. 2012. “Obama Defends Drone Use.” Wall Street  
Journal, January 31st 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702046529045771936733185894
62 
 
Lerner, Adam B. 2015. “Poll: Americans Overwhelmingly Support Drone Strikes.”  
POLITICO, May 28th. http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/poll-support-drone-
strikes-118372 
 
Lerner, Jennifer S. and Larissa Z. Tiedens. 2006. “Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker:  
How Appraisal Tendencies Shape Anger’s Influence on Cognition. Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making, 19[2]: pp. 115-137. 
 
Lipisto-Johansson, Piia. 2017. “Frame Analysis” in Encyclopedia of Case Study  
Research. SAGE Publishing: Thousand Oaks, CA. 
 
Lippmann, Walter. 1922. Public Opinion. Macmillan: New York, NY. 
 
Lippmann, Walter and Charles Merz. 1920. “A Test of the News.” New Republic (special  
supplement) 23: pp. 1-42. 
 
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1966. “The President, the Polls and Vietnam.” Trans-action,  
3[6]: pp. 19-24. 
 
Maki, Meghashyam. 2013. “Jay Carney: U.S. Drone Strikes ‘Precise’ and ‘Lawful’.”  
Washington Examiner, November 16th https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/jay-
carney-us-drone-strikes-precise-and-lawful 
 
Markel, Lester, et.al. 1949. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. Harper and Brothers:  
New York, NY.  
 
 
166 
 
Matsa, Katerina Eva and Elisha Shearer. 2018. “News Use Across Social Media  
Platforms.” http://www.journalism.org/2018/09/10/news-use-across-social-media-
platforms-2018/ 
 
Mazzetti, Mark and Declan Walsh. 2013. “Pakistan Says U.S. Drone Killed Taliban  
Leader.” New York Times, May 30th 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/30/world/asia/drone-strike-hits-near-pakistani-
afghan-border.html  
 
McCombs, Max, R. Lance Holbert, Spiro Kiousis, and Wayne Wanta. 2011. The News  
and Public Opinion: Media Effects on Civic Life. Polity Press: Malden, MA.  
 
McCombs, Maxwell. 2004. Setting the Agenda: Mass media and Public Opinion.  
Blackwell Publishing Inc.: Malden, MA.  
 
McCombs, Maxwell E., and Donald L. Shaw. 1972. “The Agenda-Setting Function of  
Mass Media.” The Public Opinion Quarterly, 36[2]: pp.176-187. 
 
McGuire, William J. 1968. “Personality and Susceptibility to Social Influence.” In E. F.  
Borgatta and W. W. Lambert (eds.), Handbook of Personality Theory and 
Research (pp. 1130-1187). Rand-McNally: Chicago, IL.   
 
McCrisken, Trevor. 2011. “Ten Years On: Obama’s War on Terrorism in Rhetoric and  
Practice.” International Affairs, 87[4]: pp. 781-801 
 
Mooney, Christopher Z., and Richard G. Schuldt. 2008. ‘‘Does Morality Policy Exist?  
Testing a Basic Assumption.’’ Policy Studies Journal, 36[2]: pgs. 199–218. 
 
Morgan, G. Scott, Linda J. Skitka, and Daniel C. Wisneski. 2010. ‘‘Moral and Religious  
Convictions and Intentions to Vote in the 2008 Presidential Election.’’ Analyses 
of Social Issues and Public Policy, 10[1]: pgs. 307–320. 
 
Mueller, Allison B., and Linda J. Skitka. 2017. “Liars, Damned Liars, and Zealots: The  
Effect of Moral Mandates on Transgressive Advocacy Acceptance.” Social 
Psychology and Political Science, 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1948550617720272 
 
Mueller, John E. 1973. War, Presidents, and Public Opinion. Wiley: New York, NY. 
 
Nebehay, Stephanie. 2010. “U.N. Investigator Calls for Halt to CIA Drone Killings.”  
Reuters https://www.reuters.com/article/us-killings-drones-
idUSTRE65131220100602 
 
New America. 2019. “Drone Strikes: Pakistan.” 
https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/americas-counterterrorism-wars/pakistan/ 
 
167 
 
New York Times. 2013. “Obama’s Speech on Drone Policy.”  
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/transcript-of-obamas-speech-on-
drone-policy.html 
 
Newport, Frank. 2017. “U.S. Confidence in Military Reflects Perceived Competency.”  
https://news.gallup.com/poll/214511/high-confidence-military-reflects-perceived-
competency.aspx 
 
Nock, Stephen L. and Thomas M. Guterbock. 2010. “Survey Experiments” in Handbook  
of Survey Research, Second Edition, Peter V. Marsden and James D. Wright, 
(eds.).  Emerald Publishing Limited: Bingley, West Yorkshire, England.  
 
NPR. 2012. “John Brennan Delivers Speech on Drone Ethics.”  
https://www.npr.org/2012/05/01/151778804/john-brennan-delivers-speech-on-
drone-ethics 
 
O’Connell, Mary Ellen. 2010a. “Lawful Use of Combat Drones.”  
https://fas.org/irp/congress/2010_hr/042810oconnell.pdf 
 
O’Connell, Mary Ellen. 2010b. “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones.” Notre Dame  
Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144 
 
O’Connell, Mary Ellen. 2011. “Seductive Drones: Learning from a Decade of Lethal  
Operations.” Journal of Law, Information & Science, August 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1912635 
 
O’Connell, Mary Ellen. 2014. “21st Century Arms Control Challenges: Drones, Cyber  
Weapons, Killer Robots, and WMDs.” Washington University Global Studies 
Law Review, 13[3]: pp. 515-533. 
 
Pew Research Center. 2011. “The Military-Civilian Gap: War and Sacrifice in the Post- 
9/11 Era.” http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/10/05/chapter-1-overview-3/ 
 
Pew Research Center. 2013a. “Public Esteem for Military Still High.”  
http://www.pewforum.org/2013/07/11/public-esteem-for-military-still-high/ 
 
Pew Research Center. 2013b. “America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than  
China’s.” http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/07/Pew-
Research-Global-Attitudes-Project-Balance-of-Power-Report-FINAL-July-18-
2013.pdf 
 
Pew Research Center. 2015. “Public Continues to Back U.S. Drone Attacks.”  
http://www.people-press.org/2015/05/28/public-continues-to-back-u-s-drone-
attacks/ 
 
168 
 
Pew Research Center. 2016. “America’s Global Role, U.S. Superpower Status.”  
http://www.people-press.org/2016/05/05/1-americas-global-role-u-s-superpower-
status/  
 
 
Pew Research Center. 2018a. “January 2018 Political Survey; Final Topline.”  
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/01/29144651/1-25-
18-Priorities-topline-for-release1.pdf 
 
Pew Research Center. 2018b. “The Generation Gap in American Politics.” 
http://www.people-press.org/2018/03/01/the-generation-gap-in-american-politics/ 
 
Prasow, Andrea J. 2014. “The Year of living More Dangerously: Obama’s Drone Speech  
Was a Sham.” The Guardian, May 23rd 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/23/obama-drone-speech-
one-year-later 
 
QinetiQ North America. 2018. “Dragon Runner: Small Unmanned Ground Robots.”  
https://qinetiq-na.com/products/unmanned-systems/dragon-runner/ 
 
Reeve, Elspeth. 2013. “The Drone Speech and the Hyperexcited Return of Intellectual  
Obama.” The Atlantic, May 23rd 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/05/drone-speech-obama-
pundits/314937/ 
 
Riza, Shane M. 2013. Killing Without Heart: Limits on Robotic Warfare in an Age of  
Persistent Conflict. Potomac Books: Dulles, VA. 
 
Ryan, Timothy J. “Reconsidering Moral Issues in Politics.” Journal of Politics, 76[2]:  
pgs. 280-397. 
 
Sauer, Frank and Niklas Schornig. 2012. “Killer Drones: The ‘Silver Bullet’ of  
Democratic Warfare? Security Dialogue, 43[4]: pp. 363-380. 
 
Savage, Charlie. 2010. “U.N. Report Highly Critical of U.S. Drone Attacks.” New York  
Times, June 2nd https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/world/03drones.html 
 
Scahill, Jeremy, et.al. 2016. The Assassination Complex. Simon and Schuster: New York,  
NY. 
 
Scales, Bob. 2015. Scales on War: The Future of America’s Military at Risk. Naval  
Institute Press: Annapolis, MD. 
 
 
 
 
169 
 
Schneider, Jacquelyn and Julia Macdonald. 2016. “U.S. Public Support for Drone Strikes:  
When do Americans Prefer Unmanned over Manned Platforms?” Center for a New 
American Security, http://files.cnas.org.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/CNAS-
Report-DronesandPublicSupport-Final2.pdf 
 
Scott, Shane and Eric Schmitt. 2010. “C.I.A. Deaths Prompt Surge in U.S. Drone  
Strikes.” New York Times, January 22nd 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/23/world/asia/23drone.html 
 
Sheets, Penelope, Charles M. Rowling, and Timothy M. Jones. 2015. “The View from  
Above (and below): A Comparison of American, British, and Arab News 
Coverage of US Drones.” Media, War, and Conflict, 8[3]: pp. 289-311. 
 
Singer, Peter W. 2009. Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st  
Century. Penguin Press: New York, NY. 
 
Skitka, L. J. 2002. “Do the Means Always Justify the Ends or do the Ends Sometimes  
Justify the Means? A Value Protection Model of Justice Reasoning”. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28: pgs. 588–597. 
 
Skitka, L. J., & Mullen, E. 2002. “Understanding Judgments of Fairness in a Real-world  
Political Context: A Test of the Value Protection Model of Justice Reasoning. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28: pgs. 1419–1429. 
 
Smith, Kim. 1987. “Newspaper Coverage and Public Concern About Community Issues.”  
Communication Research, 14[4]: pp.379-395. 
 
Soroka, Stuart N. 2003. “Media Public Opinion and Foreign Policy.” The International  
Journal of Press/Politics, 8[1]: pp. 27-48.  
 
Stanford Law School International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and  
NYU School of Law Global Justice Clinic. 2012. Living Under Drones: Death, 
Injury, and Trauma to Civilians From US Drone Practices in Pakistan. 
http://livingunderdrones.org 
 
Stemler, Steve. 2001. “An Overview of Content Analysis.” Practical Assessment,  
Research and Evaluation, 7[17]: pp. 1-6 
https://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=7&n=17 
 
Stern, Jessica. 2015. “Obama and Terrorism: Like It or Not, the War Goes On.” Foreign  
Affairs, 94[5]: pp. 62-70. 
 
Susko, Peter A. 2014. “Drones and Indexing: A Content Analysis of Print Media  
Coverage.” 
http://mars.gmu.edu/bitstream/handle/1920/9091/Susko_thesis_2014.pdf?sequenc
e=1&isAllowed=y 
170 
 
 
Takeshita, Toshio. 1993. “Agenda-Setting Effects of the Press in a Japanese Local  
Election.” Studies of Broadcasting, 29: pp. 193-216. 
 
Tatalovich, Raymond, Alexander Smith, and Michael P Bobic. 1994. ‘‘Moral Conflict  
and the Policy Process.’’ Policy Currents, 4: pgs. 1–7. 
 
US Congress. 2001. “S.J. Res. 23-Authorization for Use of Military Force.”  
https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/23 
 
Verba, Sidney, Richard A. Brody, Edwin B. Parker, Norman H. Nie, Nelson W. Polsby,  
Paul Ekman, and Gordon S. Black. 1967. “Public Opinion and the War in 
Vietnam.” The American Political Science Review, 61[2]: pp. 317-333. 
 
Vogel, Ryan J. 2103. “Droning On: Controversy Surrounding Drone Warfare Is Not  
Really About Drones.”  Brown Journal of World Affairs, 19[11]: pp. 111-121. 
 
Walsh, Declan. 2010. “Leading UN Official Criticises CIA’s Role in Drone Strikes.” The  
Guardian, June 3rd https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/03/us-pakistan-
drone-strikes 
 
Walsh, James Igoe. 2015. “Precision Weapons, Civilian Casualties, and Support for the  
Use of Force.” Political Psychology, 36[5]: pp. 507-523. 
 
Washington Post. 2001. “Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation.”  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html 
 
Weaver, David. 1996. “What Voters learn from Media.” Annals of the American  
Academy of Political and Social Science, 546: pp. 34-47. 
 
Weaver, David, Doris Graber, Maxwell McCombs and Chaim Eyal. 1981. Media Agenda  
Setting in a Presidential Election: Issues, Images and Interest. Greenwood: 
Westport, CT. 
 
Whittle, Richard. 2014. Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution. Henry  
Holt and Company, LLC: New York, NY. 
 
Winter, James and Chaim Eyal. 1981. “Agenda Setting for the Civil Rights Issue.” Public  
Opinion Quarterly, 45[3]: pp. 376-383. 
 
Wlezien, Christopher. 1996. “Dynamics of Representation: The Case of US Spending on  
Defence.” British Journal of Political Science, 26[1]: pp. 81-103. 
 
 
 
171 
 
Woods, Chris. 2015. “The Story of America’s Very First Drone Strike.” The Atlantic,  
May 30, 2015. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/america-first-drone-
strike-afghanistan/394463/ 
 
Woolley, Peter J. and Krista Jenkins. 2013. “Public Says It’s Illegal to Target Americans  
Abroad as Some Question CIA Drone Attacks.” 
http://www.publicmind.fdu.edu/2013/drone/ 
 
Zagzebski, Linda. 2017. “What is Knowledge?” In John Greco and Ernest Sosa (eds.),  
The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell Publishing: Malden, MA. 
 
Zaller, John. 1991. “Information, Values, and Opinion.” The American Political Science  
Review, 85[4]: pp. 1215-1237. 
 
Zaller, John R. 1992. The Nature and origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge University  
Press: New York, NY. 
 
Zauzmer, Julie. 2017. “You Have to be a Christian to Truly be ‘American’? Many People  
in the U.S. Say So.” Washington Post, February 1st. 
 
 
Zenko, Micah. 2014. “You Might Have Missed: One Year After Obama’s Drone  
Speech.” Council On Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/you-might-
have-missed-one-year-after-obamas-drone-speech 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
172 
 
APPENDIX A 
DATA COLLECTED AUGUST 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
173 
 
Public Opinion Polling: US Drone Strikes 2011—2015  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POLL SUPPORT OPPOSE NO OPINION 
Pew ST 2011  68 19 11 
Pew RP 2012 55 34 11 
Pew GA 2012 62 28 10 
Farleigh Dickson 2012 75 13 12 
WP/ABC 2012 82 11 6 
CBS 2013 71 20 9 
FOX News 2013 74 22 4 
Economist/YouGov 76 14 10 
Pew 2013 56 26 18 
Pew GA 2013 61 30 8 
NBC/WSJ 2013 64 12 24 
NYT/CBS 2013 70 20 10 
YouGov 2013 60 18 22 
NYT/CBS 2014 51 42 7 
Pew GA 2014 52 41 7 
Pew PS 2015 58 35 7 
AP-GFK 2015 61 13 26 
Gallup 2015 65 28 8 
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Opposition to the Use of Military Force 
 
 
Experimental Conditions N Mean Std. Deviation Sig. 
Which comes closer to 
describing your view? I 
support the U.S.-led efforts to 
fight terrorism, OR I oppose 
the U.S. led efforts to fight 
terrorism? 
Control 98 2.62 1.296 .053 
Civilian Casualties 101 2.97 1.228  
Do you support or oppose the 
United States deploying large 
numbers of conventional 
military ground forces to 
target terrorists in other 
countries? 
Control 98 3.33 1.441 .371 
Civilian Casualties 100 3.51 1.439  
Do you support or oppose the 
United States conducting 
strikes using Special 
Operations forces (Navy 
SEALS, Army Rangers, etc.) to 
target terrorists in 
other countries? 
Control 98 2.76 1.415 .634 
Civilian Casualties 100 2.85 1.388  
Do you support or oppose the 
United States conducting 
strikes using conventional 
manned aircraft (F-16, A-10, 
Apache Helicopters, etc.) to 
target terrorists in other 
countries? 
Control 97 3.12 1.467 .380 
Civilian Casualties 101 3.31 1.461  
Do you support or oppose the 
United States conducting 
strikes using long-range 
weapons such as Tomahawk 
cruise missiles to target 
terrorists in other countries? 
 
 
 
Control 
98 3.26 1.501 .328 
Civilian Casualties 100 3.47 1.579  
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Do you support or oppose the 
United States conducting 
strikes from pilotless aircraft, 
commonly referred to as 
drones, to target extremists 
in other countries? 
Control 
Civilian Casualties 
98 
101 
3.00 
3.47* 
1.443 
1.566 
.031 
*p<.05  ; **p<.01: ***p<.001  
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 Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
Part 1. When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following 
considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement using this scale: 
      [0] = not at all relevant (This consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right and 
wrong) 
         [1] = not very relevant 
            [2] = slightly relevant 
                [3] = somewhat relevant 
                   [4] = very relevant 
                      [5] = extremely relevant (This is one of the most important factors when I judge right 
and wrong) 
 
______1. Whether or not someone suffered emotionally  
______2. Whether or not some people were treated differently than others 
______3. Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country 
______4. Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority  
______5. Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency 
______6. Whether or not someone was good at math 
______7. Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable 
______8. Whether or not someone acted unfairly 
______9. Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group 
______10. Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society  
______11. Whether or not someone did something disgusting 
______12. Whether or not someone was cruel 
______13. Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights 
______14. Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty 
______15. Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder 
______16. Whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of 
 
Part 2. Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement: 
 [0]  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
       Strongly      Moderately         Slightly         Slightly      Moderately       Strongly 
       disagree        disagree         disagree           agree           agree         agree 
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______17. Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue. 
______18. When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that 
everyone is treated fairly. 
______19. I am proud of my country’s history. 
______20. Respect for authority is something all children need to learn. 
______21. People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed.  
______22. It is better to do good than to do bad. 
______23. One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal. 
______24. Justice is the most important requirement for a society. 
______25. People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something 
wrong.   
______26. Men and women each have different roles to play in society. 
______27. I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural. 
______28. It can never be right to kill a human being. 
______29. I think it’s morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children 
inherit nothing. 
______30. It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself. 
______31. If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer’s orders, I would obey 
anyway because that is my duty. 
______32. Chastity is an important and valuable virtue. 
 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
To score the MFQ yourself, you can copy your answers into the grid below. Then add up the 6 
numbers in each of the five columns and write each total in the box at the bottom of the column. 
The box then shows your score on each of 5 psychological “foundations” of morality. Scores run 
from 0-30 for each foundation. (Questions 6 and 22 are just used to catch people who are not 
paying attention. They don't count toward your scores). 
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Care
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Reciprocit
y
In-group/ 
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Authority / 
Respect
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The average politically moderate American’s scores are: 20.2, 20.5, 16.0, 16.5, and 12.6. Liberals 
generally score a bit higher than that on Harm/care and Fairness/reciprocity, and much lower 
than that on the other three foundations. Conservatives generally show the opposite pattern.  
The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ-30, July 2008) by Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt, 
and Brian Nosek. For more information about Moral Foundations Theory, scoring this form, or 
interpreting your scores, see: www.MoralFoundations.org. To take this scale online and see how 
you compare to others, go to www.YourMorals.org 
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 Use of Force Against Terrorists Questionnaire  
 
 
1. Which comes closer to describing your view? I support the U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism, 
OR I oppose the U.S. led efforts to fight terrorism? 
strongly support     support     somewhat support     somewhat oppose     oppose     strongly 
oppose       
 
2. Do you support or oppose the United States deploying large numbers of conventional military 
ground forces to target terrorists in other countries? 
strongly support     support     somewhat support     somewhat oppose     oppose     strongly 
oppose 
 
3. Do you support or oppose the United States conducting strikes using Special Operations 
forces (Navy SEALS, Army Rangers, etc.) to target terrorists in other countries? 
strongly support     support     somewhat support     somewhat oppose     oppose     strongly 
oppose 
 
4. Do you support or oppose the United States conducting strikes using conventional manned 
aircraft (F-16, A-10, Apache Helicopters, etc.) to target terrorists in other countries? 
strongly support     support     somewhat support     somewhat oppose     oppose     strongly 
oppose 
 
5. Do you support or oppose the United States conducting strikes using long range weapons such 
as Tomahawk cruise missiles to target terrorists in other countries? 
strongly support     support     somewhat support     somewhat oppose     oppose     strongly 
oppose 
 
6. Do you support or oppose the United States conducting strikes from pilotless aircraft, 
commonly referred to as drones, to target extremists in other countries? 
strongly support     support     somewhat support     somewhat oppose     oppose     strongly 
oppose 
 
In your opinion, are the following statements true, mostly true, somewhat true, somewhat false, 
mostly false, or false.  
7. Drones are necessary for protecting the United States from terrorist attacks. 
True        Mostly True        Somewhat True        Somewhat False        Mostly False        False 
 
8. The use of drones causes more civilian casualties than does the use of manned aircraft in 
similar situations. 
True        Mostly True        Somewhat True        Somewhat False        Mostly False        False 
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9. The use of drones contributes to the growth of terrorism by encouraging people to join terrorist 
organizations. 
True        Mostly True        Somewhat True        Somewhat False        Mostly False        False 
 
10. Using drones to kill enemy combatants saves the lives of US military personnel. 
True        Mostly True        Somewhat True        Somewhat False        Mostly False        False 
 
11. Operating a drone is like playing a video game. 
True        Mostly True        Somewhat True        Somewhat False        Mostly False        False 
 
12. Using drones for combat operations is cheaper than using manned aircraft 
True        Mostly True        Somewhat True        Somewhat False        Mostly False        False 
 
13.  When it comes to hitting their intended targets, drones are more precise than manned 
aircraft. 
True        Mostly True        Somewhat True        Somewhat False        Mostly False        False 
 
14. Using drones for combat is cowardly because the operators sit far removed from the 
battlefield and are in no personal danger. 
True        Mostly True        Somewhat True        Somewhat False        Mostly False        False 
 
15. Using drones for combat violates the laws of war. 
True        Mostly True        Somewhat True        Somewhat False        Mostly False        False 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
184 
 
 
APPENDIX E 
DATA COLLECTED SEPTEMBER 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
185 
 
Beliefs About Drone Strikes and Moral Attitudes 
 
Positive Beliefs 
 
Do 
you support or 
oppose the United 
States conducting 
strikes from pilotless 
aircraft, commonly 
referred to as 
drones, to target 
extremists in other 
countries? 
Drones are 
necessary for 
protecting the 
United States 
from terrorist 
attacks. 
Using 
drones to kill 
enemy 
combatants 
saves the 
lives of US 
military 
personnel. 
When 
it comes to 
hitting their 
intended 
targets, 
drones are 
more precise 
than manned 
aircraft. 
Do 
you support or oppose 
the United States 
conducting strikes from 
pilotless 
aircraft, commonly 
referred to as drones, 
to target extremists in 
other countries? 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.650** -.446** -.287** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 
N 497 497 496 493 
Drones are necessary 
for protecting the 
United States from 
terrorist attacks. 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.650** 1 .316** .306** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 
N 497 497 496 493 
Using 
drones to kill enemy 
combatants saves the 
lives of US military 
personnel. 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.446** .316** 1 .307** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 
N 496 496 496 492 
When 
it comes to hitting their 
intended targets, 
drones are more 
precise than manned 
aircraft. 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.287** .306** .307** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  
N 493 493 492 493 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Negative Beliefs 
 
Do 
you support or 
oppose the 
United States 
conducting 
strikes from 
pilotless 
aircraft, 
commonly 
referred to as 
drones, to 
target 
extremists in 
other 
countries? 
The 
use of 
drones 
causes more 
civilian 
casualties 
than does 
the use of 
manned 
aircraft in 
similar 
situations. 
The 
use of 
drones 
contributes 
to the growth 
of terrorism 
by 
encouraging 
people to 
join terrorist 
organizations
. 
Operatin
g 
a drone 
is like 
playing a 
video 
game. 
Using 
drones for 
combat is 
cowardly 
because 
the 
operators 
sit far 
removed 
from the 
battlefield 
and are in 
no personal 
danger. 
Do 
you support or oppose the 
United States conducting 
strikes from pilotless 
aircraft, commonly referred to 
as drones, to target extremists 
in other 
countries? 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
1 .472** .464** -.129** .362** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
.000 .000 .004 .000 
N 497 493 495 494 496 
The 
use of drones causes more 
civilian casualties than does 
the use of manned 
aircraft in similar situations. 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.472** 1 .425** -.012 .352** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 
 
.000 .792 .000 
N 493 493 492 492 493 
The 
use of drones contributes to 
the growth of terrorism by 
encouraging people to 
join terrorist organizations. 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.464** .425** 1 -.016 .327** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 
 
.727 .000 
N 495 492 495 492 494 
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Operating 
a drone is like playing a video 
game. 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
-.129** -.012 -.016 1 .109* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.004 .792 .727 
 
.015 
N 494 492 492 494 494 
 
Using 
drones for combat is cowardly 
because the operators sit far 
removed from the 
battlefield and are in no 
personal danger. 
 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
. 
362** 
 
.352** 
 
.327** 
 
.109* 
 
1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .015 
 
N 496 493 494 494 496 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
